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University of Pittsburgh, 2017 
In having a visual experience, we can come to know facts of at least two kinds: facts about 
our environment (“there is a red cup before me”), and facts about ourselves (“I am having an 
experience as of a red cup”). How do these types of knowledge—perceptual knowledge and 
perceptual self-knowledge—relate? 
For a certain type of rationalist a visual experience is identical with a form of self- 
awareness of the relevant visual experience. For you to be aware of having an experience E is 
nothing over and above you having E. Specifically, the rationalist holds that this fact is grounded 
in the way a capacity for thought expresses itself in experience as what I call experiential self- 
consciousness. 
I argue that this form of rationalism provides a novel way of approaching critical debates 
about visual experience, including the structure of perceptual representation and the grounds for 
perceptual knowledge. In experience things can self-consciously look to the subject to be 
specifically thinkable ways: the way experience makes things look to the rational subject can, in 
part, be expressed through the sort of contents experience makes it available for the subject to 
think. Moreover, in experience the objects of perceptual knowledge can be self-consciously 
present to the subject. I argue this type of perceptual presence supports a novel, non-evidentialist 
internalism about perceptual knowledge and justification. Moreover, I suggest rationalism 
illuminates an association between experience bearing representational content and a type of self-
conscious experiential unity. 
v 
I also spend significant time placing rationalism in its historical context, specifically a 
broadly Leibnizian theme running through Kant’s views on experience. I argue that placing a type 
of rationalism central to a reading of Kant allows us to (i) appreciate the way Kantian intuitions 
(Anschauungen) are conceptual and yet non-judgmental representations; (ii) see the way sensations 
(Empfindungen) figure in Kant’s thinking merely as abstractions from self- conscious states; and 
(iii) read the Paralogisms chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason as consistent with Kant holding 
a substantial conception of the thinking and perceiving subject. 
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As we perceive something, we rouse ourselves, so to speak, as though from a sleep with 
respect to the object. We grasp [it], comprehend it, we grasp ourselves with respect to it, 
[and] reflect upon ourselves. 
J. N. Tetens, 1913, p. 284 
By the term ‘thought’ I understand everything which we are aware of as happening  within 
us, insofar as we have awareness of it. Hence, thinking is to be identified here not merely 
with understanding, willing and imagining, but also with sensory awareness. 
René Descartes CSM 1. 195 
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PREFACE 
In many ways, writing a dissertation in general is a personal task—but among its parts, the 
preface is perhaps the most directly intimate. Accordingly, given the extent to which my time in 
Pittsburgh has been personally significant to me, I have always looked forward to writing this bit. 
Unfortunately, circumstances have left little time, and there is more I would like to express than I 
am able to do here. Suffice it to say that Pittsburgh is a special place, and that the themes that 
animate Pitt’s philosophy department have left an indelible imprint on my thinking. Indelible also 
will be the memory of the Cathedral of Learning—especially its 14th floor—where so often I found 
myself turning off the lights (and sometimes on again). 
While a dissertation is a personal project, it incurs debt to the work and support of others. 
I first want to thank my co-advisors John McDowell and Stephen Engstrom. The significance of 
John’s appreciation of the fundamental themes in thinking about perception is apparent throughout 
the work, but what will be less evident is what I owe to his support in completing my work. I could 
neither have started nor completed the piece without his guidance. In Steve’s sensitivity to the deep 
layers of Kant’s thinking I found the perfect sounding board for my historical exploration of Kant’s 
relation to rationalism. Our meetings, as fun as they were intellectually engaging, stand out as 
among the best moments of my academic path in Pittsburgh. I should also thank Anil Gupta 
and  Wayne  Wu. Neither  shares  my  final  conclusions, but  my  exchanges with them critically 
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 shaped my thinking (I believe I may have attended Anil’s seminar on perception four times in its 
different guises). 
Finally, while I was very significantly helped in discussion with my fellow students, I want 
to acknowledge especially the friends Pittsburgh afforded me, who nourished me intellectually and 
otherwise: Ben Schulz, Alison Springle, Tom Marré, Preston Stovall, Miloš Vuletic, and Tom 
Breed. I should single out especially Laura Tomlinson, Stephen Makin, Ori Beck, and Eric Palmer. 
Their absence from  my  career  in  Pittsburgh  is  unimaginable.  I  should also thank Joanna 
Sterling, Dora Lukacevic and Aaron Rosen, as well as my mother Tamar, my sister Esther, and my 
brother Joel, for supporting me throughout my  efforts. 
I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my father, Dirk de Bruijn (ל״ז): his memory is 
a blessing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A RATIONALIST THEME 
There are many traditional epistemological questions to which some version of rationalism 
has seemed a plausible approach. For example, many philosophers hold that when it comes to our 
justification for believing true mathematical or ethical propositions, the relevant entitlements 
derive from our character peculiar to us as rational subjects. Plausibly aspects distinctive of our 
capacity for thought provide a priori support for the relevant beliefs. For some philosophers, this 
sort of rationalist orientation extends beyond our beliefs in abstract mathematical truths or ethical 
principles, and can ground more concrete beliefs as well, e.g., the non-obtaining of certain 
skeptical scenarios. 
But rationalism has not seemed nearly as plausible as an approach to certain other 
epistemological questions: those arising from the character of our sensory awareness. The reason 
is straightforward. In the above cases, rationalism is understood as an orientation on a priori 
knowledge and justification specifically. The character of a capacity for thought is held to shed 
light on our epistemic standing vis-à-vis certain propositions in abstraction from sense affection 
and empirical contingencies. By contrast, knowledge that derives from sense perception is 
paradigmatically a posteriori. It can seem of limited promise to approach such a posteriori 
knowledge from the rationalist perspective of a capacity for thought as such. This point is not 
merely epistemological, but also tracks certain apparently evident facts about the character of our 
conscious  mind.  In  its  phenomenal  richness,  sensory  consciousness  is  not  thought-like, and 
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appears to derive from a distinctly sensible capacity. Plausibly then, understanding perceptual 
knowledge requires leaving behind traditional rationalist interests in our character as subjects of 
thought, and focusing instead on our nature as sensible beings. 
But the aim of this dissertation is to explore a version of rationalism as providing a 
compelling approach to the character of sensory awareness, and the way it grounds perceptual 
knowledge. Perceptual knowledge is, of course, knowledge, and accordingly it is not implausible 
to wonder whether there is a more general way in which reflecting on our capacity for thought can 
illuminate our entitlement to such knowledge, i.e., a way of thinking about rationalism that does 
not restrict its purview to our supposed entitlement to a priori truths. 
One way to express this rationalist approach to sensory awareness is by considering the 
capacity for thought as encompassing an ability to have “intuitions” of a sort. For present purposes, 
intuitions are distinctly rational perceptual confrontations with objects: they are at once states of 
sensory consciousness, and states fundamentally shaped by the capacity for thought.1 Accordingly, 
if for humans perception involves “intuitions,” then pace the above sketch, there is after all not a 
sharp break in our mental economy between thoughtful states and the  rich, sensuous structure of 
our conscious experiences. Experiential consciousness itself can reflect the subject’s possession of 
a rational nature. In this sense, my interest is in how to understand “intuitions,” the way they spell 
out an approach to the character of sensory awareness, and the way they ground perceptual 
knowledge. 
What, then, are “intuitions” in the relevant sense? The central rationalist thesis running as 
a theme through  this  dissertation  is  that intuitions  are experiences  associated  with a distinctly 
1 That is, I consider empirical intuitions, and not what Kant calls “pure intuitions.” Nor do I focus on the idea of 
purely intellectual intuition, as in the grasping of abstract truths (e.g., Chudnoff 2013. Chudnoff’s work has recently 
drawn attention to the possibility of an “intuitive” perceptual epistemology, but I do not subscribe to the particulars 
of Chudnoff’s program. See discussion in Chapter 5 below.) 
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rational form of self-awareness. Suppose you are having a conscious perceptual experience of a 
red cup before you. It is natural to think that in virtue of having this experience you can come to 
know facts of at least two kinds: facts about the cup before you (“there is a red cup before me”), 
and facts about yourself (“I am having an experience as of a red cup before me”). How do these 
types of knowledge—perceptual knowledge and perceptual self-knowledge—relate? 
A natural answer might have seemed to be: not significantly. Of course perceptual self- 
knowledge is knowledge of a perceptual experience. But otherwise perceptual knowledge and 
perceptual self-knowledge seem fundamentally different in kind. Most obviously, these types of 
knowledge can seem to concern different stretches of reality (the “outer” and the “inner,” 
respectively). More fundamentally, perceptual knowledge and self-knowledge can also seem 
distinct and indeed opposed “modes” of knowing: the types of knowledge in question derive from 
fundamentally different epistemic sources. Perceptual knowledge is sense-mediated: for a subject 
S to have perceptual knowledge of some object o, S needs (at a minimum) to stand in an appropriate 
sensory relation to o. By contrast, many philosophers deny that self-knowledge is (in general) 
sense-mediated, and moreover, deny that it can be understood on the model of sense- mediated 
knowledge. Perceptual knowledge and perceptual self-knowledge can  accordingly seem quite 
radically distinct. 
However, for the type of rationalist in whom I am interested, the idea of rationality— the 
character of a capacity for thought—forges a much more intimate connection. For the rationalist, 
thought joins empirical (e.g., perceptual) knowledge and self-knowledge at the hip: the capacity is 
at once a capacity for representations of the external world, and the ground of a sui generis 
epistemology of itself. This idea is of course famously captured in Kant’s view that the capacity 
for thought, Kant’s faculty of understanding, is essentially “apperceptive,” its acts attended by 
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Kant’s expression of self-awareness in thought, the “I think.” In the course of this dissertation I 
will have reason to consider various aspects of the “I think,” including its relation to the “I” as a 
distinct type of subject, and its relation to the contents it thinks: viz. the sort of contents distinctive 
of thought, i.e., contents properly characterized as conceptual. 
But presently the most significant aspect of the rationalist view of self-awareness is that it 
posits a form of first-order self-consciousness. Consider the question: how do you know what you 
are presently thinking? For the rationalist, it is distinctive of a capacity for thought that a type of 
self-awareness is internal to its acts themselves. For you to be aware of thinking a  thought T is 
nothing over and above you thinking T. It is this idea that has a ready application to  a view of 
sensory consciousness. Ask: How do you know the character of your present visual experience? 
The rationalist gives the same sort of answer. For you to be aware of having an experience E is 
nothing over and above you having E. Specifically, the rationalist holds that this fact is grounded 
in the way a capacity for thought expresses itself in experience as a form of experiential self-
consciousness.2 Accordingly, 
2 The conception of self-awareness as the expression of a capacity for thought extending to sensory, experiential 
states is of course a prominent theme in early modern rationalists like Descartes. As the epigraph above has it (CSM 
1. 195)
By the term ‘thought’ I understand everything which we are aware of as happening within us, insofar 
as we have awareness of it. Hence, thinking is to be identified here not merely with understanding, 
willing and imagining, but also with sensory awareness. 
But an idea broadly along these lines is not unique to early modern rationalists, and is shared by some empiricists. 
So Locke writes (Locke 1975 II. Xxvii.9) 
When we hear, smell, taste, feel, mediate, or will anything, we know that we do so. Thus it is always 
as to our present Sensations and Perceptions. 
Much like Descartes, Locke associates this ubiquitous self-knowledge with thought—specifically what 
Locke calls a “consciousness [that] is inseparable from thinking, and […] seems to me essential to it.” (ibid.). 
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Experiential Self-consciousness: for rational subjects, conscious perceptual experience is 
identical with a form of self-awareness of the relevant experience. As such, just in having 
E, the rational subject is in a position not merely to gain knowledge of her environment, 
but also of herself, namely her having E. 
For purposes of this dissertation, intuitions are rational experiential states in this specific sense: 
states in which the subject is self-aware of her experiencing. The suggestion is that this conception 
of an intuition can play a critical role in our understanding of the nature of experiential 
consciousness, and its epistemic potential. Indeed, the upshot of the study of intuitions is that a 
rationalist approach to our capacity for thinking as such sheds light not merely on the foundations 
of our priori or “pure” knowledge (to the extent it does that), but also reveals the very same capacity 
as intimately associated with the grounds of more commonplace a posteriori knowledge: 
specifically such grounds as are located in perceptual awareness. 
OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
In this dissertation I develop a rationalist line as an approach to experience in two 
contexts. 
(1) The first context is Kant’s view of intuitions and their relation to the rational subject. 
Classically, the debate over Kantian intuitions concerns the question whether intuitions are 
conceptual, i.e., broadly intellectual states, or whether for Kant intuitions are representations of a 
non-conceptual and more primitively sensory variety. In Colin McLear’s depiction of the choice 
(McLear 2015, p. 81). 
Either sensibility, independently of any synthesis [by the understanding], furnishes the mind with 
objective representations (intuitions), or such objective representations depend, at least in part, on 
mental acts of synthesis. 
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My argument in this area is for a distinct type of conceptualist answer to McLear’s question, which 
centers on what I call Monism: the idea that for Kant the understanding is properly the faculty 
responsible for all cognitively significant representations, and is accordingly required to provide 
intuitions with their fundamental form or nature as presentations of objects. 
In Chapter 1 I begin by considering the relation between intuitions and Kant’s view of the 
synthetic activity of the imagination. While conceptualists understand imaginative synthesis as 
implicating the understanding in intuition, non-conceptualists argue either that imaginative 
synthesis is exercised by sensibility, or that it is not implicated in intuition. I argue that both non- 
conceptualist views are inconsistent with Kant’s hylomorphic account of intuitions. More 
specifically, I argue that non-conceptualists’ reliance on textual evidence is compromised due to 
unwarranted associations between conceptualism and a classification proper to judgment. 
In Chapter 2 I continue to explore Kantian conceptualism by considering the way what 
Kant calls “sensations” (Empfindungen) constitute the material of intuition. This provides a 
broader perspective on Kant’s view of the faculty of sensibility. For what I call Dualist readers, 
understanding and sensibility are independent representational faculties: sensibility and 
understanding both provide representations, even if the type of sensory representations Kant 
associates with sensibility stand in need of structuring or ordering by the understanding. By 
contrast, I argue for a type of Monism by building on aspects of Kant’s Leibnizian heritage: only 
the understanding is genuinely a faculty for representations, and accordingly the representations 
Kant attributes to sensibility have existence merely as the passive aspect of entities informed by 
the understanding. 
In Chapter 3 I leave the immediate context of intuitions to turn to their subject: Kant’s 
thinking and perceiving “I.” On so-called “Achilles” arguments popular with Kant’s rationalist 
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predecessors like Wolff, Baumgarten, and Mendelssohn, the idea of a type of conscious unity 
proper to the subject is reason to consider the subject a substance. By broad consensus, in the 
Paralogisms section of the Critique Kant rejects such arguments. But I argue the consensus is 
wrong. Kant’s target in the Paralogisms is limited to specifically empirical versions of the Achilles, 
specifically the Wolffian idea that self-awareness is a form of empirical affection. It follows that 
the unity and substantiality of the subject cannot be objects of cognition. But I argue this does not 
conflict with attributing to Kant himself a substantial view of the self, as well as a version of the 
Achilles. 
(2) The second context in which I develop a rationalist approach to experience is the 
character of sense perception as it figures in several influential debates in the contemporary 
philosophy of perception, including how experience makes things look to the subject, the character 
of experiential intentionality, and how to understand perceptual grounds for knowledge. 
In Chapter 4 I consider some prominent views about the character of self-awareness in 
experience. Specifically, I focus on recently popular “self-representational” approaches to 
consciousness, on which the conscious character of states is grounded in the way such states 
represent themselves. I press two points. First, the self-consciousness the subject enjoys in 
experience is not to be characterized as a form of self-representation: the way the subject is self- 
aware of her conscious experiential states is a result of her rational nature, but not of an intentional 
relation to herself or the state itself. Second, I suggest the subject’s self-awareness in experience 
can serve in defense of a certain strategy for arguing for perceptual content. Some philosophers 
have argued against associating content with perceptual looks on the grounds that we  cannot 
isolate  a  suitable  sense  of  looks   proper  to  experience.  I   suggest   that  the  way experience
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is self-consciously enjoyed by its subject provides one avenue for doing just that. As self-
consciously enjoyed by the subject, experience specifies a specifically rational perspective in 
experience, from which things can look as they are to be thought, i.e., as specified by certain 
contents. 
In Chapter 5 I turn to perceptual epistemology by suggesting that a view of experiential 
self-awareness yields new avenues for conceiving the shape of an internalism about perceptual 
justification. For epistemological disjunctivists about experience, the epistemic contribution of 
experience is such that (1) experience guarantees the knowledgeable character of perceptual 
beliefs; and (2) experience’s epistemic contribution is “reflectively accessible.” I argue that 
experiential self-awareness sheds novel light on the relation between these two claims. 
Specifically, rather than understanding the disjunctivist as conceiving of the epistemic contribution 
of experience as residing in a strong type of perceptual evidence, we can understand the 
disjunctivist view of experience as grounded in the way a subject’s self-consciousness can include 
the presence to the subject of the objects of knowledge. I suggest this sheds light on disjunctivism 
as an anti-skeptical stance, and more generally grounds the disjunctivist approach to perceptual 
justification in a sui generis conception of perception as manifesting the subject’s rational 
orientation on her environment. 
Chapter 6, finally, is more exploratory. I sketch a non-standard approach to the relation 
between representational contents and the activity of the intellect. On the view I develop, thought 
involves its contents with a certain unity: contents of the relevant sort are self-consciously  unified 
in the mind of a thinker. Specifically, I argue that experiential intentionality can be associated with 
the presence of just this sort of self-conscious unity in experience. A rational subject enjoys her 
experience  in  a  self-consciously  unified  way: she comprehends herself as engaging in a  single
9 
experiential act. I suggest this provides a non-standard way of rendering a view of experiential 
content, as well as understanding the role of content in explaining perceptual rationality. Where 
standardly experiential contents are associated with judgment-like structures on which some 
object o is represented as some way F, my approach yields a type of representational 
intentionality that captures the subject’s perceptual self-comprehension of being confronted with 
the objects of her knowledge. The idea that experience bears content, I suggest, depends on the 
role of the capacity for thought, but does not depend on the perceptual exercise of specifically 
empirical concepts like F. 
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1.0 UNDERSTANDING: THE FORM OF INTUITION 
The debate between conceptualist and non-conceptualist readings of Kant’s account of 
intuitions centers on the nature of the power Kant calls the “productive imagination.”3 In particular, 
philosophers have advocated three views on the question how the imaginative power relates to 
intuitions. On the one hand, conceptualists have argued that the productive imagination is operative 
in intuitions, and moreover, that the productive imagination is a power belonging to the faculty of 
understanding, which Kant characterizes as the faculty of concepts (A51/B75).4 On the other hand, 
non-conceptualists have either maintained that the productive imagination is operative in intuitions 
but belongs not to the understanding but to sensibility, or held that the productive imagination is 
not operative in intuitions, but rather in furnishing further stages of cognition out of materials 
intuition provides.5 
In this chapter I will defend conceptualism as an interpretation of Kant’s use of the 
imagination. More specifically, I will argue that it is important to  distinguish  two  conceptualist 
3 For non-conceptualist readings, see Hanna 2005, 2008, 2011; Allais 2009; Tolley 2013; McLear 2015; Schulting 
and Onof 2015. For conceptualist readings, see Ginsborg 2006, 2008; Wenzel 2005; Griffith 2010; Van Mazijk 
2014a, 2014b; Gomes 2014, 2017; McDowell 2009b; Engstrom 2006; Connolly 2013. Kant contrasts the 
“productive imagination” with the “reproductive imagination,” which he characterizes as a merely psychological 
process (CJ, 91n). Since it is only the productive imagination that is presently relevant, generic uses of “the 
imagination” in this paper will refer to the productive imagination. 
4 E.g., Ginsborg 2008, McDowell 2009b, Engstrom 2006. 
5 The former Hanna 2005, 2008, 2011; Allais 2009; the latter Tolley 2013. There is also a third option, which is to 
see the imagination as a separate power, standing apart both from sensibility and understanding. However, there 
seem both textual and philosophical problems with this suggestion (Van Mazijk 2014a, Onof and Schulting 2015). 
More importantly for our present purposes, the conception of the imagination as a third power has not played a 
significant role in the dispute over conceptualism in Kant’s philosophy, therefore I will not discuss this thought 
presently. 
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theses: first the claim that the imagination implicates the subject’s capacity for rational thought, in 
the form of the faculty of understanding, in perception; second the claim that via the imagination, 
the faculty of understanding implicates “concepts” in perception. These two theses are evidently 
closely linked: the involvement of concepts presumably entails the involvement of capacities for 
rational thought, and plausibly the perceptual exercise of capacities for thought takes conceptual 
form. Nevertheless, my suggestion in this chapter is that the complex relationship Kant envisages 
between the faculty of understanding and concepts merits distinguishing the two theses for the 
purpose of understanding Kant’s account of the imagination.6 In particular, I will claim that while 
Kant’s account of the productive imagination provides compelling grounds for the first thesis, 
unwarranted assumptions about the second  thesis have fueled non-conceptualist resistance. 
I first briefly provide an understanding of conceptualism (§1), which subsequently  I apply 
to Kant’s view, introducing the question about the nature of the productive imagination (§2). Then 
I elucidate the distinction between the two main non-conceptualist theses (§3), after which I 
discuss initial textual appearances of non-conceptualism (§4). I suggest they are not as decisive as 
they seem (§5). On the contrary, Kant’s invocation of hylomorphic themes counts heavily against 
the supposition that Kant would endorse either version of non-conceptualism (§6). I discuss the 
conceptualist implications that may be thought to follow from Kant’s hylomorphic conception of 
intuitions (§7), and I show how carefully distinguishing between various conceptualist claims 
dismantles the non-conceptualist case (§8). Finally, I conclude  (§9).7
6 For work that draws attention to some of these same difficulties, see Williams 2012, McLear 2014. 
7 I should note two aspects of Kant’s philosophy with which this paper will be concerned only in passing. First, there 
is Kant’s generic use of the term ‘representation.’ In this paper, I will not go into what might bind together Kant’s 
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1.1 CONCEPTUALISM 
Conceptualism is the claim that perception is constitutively dependent, in some specified 
way, on the involvement of concepts. In particular, conceptualism has been discussed either as the 
thesis that for a subject to be in certain perceptual states she must possess certain conceptual 
capacities (“state conceptualism”), or as the thesis that the constituents of perceptual contents are 
of a conceptual nature, for example by being constituents of Fregean Thoughts (“content 
conceptualism”).8 Conceptualism, further, is a thesis about the “intentional” or “world-directed” 
element of perception.9 As such, the conceptualist claim is stronger than perception involving at 
least some conceptual element(s). As A.D. Smith writes, 
Perception, for us, is typically “suffused with concepts” as it is often said. […] it may be that every 
adult human perception is so suffused. Nor shall it be denied that possession of a concept, or of even 
a recognitional ability, may affect the way something perceptually appears to you. […] even if 
[perceptual, concept-driven effects] are widespread and dramatic, such a fact would have no bearing 
on the issue of conceptualism. 10 
use of the language of representation in his account of intuitions. In particular, we should not assume that Kant’s use 
of “representation” conforms to contemporary usage, involving states that set accuracy conditions. Accordingly, we 
should not take Kant’s use of ‘representation’ as prejudicing his position in the contemporary debate between 
representational versus anti-representational views of perception. For all we know, Kant’s theory of intuitions is best 
rendered as coming down on the anti-representational side of this debate (Allais 2009). Second, there is the matter of 
Kant’s idealism, and his use of ‘appearances’ to describe the objects of perception. This will not be a topic in this 
paper. 
8 For a helpful discussion of the distinction between state and content conceptualism, see Bengson, Grube, Korman 
2011, and Speaks 2005. 
9 Note, again (fn. 4)), that this point is not intended to prejudge the debate between relational and representational 
views (as it might be thought to if “intentionality” is understood in representational terms). 
10 Smith 2002, p. 95. Compare also Allais 2009, p. 386: “while, according to [the relevant non-conceptualist] view, 
what perceptual states a subject might be in does not depend on what concepts she possesses, this need not mean 
denying that our perceptual states are brought under concepts, and that experience, for us, typically is ‘an actualization 
of conceptual capacities in sensory consciousness itself’” (McDowell 1998, pp. 365-68, 403-431). 
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On the other hand, conceptualism is a weaker thesis than perception involving exclusively 
conceptual elements. What is at issue is whether or not perception is a world-directed or world- 
revealing state due to its drawing on conceptual capacities or involving conceptual contents. As 
Smith continues the above passage, expressing a non-conceptualist view: 
when I say that concepts are irrelevant to perception, what I mean is that they are irrelevant to  what 
it is that makes any sensory state a perception at all: they are irrelevant to the intentionality of 
perception, to its basic world-directedness.11
Finally, for purposes of this chapter, it is an implication of conceptualism that, since on 
Kant’s account concepts and conceptual capacities are constitutively dependent on the rational 
faculty of understanding, the sort of perception humans enjoy is restricted to us qua rational beings. 
By contrast, non-conceptualists hold that whereas our capacities for thought are unique to us qua 
rational beings, our perceptual capacities are generic between rational and non-rational beings.12 
Conceptualism, in this way, is a claim about the relation between thought and perception. 
1.2 TWO STEMS OF COGNITION 
The conceptualism controversy about Kant’s view centers on the nature of a series of 
important distinctions Kant makes, and in particular, how to align these distinctions with Kant’s 
11 Ibid. Compare Bermudez 2003, p.1: “The central idea behind the theory of non-conceptual mental content is that 
some mental states can represent the world even though the bearer of those states does not possess the concepts 
required to specify their content.” This way of putting the thesis bears some complexity that I will bring out in §7. 
12 To differentiate between non-conceptualism and conceptualism in this way is not merely straightforward, since in 
principle it should seem consistent to stipulate that non-conceptual capacities and/or contents are proprietary to rational 
beings, and conversely there have in fact been philosophers who have attributed conceptually contentful states to non-
rational creatures. (For discussion see Speaks 2005). But in the Kantian context at issue in this paper  we can equate 
the conceptualism/non-conceptualism discussion with the question whether distinctively rational capacities are 
implicated in perception, since the debate centers on the faculty of understanding, which is precisely associated with 
the specifically human, rational capacity to judge, while conversely, sensibility is the sort of ability  to be affected by 
the external world that human beings and other animals share in common. 
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fundamental divide between sensibility and understanding. The controversy is: for those poles of 
Kant’s various distinctions that are associated with Kant’s account of intuitions, do they line up 
with sensibility alone (non-conceptualism), or must some be associated with the understanding 
(conceptualism)? 
Initial impressions seem favorable for non-conceptualism. Kant introduces the 
sensibility/understanding distinction (A15/B29) as setting apart our capacities to perceive (or 
“get”) objects from our capacities to think about them. Further, Kant seems to line up the 
sensibility-understanding divide with the distinction between receptivity and spontaneity 
(A51/B75), suggesting that as the faculty for “getting” objects, sensibility is a “receptive” capacity, 
while the understanding is “spontaneous,” being the faculty for actively producing representations 
of objects. Finally, these two distinctions seem further complemented by Kant’s distinction 
between intuition and concept, which Kant introduces as a distinction between representations that 
are immediate and singular and representations that are general and mediated, and which Kant 
subsequently seems to allocate to sensibility and understanding respectively (B75/A51). Thus 
sensibility and understanding, it seems, are divided according to their operations—“getting” 
objects versus thinking about them—according to the nature of the capacities they are—receptive 
versus spontaneous——and according to the kinds of representations they employ—intuitions 
versus concepts. 
But the role of the imagination appears to confound simple classification.13 
Kant distinguishes intuitions from mere sensations. Sensations, for Kant, are mere alterations of a 
13 As Hannah Ginsborg (Ginsborg 2008, p. 66) writes, 
[The] apparently clear-cut distinction [between sensibility and understanding] is quickly 
complicated by Kant’s introduction of the notion of synthesis, an act of combining or unifying the 
sensory manifold which he ascribes to the power of imagination. For imagination seems to have 
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subject’s subjective state insofar as the subject is externally affected (A19-20/B34). The upshot  of 
this characterization is that sensations do not have the object-presenting character of intuitions.14 
So what sets intuition apart from sensation? It is the “unity” characterizing intuitions as opposed 
to the mere “manifold” of sensation.15 This is where Kant appears to envisage a role for the power 
of imagination.16 For the mind to obtain intuitions, the “manifold” of sensation has to be 
“synthesized” by the productive imagination. It is from this “synthesis” that conceptualist readers 
of Kant take their cue. Imaginative synthesis has a spontaneous character. But Kant seems to locate 
passivity with sensibility and spontaneity with the understanding. Accordingly, conceptualists 
have suggested, imagination must belong to the understanding, and consequently the 
understanding is implicated in intuition.17 
affinities both with sensibility and with understanding, suggesting that their functions, of intuition 
and thought respectively, cannot after all be so neatly separated. 
14 That sensations for Kant are non-intentional has enjoyed broad agreement (George 1981, Westphal 2004, Aquila 
1983, Kitcher 1980), but it has not been free from dispute (Falkenstein 1990, 1995), for discussion see Kapoor, 
2014. In this paper, nothing should turn on this issue, insofar as all parties to the debate agree that object-perception 
should be located at the level of intuitions rather than sensations. 
15 For mental states x and y, Kant typically describes x as a “manifold” if, on the one hand, x somehow provides the 
material from which y can be obtained, but, on the other hand, qua being a manifold x is still too disorganized, 
disparately structured or disconnected to amount to y. We should not here make the mistake of assuming that the 
mind “produces” intuitions out of the manifold material. As we will see below, what is at issue, at least in the first 
instance, is “determination” of the manifold. 
16 Some non-conceptualists clearly do not hold that imagination is required to transition from the manifold of 
sensation to intuition. I discuss this in section 3 below. 
17 There are also conceptualists who deny that the imagination is involved in intuitions, and who instead attempt to 
vindicate conceptualism by arguing that for Kant, perceptually relevant states arise only in the form of 
conceptualized states (e.g., Erfahrung and Wahrnehmung) downstream from intuition. This seems, e.g., to be the 
preferred approach of Ginsborg 2006, 2008. These forms of conceptualism will not be at issue in this paper. 
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1.3 THE NON-CONCEPTUALIST THESES 
The claim that the imagination belongs to the faculty of sensibility has been most 
emphatically defended by Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais.18 The thought is that a type  of synthesis 
not involving the understanding is required for perceptual awareness, as opposed to the synthesis 
that is required for conceptual thought. As Allais has put the point, “synthesizing is not the same 
as conceptualizing.”19 In particular, it is held that the structures of space and time that Kant 
discusses in the Aesthetic allow for an independent synthesis on the part of sensibility that 
facilitates the intuitional presentation of objects, functioning without involvement of the 
understanding and the concepts associated with it. As Hanna has expressed the thought: “our 
capacities for spatial and temporal representation constitutively explain non-conceptual content: 
that is, non-conceptual content is nothing but cognitive content that is essentially structured by our 
a priori representations of phenomenal space and time. [….] the representational content of non-
conceptual cognition is to be so explained.”20 It follows that sensibility cannot be entirely passive, 
but must be in part spontaneous. As Hanna grants: 
the sensibility [is] only relatively passive, but not entirely passive [....] by virtue of its expressing a 
mental power for spontaneous synthesis, or mental processing. This mental power is the ‘power of 
imagination’.21
18 Allais and Hanna differ significantly in the non-conceptualism they develop. Allais’ view appears to bear 
similarities to contemporary relational views of perception, on which perceptual states do not involve content in the 
representational sense of the word but constitute direct relations to objects, while Hanna explicitly develops a theory 
of non-conceptual representational content. However, both are united in attributing imaginative synthesis to the 
faculty of sensibility, and therefore represent a common position as far as the conceptualism/non-conceptualism 
debate is concerned. As I note below (fn. 55) it is ultimately not clear that conceptualism is inconsistent with the 
motivations for either of Allais’ and Hanna’s preferred views. 
19 Allais 2009, p. 396. 
20 Hanna 2005, p. 278 (italics original). Compare also Allais 2009, p. 402, who holds that sensibility independently 
provides subjects with “an egocentric, oriented, three-dimensional frame of reference which enables us to locate 
particulars.” 21 Hanna 2005, p. 249. 
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It also follows for these non-conceptualists that we can separate the conceptual cognition 
rational animals have of their environment from the less demanding perceptual awareness  rational 
animals share in common with other creatures: “the unity of consciousness in this [conceptual] 
sense is a relatively sophisticated and fragile achievement of rational animals, but unnecessary for 
[perceptual] conscious animal cognition in general, whether the animal is  rational or non-rational, 
and whether the animal is human or non-human.”22 
The claim that imaginative synthesis is not implicated in perception has been forcefully 
argued by Clinton Tolley. On Tolley’s view, to include synthesis in intuitions leads inexorably to 
conceptualism: “at several points Kant […] asserts that the spontaneity of imagination is ‘one  and 
the same with’ that of understanding (cf. B162n), which would seem to block the escape route 
[Hanna and Allais suggest].”23 Tolley thinks that it is a mistake to suppose that intuition requires 
any synthesis from the power of imagination. Tolley suggests that for Kant intuitions have a unity 
that is “absolute” and that “belongs to [intuition] per se”: 
That some unity pertains to an intuition per se follows from Kant’s claim that a single intuition ‘as 
contained in one moment’ has ‘an absolute unity’ (A99) [Tolley’s emphasis]. What is more,  Kant’s 
use of ‘absolute’ here points to the fact that this unity is one that has no further ground whatsoever, 
let alone one in any act of synthesis.24
For Tolley, the productive imagination does not play a role in intuition, but rather in synthesizing 
intuitions into what, as Tolley emphasizes, Kant himself calls “perception” or “experience” 
(B160).  On  Tolley’s  gloss, this  intuition-experience distinction amounts  to “a clear distinction 
22 Hanna 2005, p. 253. 
23 Tolley 2013, fn. 32. While I agree with Tolley’s conclusion, I doubt that B162n settles the failure of the view that 
imaginative synthesis belongs to sensibility, because while B162n suggests both imagination and understanding 
share their spontaneous character, the additional premise is needed that only the understanding, as opposed to 
sensibility, is spontaneous. I provide this premise in §5 below. 
24 Tolley 2013, p. 123. Tolley does allow that “absolute” intuitional unity results not from synthesis but from what 
Kant calls “synopsis of the manifold a priori through sense (A94)” (Tolley 2013, fn. 33. Italics mine). The difference 
between “synthesis” and “synopsis” as regards spontaneity is independently interesting, but it will not affect the 
point I am making below: that intuitional unity requires a form that can be provided only by synthesis. 
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between (a) an intuition’s being a unity, and containing a manifold, and (b) that intuition’s being 
represented as a unity, or as containing a manifold.”25 Or again, 
What [Kant] is concerned with [in “experience” as opposed to intuition] are the conditions under 
which intuitions must stand ‘in order to become an object for me’ (B138) […] This, however, is a 
concern distinct from the conditions that intuitions must meet in order to themselves already 
represent or relate to an object.26
Tolley further aligns the distinction between the “absolute” unity of intuitions and the 
“synthetic” unity of experience with Kant’s distinction between intuition and concept, i.e., the 
distinction between representations that put the subject into immediate relations (“Beziehungen”) 
to objects, and representations that provide merely mediate contact. In this way, Tolley suggests 
that intuitions require no synthesis in order to count as placing the mind in immediate relations to 
objects, and synthesis is only subsequently required to produce mediate awareness of the subject 
as standing in relations to objects. For Tolley, this distinction between two types of awareness- 
relations to objects can be glossed as a divide between two types of content. Accordingly, since 
perception for Kant is characterized by intuitional content, this means that conceptual content must 
be excluded. After all, it would seem implausible that perception simultaneously bears mediate 
and immediate relations to its objects. 
It is worth observing here that despite their different conceptions of the imagination, 
proponents of both non-conceptualist theses largely share a common understanding of the 
conceptualist thesis about Kant’s view. This point is illustrated by Tolley’s opposition to the 
thought that intuitions represent items “as a unity.” Tolley here emphasizes the same idea Allais 
expresses by distinguishing synthesizing from “conceptualizing.” On both readings, the 
conceptualist view is understood as the claim that  imaginative  synthesis  classifies  items  under 
25 Tolley 2013, p. 122. Compare also Tolley’s invocation of (A120) “intuitions are the material the imagination 
synthesizes to produce a certain awareness of ourselves as standing in a determinate relation to an object.” 
26 Tolley 2013, p. 123. 
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concepts. This point is further reflected in the common non-conceptualist view of “determinacy” 
in Kant, which non-conceptualists associate with conceptual classification. As Hanna writes, 
We learn in the first Critique that empirical intuitions must be combined with concepts in the context 
of judgments in order to be ‘determined’ and thus represent determinate objects of experience […]. 
But empirical intuitions are, as such, very strongly non-conceptual […]. The object of such a 
representation is not a determinate object of experience, but instead an undetermined or at best 
partially-determined object of the senses, that is, an appearance.27
Thus, on the common non-conceptualist picture, intuitions are themselves indeterminate relations 
to objects, which subsequently gain determination through conceptualization to produce states of 
awareness of the self as standing in relations to objections. Conversely, the disagreement merely 
concerns the role of the imagination: whether the synthesis of the imagination is implicated in 
intuitions but is not determinative (Hanna), or whether imaginative synthesis is coeval with 
conceptual synthesis, and therefore determinative (Tolley). In the view I will develop in this 
chapter and throughout this dissertation, the view non-conceptualists share in common commits 
the critical error of associating the operations of the understanding exclusively with the sort of 
determinate cognitions Kant associates with “concepts” (B105). This misses the alternative 
possibility that the understanding as a capacity for thought plays a more systemic, non-discursive 
role in intuition, viz. a role specified by the way the operations of the imagination imbue experience 
with a  “synthetic unity.” 
1.4 THE TEXTUAL CASE FOR NON-CONCEPTUALISM 
There are at least four types of passages in Kant’s text that non-conceptualists frequently 
cite to support their view. First, Kant makes a distinction between kennen—a form of perceptual 
27 Hanna 2005, p. 273. 
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cognition that acquaints the subject with items—and erkennen—a form of cognition that 
constitutes knowledge of items through concepts. Further, Kant suggests that kennen is generic to 
rational and non-rational animals, while only erkennen is exclusive to thinking beings. As Kant 
writes: “Animals are acquainted with (kennen) objects too, but they do not cognize (erkennen) 
them.” (JL, VIII, AA 9: 65, p. 569). Kant further appears to illustrate the kennen-erkennen 
distinction through the example of cognition in a savage (“Wilder,” JL, Introd, V. AA 9: 33, p. 
544-545): 
If a savage <Wilder> sees a house from a distance, for example, with whose use he is not acquainted, 
he admittedly has before him in his representation the very same object as someone else who is 
acquainted with it determinately as a dwelling established for humans. But as to form, this cognition 
of one and the same object is different in the two. With one it is mere intuition, with the other it is 
intuition and concept at the same time. 
For its brevity, this is a remarkably rich passage, some little observed aspects of which I 
will return to in §7 below. But on the non-conceptualist understanding, the upshot of the passage 
is reasonably straightforward. Kant’s Wilder does not have the concept of a house, but nonetheless 
he “has before him in his representation the very same object” as more cultured beings do. 
Moreover, Kant appears to endorse the above-described non-conceptualist reading of the 
conceptualist view. Kant ascribes to the Wilder “mere intuition” while the cultured person enjoys 
“intuition and concept” at the same time, suggesting that the role of concepts in  perception is 
classificatory. Finally, Kant appears to characterize the added cognitive value of the conceptual 
involvement in perception in terms of allowing “determinate [acquaintance] with [the house] as a 
dwelling.” Accordingly, it seems Kant in general conforms to the non-conceptualist view of 
distinguishing conceptual capacities from capacities for intuition simpliciter. 
The second source of support for non-conceptualism is a passage frequently cited by 
conceptualists, but which on reflection seems compellingly understood as supporting non- 
conceptualism (A51/B75): 
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Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as 
necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make 
our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts. 
Conceptualists have read the above passage as explicitly asserting that intuitions must involve 
concepts, on pain of leaving intuitions “blind” or “unintelligible.” But as non-conceptualists 
understand the passage, Kant’s thesis is not that concepts must be involved in intuition itself. 
Rather, non-conceptualists point out that in the context in which the passage occurs, Kant is giving 
an account not of intuition simpliciter, but of full-blown cognition. As Kant directly continues on 
the dictum (A52/B76): 
These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit 
nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. But that is no 
reason for confounding the contribution of either with that of the other; rather is it a strong reason 
for carefully separating and distinguishing the one from the other. 
On this interpretation, Kant’s thought is that intuitions require concepts to constitute 
cognition or knowledge, but not qua being intuitional states. Indeed Kant seems emphatic that  we 
should not take the necessary cooperation of understanding and sensibility in empirical knowledge 
as reason to think of their functions as anything but wholly distinct. Non- conceptualists point out 
that Kant says a lack of concepts renders intuitions “blind,” not that it renders them “nonexistent” 
or “deficient”.28 
The third source of support for non-conceptualism stems from Kant’s famous discussion 
of “incongruent counterparts” (UG, p. 370): objects that are identical in their qualities,  but  have 
28 As De Sa Pereira 2013, p. 234 writes: 
Kant’s dictum has been misconstrued as reflecting the conceptualist assumption that, without 
conceptual capacities, sensible intuition refers to or represents nothing. Nonetheless, what Kant 
had in mind with this famous dictum was something quite different. Without general concepts, 
sensible intuitions are blind not in sense [sic] of referring to nothing (conceptualism), but rather in 
the sense of providing no knowledge of the objects to which sensible intuitions refer. For one 
thing, without the general concepts involved in the specification of what it is represented [sic], the 
subject cannot understand or know what her sensible intuitions actually represent. Thus blindness 
does not reflect a lack of reference, but rather a lack of understanding and of propositional 
knowledge about what is represented. 
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different spatial orientations towards the perceiving subject (e.g., paradigmatically an identical pair 
of left and right hands).29 Non-conceptualists have taken the example of incongruent counterparts 
to militate against conceptualism. Incongruent counterparts are distinguished exclusively by 
spatial features, which for Kant seem associated with the structures of sensibility discussed in the 
Aesthetic, not the concepts of the understanding. Accordingly, it seems that only non-conceptual 
elements can distinguish intuitions of incongruent counterparts. So if conceptualism about 
intuitions were true, it might seem that Kant would lack the resources to accommodate his own 
incongruent counterparts example. 
Fourth, and apparently most conclusively, there are passages in which Kant seems to 
explicitly set intuition apart from the influence of the understanding. As Kant writes (A89- 
91/B122-3; italics mine): 
The categories of the understanding, on the contrary, do not represent to us the conditions under 
which objects are given in intuition at all, hence objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily 
having to be related to functions of the understanding, and therefore without the understanding 
containing their a priori conditions […] Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our 
intuition, for intuition by no means requires the function of thinking. 
This passage seems explicit on the conceptualism question: pace conceptualists, objects can in fact 
appear in intuition without being related to the “categories” or “functions” of the understanding. 
Especially when considered in combination with the other passages discussed, this explicit 
disavowal of conceptualism may well seem to settle Kant’s position in the non- conceptualist 
camp. 30 
29 See e.g., Hanna 2008, who describes the case as concerning “Enantiomorphs […] qualitatively identical but 
topologically non-identical.” (p 54). Hanna has argued the case transmutes to temporal differences as well (p.  57/58). 
30 Various recent commentators have found this evidence conclusive, e.g., McLear 2016a, p. 100. Indeed Pereira 
2013 concludes that the conceptualism debate in Kant is altogether closed: “[e]ven though the conceptualist reading 
of Kant’s position is no longer questioned, what non-conceptualistm amounts to in Kant’s philosophy remains an 
open question” (De Sa Pereira 2013, p. 236). 
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1.5 THE CONDITIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING 
But indications of Kant’s non-conceptualism are less conclusive than they seem. I discuss 
the first three types of supposed non-conceptualist evidence in section 8 below, but it is worth 
rebutting straightaway Kant’s most explicit apparent endorsement of non-conceptualism. It is 
important to consider the passage in full (A89-91/ B122-123): 
That objects of sensible intuition must conform to the formal conditions of sensibility which lie a 
priori in the mind is evident, because otherwise they would not be objects for us. But that they must 
likewise conform to the conditions which the understanding requires for the synthetic unity of 
thought, is a conclusion the grounds of which are by no means so obvious. Appearances might very 
well be so constituted that the understanding should not find them to be in accordance with the 
conditions of its unity. Everything might be in such confusion that, for instance, in the series of 
appearances nothing presented itself which might yield a rule of synthesis and so answer to the 
concept of cause and effect. This concept would then be altogether empty, null and meaningless. 
But since intuition stands in no need whatsoever of the functions of thought, appearances would 
none the less present objects to our intuition. 
As the full passage makes clear, Kant’s apparent expression of support for non- 
conceptualism comes during a programmatic exposition. In particular, Kant’s concern is to present 
a prima facie consideration contrasting the ease with which he achieved the aims of the Aesthetic, 
viz. the way intuitions must be subject to the a priori conditions of sensibility, with the difficulty 
of establishing the conclusion in the Deduction, viz. that intuitions must be subject to the a priori 
conditions of the understanding as well. Accordingly, I suggest this passage offers  the 
conceptualist two ways of resisting its apparent non-conceptualist thrust, a strong and a more 
modest conceptualist reading.31 
31 As I will describe it, the strong reading plausibly conforms to Kant’s approach in the Transcendental Deduction. 
However, the argument in the Deduction has also been read as consistent with non-conceptualism, and I will 
therefore not here assume Kant’s commitment to the strong reading. 
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The strong conceptualist reading suggests that Kant’s non-conceptualist comments are  not 
made in propria persona, but rather constitute the lead-up to a reductio. 32 On this reading, Kant’s 
apparent expression of support for non-conceptualism merely serves to illustrate the urgency of 
proving the opposite thesis.33 That is, Kant’s aim is not to establish that a category like causation 
“[is] altogether empty, null and meaningless,” but rather that it “must […] be grounded completely 
a priori in the understanding” (A91/B124). In this way, the strong reading understands Kant’s 
comments as follows: if appearances were structured merely by sensibility and not by the 
understanding, then such appearances could fail to conform to the conditions of the understanding, 
and concepts such as cause and effect could be “null.” But this outcome is not to be embraced, but 
rather constitutes motivation to establish the application of the categories of the understanding to 
appearances. Accordingly, when Kant writes that “appearances might very well be so constituted 
that the understanding should not find them to be in accordance with the conditions of its unity,” 
this is not to be understood as a conclusion Kant endorses, but merely as a preamble to Kant going 
on to establish the necessary application to intuitional appearances of the conditions of the 
understanding. 
But this strong reading may not seem compulsory. After all, it does not follow from Kant 
setting out to establish the a priori validity of the conditions of the understanding that he aims to 
do so by adopting the more specific strategy of showing their application to intuition itself. 
However, it is worth considering that Kant seems to follow a similar approach when considering 
another case of a possible radical divergence between appearance and understanding (A653/B681-
A654/B682): 
32 For this sort of reading, see Aaron Griffith 2012, and more recently Schafer 2016. As Griffith points out (fn. 17), 
this understanding is also shared by Ginsborg 2008, p. 70 / 2006 p. 63; Longuenesse 1998, p. 226; Allison 2004, p. 
160-161. 
33 Griffith 2012, p. 199. 
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If among the appearances offering themselves there were such a great variety – I will not say of 
form (for they might be similar to one another in that) but of content, i.e regarding the manifoldness 
of existing beings – that even the most acute human, through comparison of one  with another, could 
not detect the least similarity (a case which can at least be thought), then the logical law of genera 
would not obtain at all, no concept of a genus, nor any other universal concept, indeed no 
understanding at all would obtain, since it is the understanding that has to do with such concepts. 
This  is  a  case  where  nature’s  presentations  are  such that no general concept could get hold.34
Kant might seem to respond as predicted by the strong reading: 
The logical principle of genera therefore presupposes a transcendental one if it is to be applied to 
nature (by which I here understand only objects that are given to us). According to that principle, 
sameness of kind is necessarily presupposed in the manifold of a possible experience (even though 
we cannot determine its degree a priori), because without it no empirical concepts and hence no 
experience would be possible. 
As on the strong reading, Kant seems to take the problematic counterfactual not at face 
value, but as a prima facie consideration to extend the application of the conditions of the 
understanding beyond their most obvious context to a more basic level. Thus Kant suggests that 
beyond the “logical principle” of genera, the understanding is also presupposed in the “manifold 
of possible experience,” since, counterfactually, we would otherwise not have empirical concepts. 
Note here Kant’s comment that we cannot a priori determine the degree of sameness that is 
necessarily presupposed, thus suggesting that the presupposition of some sameness can be known 
a priori. 
Still, the strong reading may appear questionable. In A654/B682 Kant speaks of a 
“transcendental” application of the relevant principle, which would seem to relate questionably  to 
the “figurative” application that is implicated in intuition. Relatedly, Kant speaks not of “intuition” 
but of “experience,” which as he makes clear involves “empirical concepts,” which are not 
obviously  required  for  intuition.  Accordingly,  it  may  still  seem  that  Kant’s strategy for 
34 There is variety of forms this might take: nature may be too pluriform and unstructured, but on the other hand it 
may also suffer from an excess of structural complexity. 
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 the  application  of  the conditions of the understanding does not obviously go as far down as the 
constitution of intuition itself. 
Still, the conceptualist has a more modest defense available. On this more modest  reading, 
the thought is that Kant is here working with a restricted conception of the understanding. That is, 
as I will explicate below, it is one of the main distinctive features of Kant’s considered view of the 
understanding that it is a faculty that is not restricted to discursive activity of an explicitly 
conceptual nature. But this need not be the sense of understanding at issue in the above passages, 
where Kant may be working with a more traditional conception of the understanding, which, as 
Kant explicates, “is the understanding that has to do with [universal] concepts.” For my current 
purposes, it does not matter whether the weak or the strong conceptualist reading of (A89/B122--
A91/B123) is preferred. The availability of both readings clearly shows that the programmatic 
nature of this passage in the context of Kant’s overall  project is sufficiently complicated to shed 
doubt on straightforward non-conceptualist conclusions. 
1.6 HYLOPMORPHISM IN KANT: THE CASE FOR CONCEPTUALISM 
Prior to rebutting the remaining evidence for the non-conceptualist thesis, it is good to get 
the positive conceptualist case on the table. The most convincing case for conceptualism in Kant’s 
text centers on a hylomorphic strand of thinking running through Kant’s view of intuitions, which 
associates   sensibility   with   mere   matter,   and   understanding   with   determinative   form.35 
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A  critical  passage  in  this  regard  is  B152.  The passage comes in the context of Kant’s 
introduction of the productive imagination in terms of the distinction between synthesis 
intellectualis – “combination through the understanding” – and synthesis speciosa – “figurative 
synthesis” (B151). By “intellectual synthesis” Kant says he means a synthesis that amounts to 
“merely intellectual combination,” “which is carried out by the understanding alone.” In contrast, 
figurative synthesis arises for Kant because we are not creatures merely of understanding, but are 
also characterized by “a certain form of a priori sensible intuition, which depends on the receptivity 
of the faculty of representation (sensibility).” And it is this “figurative synthesis” that Kant ties to 
operations of the imagination. In other words, while for Kant there is a kind of synthesis that 
pertains to the understanding alone, there is also a kind of synthesis involving sensibility: and it is 
this synthesis that the imagination enacts. To this extent, the Kantian distinction may appear to fit 
the non-conceptualist view that associates the imagination with sensibility. 
But B152 takes some decisive steps towards conceptualism: 
Now since all our intuition is sensible, the imagination, owing to the subjective condition under 
which alone it can give to the concepts of understanding a corresponding intuition, belongs to 
sensibility. But inasmuch as its synthesis is an expression of spontaneity, which is determinative and 
not, like sense, determinable merely, and which is therefore able to determine sense a priori in 
respect of its form in accordance with the unity of apperception, imagination is to that extent a 
faculty which determines the sensibility a priori; and its synthesis of intuitions, conforming as it 
does to the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of imagination. This synthesis is an 
action of the understanding on the sensibility. 
This is a complex passage, in which Kant appears to introduce the following ideas.  Kant’s 
first sentence makes clear that (i) the imagination “belongs” to sensibility to the extent that 
sensibility  is  a  necessary  condition  on  the  functioning of the imagination, since it only in this 
35 In emphasizing Kant’s hylomorphism, I take my cue from Engstrom 2006. In this context, however, I 
unfortunately have to abstract from some of the compelling sophistications of Engstrom’s analysis, focusing instead 
on the upshot of Engstrom’s analysis for non-conceptualist readings of the imagination. 
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way that the subjective condition of object-presentation is met.36 However, even as imagination 
bears a necessary connection to sensibility, (ii) the imagination’s spontaneous character entails that 
the role of the imagination is to determine sensibility. On the other hand, (iii) sensibility itself is 
merely determinable. Moreover, the imagination’s determination is (iv) a priori, (v) in respect of 
its form, (vi) in accordance with the unity of apperception, (vii) conforming to the categories, and 
(viii) transcendental. Finally, it follows for Kant that imagination is an (ix)  “action of the 
understanding on the sensibility.” 
The present context allows us to abstract from some of these complexities, and focus on 
elements (i)-(iii), (v), and (ix). The first point to note is that (i)-(iii) seem explicitly inconsistent 
with the reduction of the imagination to sensibility, and the view that sensibility is partially 
spontaneous. Kant explicitly contrasts spontaneity, which, Kant suggests, has the capacity to 
determine, with the “determinable only” nature of sense. Textually, therefore, it is simply not an 
open question whether Kant allows for spontaneity on the part of sensibility: he does not. But the 
primary point is not textual. As Kant’s remark that the imagination determines sensibility in respect 
of its form illustrates, we should understand the opposition between determinative spontaneity and 
determinable sense in hylomorphic terms. Accordingly, for Kant, attributing active synthesis of 
sensation to sensibility amounts to conceiving of matter as informing itself. Kant explicitly denies 
thoughts of this kind (B130): 
The combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and 
cannot, therefore, be already contained in the pure form of sensible intuition. For it is an act of 
spontaneity of the faculty of representation; and since this faculty, to distinguish it from  sensibility, 
must be entitled understanding, all combination—be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination 
of the manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts—is an act of the 
understanding. To this act the very general title ‘synthesis’ may be assigned. 
36 In light of what follows, it is worth drawing attention to Kant’s specific wording that it is the imagination which 
presents objects to the mind, albeit under a sensible condition. This counts strongly against the non-conceptualist 
suggestion of sensibility itself being a presentational faculty, and counts strongly in favor of Engstrom 2006’s 
suggestion that sensibility should be conceived as a mere medium for the functioning of other capacities. 
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In contrast, Clinton Tolley’s non-conceptualist claim that the imagination is not implicated 
in intuition may seem in a stronger position, both textually and philosophically. For example, when 
Kant characterizes imaginative synthesis as a “synthesis of intuitions,” a “combination of the 
manifold of intuition,” and “an action of the understanding on the sensibility,” this may be read in 
terms of the imagination synthesizing independently provided intuitions.37 Such a view would 
seem to respect the merely material character of sensibility by sharply distinguishing it from the 
spontaneity of imagination, and associating the latter with the understanding. Finally, as discussed 
above, Tolley could rely on his textual evidence that Kant, after all, seems to attribute to intuition 
“an absolute unity” (A99), which might seem to obviate any need for synthesis. 
However, reflection shows that Kant’s hylomorphism also tells against the idea that Kant 
ascribes intuitions a “basic” form of unity, not produced through synthesis. First, Tolley’s reliance 
on A99 is profoundly misleading. The mention of “absolute unity” comes in a passage entitled 
“On the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition.” In this passage, Kant is concerned to explain 
how representations at their most rudimentary, generic level constitute mere modifications of the 
mind, which require a synthesis in order to produce more significant representations, such as of 
external objects in space. In this way, Kant explicitly attributes “absolute unity” only to 
“impressions” (Eindrücke), basic representations that are not yet characterized by the dimension 
of time, and in this sense have a unity “contained in one moment.” Kant clearly intends “one 
moment” here is as no period of time at all, but rather  merely the very lack of any temporal 
dimension.  Pace  Tolley,  then,  “absolute  unity”  is  in  a  sense  no significant unity at all:  it is 
37 Emphasis mine. On the other hand, this position would seem hard pressed to account for Kant’s affirmation at (i) 
that the imagination “belongs to sensibility,” and thus could not be wholly post-perceptual. 
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merely the sort of absolute character that can be attributed to a representation per se, 
independent of any meaningful dimensions such as time and space. More specifically, it is 
certainly not intuitions—representations of objects—that are characterized by “absolute unity.” 
Rather, intuitional unity is precisely what is to be produced by the synthesis  that is the topic of 
the passage. As Kant writes (A99): 
Now in order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold [of Eindrücke] (as, say, in the 
representation of space), it is necessary first to run through and then to take together this 
manifoldness, which action I call the synthesis of apprehension.38 
More fundamentally, we can note that, on reflection, Tolley’s view merely superficially 
respects the sense in which Kant approaches the relation between sensibility and spontaneity in 
hylomorphic terms. Tolley respects the hylomorphic conception insofar as his view acknowledges 
that informing synthesis for Kant would have to be associated with the  spontaneity of 
understanding as opposed to the merely determinable character of sensibility. But Tolley misses 
the consequences this conclusion has for the status of unformed sensibility as merely material. On 
Tolley’s view, it would have to be the mere material of sensibility that independently allows for 
intuition. But as Kant’s discussion at A99 makes clear, the mere matter of sensibility concerns the 
role of impressions or sensations, not of intuitive representations of objects. It is implausible that 
intuitions, as opposed to sensations, should have their characteristic object-directedness while 
being no more informed than sensations. Indeed, Kant appears precisely to contrast intuitions with 
mere sensations in terms of the latter being merely the material aspect of a hylomorphic unity, as 
opposed to the way such unity characterizes intuitions. This  point  gains  added  urgency  
when we  consider  that  in  the  early modern  thinking about hylormophic themes in the  context
38 Kant’s discussion of the synthesis of apprehension here exhibits a distinction between the treatments of intuitional 
unity in the A and B editions. In this A-edition passage, Kant includes pure intuitions among those the unity of 
which is constituted through the relevant synthesis (as evidenced by Kant’s focus on the representation of space); in 
the B-edition this concerns rather the unity of specifically empirical intuition. This point was raised to me by 
Stephen Engstrom. 
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of which we should place Kant’s view, it is paradigmatically doubtful whether unformed matter 
can have independent existence at all.39 In the context of this type of worries about matter, it is 
precisely the unity provided by an active force that is taken to set genuinely independent, 
informed entities apart from mere aggregates.40 Given these considerations, we can see 
that for Kant the idea of a “basic” intuitional form of unity, unproduced by an exercise of 
synthesis, would flout the important role of formative spontaneity in uniting mere aggregates.41 
1.7 CONCEPTUALISM AND JUDGMENT 
The above considerations make it compelling to ascribe to Kant some conceptualist  thesis, 
but critically it has been unclear precisely what sort of conceptualism is at issue. Consider Robert 
Hanna’s characterization of the conceptualist view as suggesting that “we always cognitively 
encounter [things] only within the framework of discursive rationality,” where this “framework” 
involves concepts understood as “object-categorizing, object-classifying, object- discriminating, 
and object-identifying cognitive devices.”42 Hanna also suggests that it must “be possible to 
linguistically convey the content of a concept to someone else who is not directly acquainted with 
or  confronted  with  the  object  or  objects  represented  by  that  conceptual  content,”  such that 
39 Leibniz provides of course the paradigmatic argument to the effect that mere matter achieves at best mere contiguity 
between its parts (AG, p. 85). For more on the Leibnizian themes of Kant’s thinking about sense and spontaneity, see 
Chapter 2. 
40 See e.g., M 300, 95-96; LOC 285-7; L 502. See also Garber and Rauzy 2004, p. 33. 
41 For places where Kant explicitly appears to condition unity on a form of synthesis, A79/B104-5, B143. 
42 Hanna 2011, p. 326; Hanna 2008, p. 51. Compare also Hanna 2005, p. 250 and Allais 2009, p. 386. 
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therefore we can “map the contrast between essentially non-conceptual content and 
conceptual content onto the classical contrast between knowledge by acquaintance, or immediate 
experience of the world and oneself, and knowledge by description, or mediated thought about the 
world and oneself.”43
Hanna’s characterization of the conceptualist thesis constitutes a strong endorsement of 
what Thomas Land has helpfully described as a “judgmentalist” conception of Kant’s view of 
synthesis.44 On this conception, the conceptualist thesis that the synthesis of the understanding, the 
faculty exercised in judgment, is implicated in intuition entails that this synthesis must itself take 
the form of an exercise of judgment (or alternatively, a form that is in important respects akin to 
judgment). In particular, as Hanna’s above characterization of conceptualism illustrates, the 
judgmentalist interpretation of conceptualism assumes that conceptualists conceive of imaginative 
synthesis as possessing the discursive character of judgment, which on Kant’s understanding is 
associated with a predicative (or classificatory) nature (A69/B94).45 Moreover, insofar as judgment 
is in principle unrestricted in the range of concepts it might implicate, the judgmentalist 
understands conceptualists not to impose restrictions on the conceptual content of intuitions. 
But pace the judgmentalist, even as conceptualism for Kant amounts to the implication of 
the understanding in intuition, the relation Kant envisages between intuition and judgment (and 
43 Hanna 2008, p. 52. 
44 Land 2015. Land’s version of the judgmentalist thesis is slightly different than the one I am considering in this 
paper. On Land’s rendering, judgmentalism is the thought that concepts can only be employed in judgment, which 
thesis Land disputes by suggesting that concepts can also be implicated non-discursively in intuition. In contrast, my 
anti-judgmentalism does not challenge the thought that concepts are proper only to judgment, but merely asserts that 
the understanding has an exercise independent of judgment. Indeed, I suggest this points up an important sense in 
which the relevant activity is independent not merely of judgment, but also of concepts. 
45 See also Land 2015, p. 61. 
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the way either relates to concepts) is anything but straightforward. Consider the way Kant 
paradigmatically expresses his conceptualism (A79/B104-5): 
The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity 
to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition. 
This passage does not posit a simple but rather a complex relation between the nature  of intuitions 
and the nature of judgments. Kant’s claim is that the same function endows intuition and judgment 
with unity, rather than the claim either that judgment and intuition have the very same unity, or the 
claim that judgment itself endows intuitions with unity.46 It can seem hard to see what Kant has in 
mind with this talk of “function,” and its upshot for the conceptualist view.  I will provide a positive 
view only in the later chapters of this dissertation.47 
For the immediate purposes of this chapter, however, it is most important to note what  the 
dictum does not imply. In particular, it does not follow from the idea that intuitions bear a synthetic 
unity provided by the understanding that intuitions for Kant would have generic, empirical 
conceptual content. Accordingly, conceptualism—pace Hanna—need not adopt a “classificatory,” 
“discursive,” or “descriptive” view of intuitions. It is worth noting that this point extends even to 
the “categories.” Categories capture the nature of synthesis. However, it is important that Kant 
describes them as capturing this imaginative synthesis “generally represented.”48  Accordingly,  
we  need   not   think   of   the   categories   as   themselves   contents  of  intuitions,  as  these are 
46 For similar language, B143 (italics mine): “All the manifold, therefore, so far as it is given in a single empirical 
intuition, is determined in respect of one of the logical functions of judgment, and is thereby brought into one 
consciousness. Now the categories are just these functions of judgment, insofar as they are employed in 
determination of the manifold of a given intuition […] Consequently, the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily 
subject to the categories.” 
47 Esp. Chapter 6 below. 
48 Compare also the last segment of the dictum itself: “The same function that gives unity to the different 
representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, 
which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of the understanding” (italics changed). 
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 synthesizedby the understanding. Rather, the categories in some sense abstract from, and thus 
capture “generally,” the nature of this synthesis at a conceptual level.49
In sum, we can put this conclusion in two ways: (i) insofar as the disputed thesis about 
intuitions is “state conceptualism,” i.e., a view of the types of capacities required for perception, it 
is clear that intuitions require the capacity to understand and therefore to judge, but it is not clear 
that their exercise in intuition must equally take the form of judgment, e.g., in being discursive or 
involving classification; (ii) insofar as the disputed thesis is “content conceptualism,” i.e., a view 
of the contents of perception, we should note that Kant’s concern is most clearly with the categories 
of the understanding, as opposed to concepts generally, and even concerning the categories we 
should be careful about taking conceptualism to imply that perception has “categorial content.”50 
1.8 NON-CONCEPTUALIST EVIDENCE REVISITED 
Let’s now return to the non-conceptualist evidence discussed in section 4. Consider De  Sa 
Pereira’s non-conceptualist reading of the Wilder example: 
Non-conceptual content is defined typically as content that can be ascribed to a subject even when 
she lacks the concepts required to specify that content canonically. Thus, in the most famous Kantian 
example, a person can see a country house in the distance as the very same object as someone else 
who is acquainted with it determinately as a dwelling established for men, even though the first 
person lacks the relevant concept of a house and the partial concepts of roof, windows, etc., required 
to specify with authority what her visual experience represents (see JL: V, Ak 9: 33). Stated in these 
terms, it is hard to see how anyone could possibly deny that, from 
49 They are, in other words, analytic in their form as concepts, even as they take as their content the nature of 
synthesis as such. 50 Compare McDowell 2009b. 
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experience, we are always capable of representing something we do not understand. Put this way, 
the question of whether there are non-conceptual contents is hardly an interesting one.51
From our above discussion of Kant’s conceptualism, we can now note that De Sa Pereira’s 
unequivocal conclusion from the Wilder case seems premature. In particular, the conceptualist has 
two readings available to rebut non-conceptualist readings of the case. 
First there’s an important hylomorphic aspect in Kant’s description of the case, which 
renders its upshot for conceptualism significantly more nuanced. For Kant, the Wilder 
“admittedly” represents the same object as does the cultured person. Kant’s concessionary tone 
should alert us to the possibility that he will attempt to establish a conclusion that prima facie 
seems in tension with the stated point. This conclusion can be appreciated when we are 
appropriately attuned to the hylomorphic character of Kant’s claim that “But as to form, this 
cognition of one and the same object is different in the two.” On De Sa Pereira’s understanding, 
this phrase is intended to allow two different varieties of cognition which differ in respect of 
whether they implicate concepts, but share a common nature in equally implicating intuitions. But 
given Kant’s hylomorphism, the opposite conclusion might seem warranted. For Kant, the form of 
cognition is different depending on whether the subject has the concept “house” available, and 
accordingly, the presence of concepts (at least partially) determines the very  nature of perception. 
To be sure, here the non-conceptualist will follow Tolley’s line in objecting that what concepts 
inform is cognition not intuition, and suggest Kant makes this clear by describing the form of 
cognition as “intuition and concept.” This reading would  perhaps  not seem ruled out by Kant’s 
example,  but  neither  does  it  seem  forced.  Note, for example, that Kant is discussing a case of 
51 De Sa Pereira 2014, p. 1. 
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seeing, not one of conceptual knowledge.52 Note also that Kant suggests that seeing can be 
“intuition and concept at the same time,” as opposed to intuition preceding conceptual 
classification. In sum, the Wilder case does not unequivocally rule out that concept- possession 
informs intuitions in cases where concepts are available. 
Second, pace De Sa Pereira’s characterization of conceptualism as the view that the subject 
can “canonically specify the contents of perception,” the conceptualist question is rather whether 
the categories of the understanding are implicated in perception. Accordingly, even if Kant’s text 
is appropriately read as isolating the nature of intuition from possession of concepts like “house,” 
the Wilder is a rational human being with capacities for thought, and therefore the example would 
seem moot on the question of the way intuitions relate to the categorial concepts of the 
understanding. Finally, De Sa Pereira would seem wrong to conclude from the fact that the concept 
“house” is not implicated in the Wilder’s intuition that it must involve corresponding non-
conceptual content. An alternative possibility is that Kant thinks perception does not represent the 
object’s house-nature at all. In any case, either alternative is prima facie consistent with intuition 
implicating categorial content. 
Let’s turn to the incongruent counterpart case. Here the non-conceptualist reading similarly 
depends on an interpretation of conceptualism on which contents serve to conceptually specify 
intuited objects. Since the distinction between incongruent counterparts cannot be captured in the 
descriptive, communicable concepts that Hanna associates with conceptualism, Hanna concludes 
the case constitutes a counterexample to the conceptualist view. But once the more nuanced 
conceptualist idea is in view, the force of the non-conceptualist case  disappears.  It  must  not  be 
52 This is not in principle inconsistent with non-conceptualism, since the non-conceptualist might suggest that Kant 
distinguishes non-conceptual forms of seeing from conceptual forms seeing (seeing vs. seeing ‘as’), where intuitions 
correspond to non-conceptual seeing. 
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assumed that the categorial concepts Kant implicates in intuition are descriptive or 
communicable. To be sure, there is some independent reason to think that spatial differences 
between incongruent counterparts are non-conceptual, since for Kant spatio-temporal 
characteristics are associated with structures of sensibility. But this is inconsistent merely with the 
notion that intuitions implicate exclusively conceptual content, and not with the claim that 
intuitions necessarily implicate categorial conceptual content. More importantly, absent a more 
precise account of the character and role of the categories of the understanding in Kant’s view of 
intuitional presentation, we should not, as Hanna does, assume a straightforward separation 
between sensibility and understanding, on which sensibility by itself imbues intuited objects with 
their spatial characteristics. That is, insofar as the intuitional role of the understanding is associated 
with intuitive presentation simpliciter, it plausibly also informs sensibility to produce spatial 
representations. This general reflection should shed doubt on the suggestion that there could be 
intuitional representation of attributes of objects, including spatial attributes, without implication 
of the understanding. So there is no simple argument from incongruent counterparts against 
conceptualism. 
Kant’s distinction between kennen and erkennen, finally, admits of structurally similar 
treatment. When Kant writes that “the understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think 
nothing” and urges “carefully separating and distinguishing the one from the other,” he affirms the 
important distinction between thinking about objects (and the specific application of conceptual 
capacities in doing so) and perceptually intuiting objects. But recognizing the distinct nature of 
thought is not at odds with acknowledging the involvement of the same faculty in intuition. 
Likewise, it is not problematic to distinguish between perception presenting objects for cognition 
(kennen),  and  the  further  cognition  of  classifying  such  objects  under   concepts  (erkennen). 
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To be sure, this leaves the problem of Kant’s attribution of perceptual kennen to non- rational 
animals, which would seem at odds with any form of conceptualism. But here, too, the 
conceptualist has resources available to question non-conceptualist interpretations. Recall the 
hylomorphic aspect of the Wilder case, on which the presence or absence of concepts arguably 
provides a distinct form to subjects’ representations of a house, even as the object is in both cases 
intuited (in the case of the Wilder, “merely intuited”). A similar solution might be thought to apply 
to the case of animal cognition. There is an obvious sense in which non-rational animals  do not 
traffic in full-blown cognition through concepts, but do represent objects in ways that go beyond 
mere sensations. In this sense, one might think erkennen is restricted to rational animals in a way 
that kennen is not. But taking Kant’s hylomorphism seriously, it does not follow that kennen in 
rational and non-rational animals shares a common nature. Accordingly, the conceptualist can 
insist that in rational subjects kennen is informed by the spontaneity of the understanding, while 
the same is not true for creatures lacking a faculty of this rational nature, even if such creatures are 
capable of mental processes that are in important respects similar to human kennen. 
1.9 CONCLUSION 
Non-conceptualists have argued that for Kant the faculty of sensibility independently 
provides intuitions, since either synthesis by the imagination is an activity of the senses, 
or intuitions possess a basic unity that is not produced by mental activity. I have argued that both 
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views are inconsistent with Kant’s hylomorphic conception of intuitions, and Kant’s thought that 
the same function of cognition characterizes both intuition and judgment. But I have argued that it 
remains a nuanced question what forms of conceptualism can be ascribed to Kant on this basis. In 
particular, I have suggested that non-conceptualists have typically failed to acknowledge  forms of 
conceptualism that respect the sophisticated relation Kant envisages between exercises of the 
understanding in judgment and in intuition. Accordingly, there are versions of conceptualism that 
are prima facie consistent with textual evidence frequently cited to support non-conceptualism, 
viz. Kant’s distinction between kennen and erkennen and his example of the Wilder, the case of 
incongruent counterparts, and Kant’s admonishment to distinguish intuition from thought. 
40 
2.0 SENSIBILITY: MATTER OF INTUITION 
Recent readers of Kant have sharply disagreed on the question whether Kant should be 
considered as holding a “non-conceptualist” or a “conceptualist” view of the nature of perception. 
The disagreement concerns the relationship between sensibility and understanding (A15/B29), the 
two faculties whose cooperation amounts to cognition. Do sensibility and understanding constitute 
independent partners in the joint venture of cognition? Or is the relation more complicated in that 
the understanding plays an indispensible role even in states associated with sensibility? Contrast: 
Dualism 
Kant’s account of cognition recognizes sensible and intellectual states that are 
independent in some important sense, the combination of which constitutes 
cognition full-blown.53
Monism 
For Kant the spontaneity of the understanding must play a role in anything that 
counts as a state of cognition, including sensible states. 
Although the dialectic is not entirely straightforward, a commitment to Dualism will typically 
incline a reading towards non-conceptualism, while Monism fosters conceptualism.54 
53 A naturally Kantian way of speaking here might be to suggest that both faculties independently contribute 
representations (Vorstellungen). But this would set the bar too high for the Dualist I consider in this paper, who 
might be content with sensible provisions that fall short of representations proper. 
54 Recall the complexity in Chapter 1. Some weaker varieties of conceptualist positions are consistent with Dualism 
(Allais 2015 and discussion by Schafer 2016). By contrast, Monism essentially entails at least some form of 
conceptualism. Note, however, that Monism does not entail commitments concerning the role or nature of 
conceptual contents in Kant’s view of perceptual contact with the world (for views that do, Ginsborg 2006, 2008; 
Abela 2002). Indeed, Monism does not entail even merely categorial conceptual involvement in perception (Griffith 
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In this context, much turns on Kant’s characterization of the relation between 
understanding and sensibility as a relation between form and matter, and as the determination of a 
determinable (Engstrom 2006.) For Kant it seems to be the spontaneity of the understanding that 
accounts for its informing role. Consider, for example, Kant’s comments on the role of “synthesis” 
in cognition (B152): 
synthesis is an expression of spontaneity, which is determinative and not, like sense, determinable 
merely, and which is therefore able to determine sense a priori in respect of its form in accordance 
with the unity of apperception […] This synthesis is an action of the understanding on the sensibility. 
Note here the opposition Kant suggests between the determinative nature of spontaneity and the 
determinable character of sense, such that “therefore [spontaneity] is able to determine sense a 
priori in respect of its form.”55 Monists—but not Dualists—take it to follow that  even  cognitively 
“obscure” states such as intuitions (Anschauungen) (JL 9:33) must implicate the spontaneity of the 
understanding. In Ernst Cassirer’s trenchant expression, 
The matter is […] as follows: the being of intuition as definite (and what would an existence be like 
which was completely undetermined?) depends upon the function of the understanding.56
An entity’s form determines its nature. So the Monist holds that ultimately Kant takes all cognitive 
states to bear the nature of the single spontaneous faculty of understanding, even if this faculty 
functions under conditions of sensibility.57
2012, Connolly 2013.) At bottom, the Monist thought merely is that perceptual cognition must be understood as the 
exercise of a single capacity. 
55 Clearly this passage does not provide conclusive evidence for an association between spontaneity and form. It 
might be held, for example, that the relevant connection is between spontaneity and the unity of apperception, rather 
than form per se. My aim in this paper is not to defend the Monist thesis itself. But I believe my discussion below 
makes compelling the thought that it is form per se that is associated with spontaneity, rather than form only in 
connection with apperception. 
56 Cassirer 1967, p. 141. 
57 There is an important distinction here between the understanding operating under conditions imposed by 
sensibility and conditions provided by sensibility. The former might imply that the understanding is itself 
unconstrained and limited merely by human sensibility, while the latter might imply that the understanding is itself a 
limited capacity, which requires sensibility for its functioning. In this paper it is the latter I have in mind (see my 
conclusion at §5 below). 
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In this chapter I will focus on a source for Dualism that is apparently unaffected by the 
Monist observation of Kant’s association between spontaneity and form. The point concerns 
Kant’s conception of sensations (Empfindungen).58 In particular, the consideration is that Kant 
characterizes Empfindungen as providing the material of cognition (R619 AA 15: 268): 
The first building block [Grundstück] of our cognition is Empfindung. One designates 
[Empfindungen] the representations in which the mind is viewed as merely passive, to the extent it 
is affected [gewirkt] by the presence of a thing. [The Empfindungen] constitute at the same time  the 
material of all our cognition.59
This is a complicated passage, and my argument will turn on some of its details. But note 
Kant’s characterization of sensation as “the first building block” and the “material” of cognition. 
The Dualist thought is this: it is perfectly consistent with conceding the Monist claim that for Kant 
the understanding provides cognition with its form to also recognize an independent contribution 
from sensibility as providing cognition with its matter (however more precisely this is conceived). 
Indeed this seems to be just what Kant is saying in passages like the above, and so many 
interpreters have understood him.60 In particular, this would make sense of sensibility providing 
genuinely independent deliverances, which nevertheless stand yet to be informed as states of 
cognition. Indeed, this may seem to be what Kant has in mind when he allocates to the 
understanding the exclusive function of “combining” the sensible manifold (B130): 
The combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses […] 
For it is an act of spontaneity of the faculty of representation; and since this faculty, to distinguish 
it from sensibility, must be entitled understanding, all combination—be we conscious of it or not, 
be it a combination of the manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts—
is an act of the understanding. To this act the very general title ‘synthesis’ may be assigned. 
58 I will use the English ‘sensation’ and the German ‘Empfindung’ interchangeably. 
59 For similar language, consider Kant’s characterization in A19-20/B34 (emphasis mine): “the effect of an object on 
the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it.” I discuss this passage below. 
60 E.g., Allison 1989; Aquila 1983; Falkenstein 1990, 1995; George 1981. 
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It seems natural enough to think that if there is “combining” then there must be something 
“combined.” As such, it seems the understanding is tasked with “combining” and thereby 
providing form to cognition, while sensibility is tasked with delivering that which is “combined,” 
the matter. 
This picture yields an interpretation of Kantian Dualism that ostensibly occupies a 
comfortable middle ground vis-à-vis Monism. Sensibility and understanding may not stand over 
against one another as producing independent, fully-formed cognitive representations, but they  do 
stand over against another in a different sense: as providing a “manifold” of “sensory material” 
versus providing “determinative form.” Indeed this form of Dualism would seem difficult for the 
Monist to defuse.61 Because insofar as the Monist thesis turns on recognizing Kant’s association 
of spontaneity with form, it seems powerless to oppose sensibility playing a merely material role. 
But I will argue that the Dualist underestimates the radical character of the Monist 
conception of cognition. On the Monist understanding, Kant does not recognize the reality of 
Empfindungen apart from their existence as informed by the understanding. In particular, I argue 
the Dualist misses the specific notion of “matter” that Kant associates with Empfindung. This 
notion of “matter” does not carry connotations of constitution. Rather, I suggest Kant trades on a 
specific Leibnizian elaboration of the distinction between primary and secondary matter, i.e., the 
distinction between matter without form, and matter with form.62 On the Leibnizian elaboration  of 
this view, primary matter is associated not with constitution but with passivity. Moreover, 
matter in   Leibniz’s sense does not  constitute an  independent metaphysical reality that might  in 
61 I will simply assume here a type of Monist that wants to resist this version of Dualism. I develop a more positive 
understanding of a Monist view of perceptual cognition in Chapter 5 and 6 below. 
62 For important recent discussion, Duarte 2015. 
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sense (logically or temporally) precede form. Rather, matter is merely an abstraction from 
informed reality. I suggest this is the sense of “material” Kant has in mind. If I am correct in this, 
we should take seriously that Empfindungen, as Kant writes in the above passage, are states “in 
which the mind is viewed as merely passive” (italics mine). I will suggest that such expressions 
flag a carefully inserted qualificatory and aspectual tone to Kant’s discussion of Empfindngen 
which points to the important sense in which for Kant (R177, AA 15:65) "Empfindungen are not 
representations, but are the material for them.” So the thesis I defend is: 
Empfindungen 
For Kant sensations are the primary matter of cognition. Sensations do not 
constitute independent perceptual states, but abstractions from perceptual states 
intended to capture a passive aspect of such states. 
I will proceed as follows. In §1 I introduce the state of debate about the character of Kant’s 
Empfindungen.  In  §2  I  note  the  relevant  aspects  of  Leibniz’s  views  on form and matter. In 
§3 I draw out the implications of Leibniz’s view for the way Kant considers Emfindungen as
“material.” In §4 I briefly return to the rich (post-)Leibnizian background of Kant’s thought. 
Since my argument turns on an affinity between Kant’s thinking and Leibnizian substance 
metaphysics, I should start on a brief historical note in support of this approach. The philosophical 
environment that shaped the interests and views of the young Kant was dominated by Leibniz 
expositors like Christian Wolff and Alexander Baumgarten. Much discussion in this period 
centered on the basic tenets of Leibniz’s metaphysics, including: the need for and nature  of simple 
substances; the representational capacities of such substances; and the relation of such substances 
to space, time and causality. Kant’s earliest works constitute direct engagements with these 
Leibnizian debates. We need merely consider such titles of Kant’s works as Living Forces (1746) 
and   Physical   Monadology   (1756)    to    see    the   centrality   of   Leibniz    to   Kant’s   early 
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thinking.63 But as Kant’s contemporaries noted, Leibniz continues to loom large in the critical 
period as well.64 To be sure, we need not go as far as Kant’s correspondent Eberhard, who 
notoriously proclaimed that “there is nothing true in the [first] Critique that is not already to be 
found in Leibniz.”65 But as I hope to make compelling in this chapter, there is nevertheless a sense 
in which we should take seriously Kant’s own claim, in reply to Eberhard, of providing “the true 
apology for Leibniz” (D, AA 8 250).66 
2.1 THE NATURE OF SENSATION 
In one important passage, Kant characterizes Empfindungen as (A19-20/B34): “the effect 
of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it.” This is an 
interesting passage since it combines two features that Kant repeatedly associates with sensation, 
but which may seem in some tension. On the one hand, sensations are “the effect of an object,” 
i.e., their description makes reference to an external entity, namely as the object of affection. On
the other hand, sensations seem intended to capture a distinctly subjective side of this process of 
affection. As Rolf George writes, “[t]he rider ‘in so as far as we are affected by it’ is crucial. It is 
to convey that if merely a sensation is present in the mind, no object is represented.”67 In 
interpretations of Kant’s view of sensations, these two aspects have tended to pull apart. 
63 For exposition of Kant’s early thinking see Watkins 2006; see also Svare 2006. To be sure, Kant is known to have 
deplored some of his early Leibnizian works (Svare 2006). But this may have more to do with the (perceived) failure 
of their engagement with Leibnizian thought, rather than a repudiation of their subject matter per se. 
64 Leibniz is, in fact, the philosopher Kant cites most in the first Critique (Jauernig 2008). 
65 Eberhard 1968, p. 289. For discussion, see Allison 2012, p. 189. 
66 To some ears this cannot seem right, given Kant’s well-known rebuke of Leibniz in the Amphiboly section of the 
Critique for having “intellectualized the appearances.” I answer this objection in section 2.5 below. 
67 George 1981, p. 239. 
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Some philosophers (George 1981, Kumar 2014) have considered the subjective character 
of sensations to be their critical feature, focusing on other passages where Kant seems to make this 
explicit (A320/B376; R683, AA 15; italics mine): 
That perception (Perzeption) [i.e., representation with consciousness] which relates solely to the 
subject, as the modification of its state, [is sensation].68
Appearance is a representation of the senses, to the extent it relates to an object; sensation: if it 
relates merely to the subject. 
In particular, Rolf George (1981) has taken Kant’s characterization of sensations as subjective as 
evidence of his adherence to the so-called “sensationist” doctrine, i.e., the view that the most basic 
states produced through sense-affection are non-intentional sensations. George finds the locus 
classicus for this view in Malebranche: 
It seems that Malebranche was the first to hold that external impingements upon the senses must 
initially result in sensations, merely subjective modifications of the mind. The important insight here 
is not that all knowledge of external things begins with sensory awareness—many others held this 
view—and that some elaboration of the sensory input by central functions of the mind is needed 
before one can properly speak of knowledge or perception. It was, rather, that the mental states 
initially induced are non-intentional or non-referential.69
George’s attribution of “sensationism” to Kant is supposed to gain further plausibility from its 
apparent endorsement by Johannes Nicolaus Tetens, whose work Kant allegedly consulted when 
writing.70 Consider, for example, the following passage from Tetens, which seems along Kant’s 
above-noted lines in characterizing Empfindungen as alterations of a subject’s state: 
In sensation [Empfindung] comes [entsteht] an alteration [Veränderung] of our state, a new 
modification [Modification] in the soul. I direct my eyes to the sun. Something happens here, and I 
feel something, sense [empfinde] it. The impression [Eindruck] comes in this case from the  outside; 
[…] the felt alteration is the Empfindung.71 
68 Falkenstein argues that the Stufenleiter at (A320/B376) should not be taken at face value, since it comes in the 
context merely of Kant distancing his notion of “idea” from those of preceding empiricists (1990, p. 114). Kumar, 
for his part, disputes Falkenstein’s contention (Kumar 2014, fn. 54). 
69 George 1981, p. 229. For similar views, see Kitcher 1993, Aquila 1983, Kumar 2014. 
70 For the claim that Kant looked at Tetens while writing, Hamann’s letter to Herder (May 17, 1779): "Kant is 
working busily on his moral (sic.) of pure reason, and Tetens is always before him." Quoted in Manfred Kuehn 
1987, p. 143. For discussion see Kumar 2014, p. 283; Kitcher 1993, p. 68. 
71 Tetens 1913, pp. 161-162. In turn, the source for Tetens’ sensationism seems to be Étienne Condillac (see 
Condillac 1971, 1930). 
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But understanding Kant’s view of Empfindungen along sensationist lines is not 
uncontroversial. There are other passages in which Kant seems to emphasize the alternative aspect 
of sensations, i.e., their relation to objects of affection. As noted, Kant frequently speaks  of 
sensations as the “material” of cognition of external objects. Kant at times identifies sensation as 
the material of intuition (A42/B60), and at other times Kant introduces sensation as 
“corresponding” to the matter of appearance, i.e., as corresponding to the objects of intuition 
(A723-B751; A581-B609). Grounded in these passages, Lorne Falkenstein provides a reading of 
sensations that emphasizes not their subjectivity, but their role in external object-cognition.72 For 
Falkenstein, “the ‘matter’ of appearance, presumably, is […] the stuff it is made of.”73 Accordingly, 
sensation cannot on pain of inconsistency be the material both of intuition and of appearance. 
Falkenstein resolves this conflict by taking seriously the idea that sensations constitute intuitions, 
but correspond to appearances. As such, “there is some sort of correlation between what exists as 
sensation and what is referred to as a component or property of the object.” In particular, sensations 
“designate a particular content in appearances.”74 Indeed for Falkenstein, sensations are taken as 
inferential grounds for the nature of affecting objects: 
the objects referred to through perception are taken to be distinct entities to which we ascribe a 
degree of influence or force based on the intensity of our sensations. Rather than being a relation of 
identity, the ‘correspondence’ represented between sensation in our perception and force in the 
object is a relation of effect to an inferred cause.75
Pace George, Falkenstein concludes that sensations are after all not wholly subjective, since their 
nature is explicitly tied to certain features of the objects of perception. 
72 E.g., Falkenstein 1990. See also Falkenstein 1995. 
73 Falkenstein 1990, p. 66. 
74 Falkenstein 1990, pp. 67- 69. 
75 Falkenstein 1990, p. 70. Indeed, Falkenstein’s view is not merely that sensations are effects with a certain intensity, 
but more specifically, that “sensations must be physical effects on the body of the subject.” (Falkenstein 1990, p. 83). 
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The disagreement between George and Falkenstein about the subjective character of 
sensations leads to a second dispute concerning sensations’ spatio-temporal properties. Again there 
seems to be tension in Kant’s text. On the one hand, Kant seems to explicitly deny that sensations 
have spatial character in lacking “extensive magnitude” (B209), since “In mere succession 
existence is always vanishing and recommencing, and never has the least magnitude” 
(A183/B226).76 George concludes that “it is evident that Kant took the spatial and extended nature 
of objects to be the result of an interpretation placed upon sequences of sensations.” 77 On the other 
hand, Falkenstein suggests that sensations must themselves be spatio-temporally determinate in 
order to facilitate the cognition of objects in time and space. (I discuss Falkenstein’s specific 
argument to this conclusion in §4 below.)78 
Whatever interpreters’ views on the above debates about the nature of Empfindungen, in 
general a focus on sensation has fostered the above-noted Dualist readings of Kant’s view of 
cognition. These Dualist views are sometimes described as  “constructivist.”79  Constructivists take 
a “bottom-up” perspective on Kant’s conception of cognition. They see Kant as aiming to explain 
full-blown representational intentionality given a relatively austere basis of sensory  input. As 
Richard Aquila writes, representing the approach: “Like George, I connect Kant’s need to 
introduce an element of intentionality with the fact that ‘sensation’ as such does not  constitute 
76 George 1981, pp. 248-9. Longuenesse 1998 (pp. 299-300) agrees with the a-temporal characterization of 
sensation. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Falkenstein 1990, p. 64. Falkenstein recognizes that there are passages in which Kant appears to deny that sensations 
have spatial dimensions (A99; B208), but takes his argument to show that this cannot be Kant’s considered view. 
79 Here I apply the term “constructivism” more broadly than sometimes done, when it is restricted to views that 
conceive of mental states as strictly constituted by more primitive ones. In my use of “constructivism,” no such 
claim is implied. 
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mental ‘reference.’”80 Further, constructivists see Kant’s view of representational intentionality  as 
the result of a multi-tiered cognitive system in which successive processes of “synthesis” produce 
states that are more sophisticated than their predecessors.81 Constructivist readings have differed 
as to the exact nature of the “bottom-up” synthesizing process, and in particular, the stage at which 
intentional reference is attained. The most common view is that intentionality arises with judgment. 
This view, for example, is presented by Allison: 
What judgment ‘produces’ from itself is the representation of objects, that is to say, objectively valid 
judgments. The understanding is, therefore, spontaneous in the sense that it ‘constitutes’ objectivity 
or objective reference in and through the act of judgment, and it does this by synthesizing the 
manifold of sensible intuition.82 
But this view is not universal, and other philosophers have suggested that Kant recognizes 
representational significance prior to judgment.83 In particular, such philosophers recognize what 
Thomas Land has described as a “two-species view of the exercise of spontaneity,” on which Kant 
distinguishes between combination “of the manifold of intuition” and the combination of “several 
concepts in judgment” (A79/B104-5).84 On this form of constructivism, it remains true that Kant 
takes a “bottom-up” view of representational intentionality, but such intentionality is not attained 
in a single way or at a single stage, but rather in different ways in intuition and in judgment. 
80 Aquila 1983, p. 186n. Compare also descriptions of Kant’s project as concerning “how a mental state could be 
‘intentional’” (Kitcher 1990, p. 66), and the way “The aggregation and coordination of sensory impressions produce 
objects, reference.” (George 1981, pp. 240-241). 
81 As Falkenstein details his view of the process (Falkenstein 1990, pp. 64-65): 
The picture Kant draws of the cognitive process consists of three moments: the presentation of data, 
the processing of data, and the output of knowledge claims. The moment of data processing  is 
referred to as synthesis and the original output of processing as concept. Concepts can in turn be 
subjected to higher level processing, yielding propositions or what Kant called judgments, and this 
state of processing is in fact referred to specifically as judgments. Judgments can in their own right 
be subject to a yet higher level of processing, yielding new judgments. 
82 Allison 1989, p. 94. For similar approaches, see also Paton 1936, Buroker 2006, Bird 2006, Bennet 1966. See 
Land 2006, fn. 10. 
83 Longuenesse 1998 constitutes a prominent example. 
84 Land 2006, p. 196. 
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2.2 LEIBNIZ ON PRIMARY AND SECONDARY MATTER 
On my understanding, it is doubtful whether Kant’s account of Empfindungen can  support 
a “bottom-up” view of perceptual cognition. The sense in which Kant describes  sensation as 
“material” implies that Empfindungen cannot exist independent of the informing influence of 
spontaneity. Therefore Empfindung cannot precede spontaneity either temporally or logically.85 To 
see why, we should turn to Kant’s Leibnizian heritage. 
Leibniz is most familiar from his Monadology: the notoriously cryptic metaphysical 
program positing an infinite multitude of mind-like, atomistic simple substances. But for our 
purposes it is helpful to also consider Leibniz’s views in some earlier works.86 Instead, carving 
Leibniz’s corpus at the joints requires recognizing an early mechanist phase as well  as  least  two 
85 Consider, for example, that in the Axioms of Intuition Kant does not treat Empfindung as a basis from which 
intuition is to be built up. To be sure, this does not rule out other senses in which for Kant sensation may be more 
primitive or basic than the informed representational states of which it is the material component. 
86 For some interpreters it is positively a mistake to view Leibniz’s oeuvre through the prism of Leibniz’s late work 
(e.g., Garber 1997, Garber and Rauzy 2004, Adams 1994, p. 308ff for discussion.) As Garber writes (Garber 2008, 
p. 65):
The ‘Monadology’ is a particularly unfortunate text on which to ground an understanding of 
Leibniz’s philosophy […] it is not clear why it was written or the status it had in Leibniz’s own 
mind. The text was never published, and was probably not intended for publication, nor was it 
widely circulated. It sets Leibniz’s view out in neat little packages and misses the richness of 
dialogue and discussion characteristic of Leibniz’s letters and other writings. It also misses the 
way in which Leibniz’s thought fits into the dialectic of different views at the end of the 
seventeenth century, and gives almost nothing of the motivation that drove Leibniz to introduce 
monads in the world. 
But Garber’s view of Leibniz’s thinking as in constant development remains controversial, and need not be 
assumed for my purposes. 
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phases of neo-Aristotelian substance-metaphysics (divided e.g., by their stance on the reality of 
corporeal substance). Our present purposes allow us to abstract from some of these exegetical 
details, and focus instead on several broad themes motivating and running throughout Leibniz’s 
Aristotelian thinking.87 In particular, we need to get in view some basic aspects of Leibniz’s 
development of an Aristotelian substance metaphysics in terms of a hylomorphic taxonomy of 
intrinsic substantial forces. 
To illuminate Leibniz’s account of substance in terms of forces, we need to appreciate its 
origins in Leibniz’s rejection of Cartesian mechanism, both its metaphysics and its dynamics.  The 
relevant Cartesian mechanism abandoned Aristotelian substances in favor of a material substance 
defined in terms of extension. In Eric Watkins’ description of the view: 
According to Descartes, bodies do not consist of substantial forms and primary matter, as scholastic 
Aristotelians had thought; nor, as Leibniz understands him, are they the seats of active causal powers 
by means of which they could cause changes of motion in each other; rather, as purely geometrical 
figures, they are simply extended in space.88
Leibniz’s philosophy is best understood as a wholesale repudiation of this broadly Cartesian  view 
in favor of a rehabilitation of (neo-)Aristotelian metaphysics. For our purposes, we can make do 
with a relatively simple-minded summary of the thrust of Leibniz’s resistance to the Cartesian 
view. In particular, there are two points worth noting, one concerning Leibniz’s rejection of 
Cartesian metaphysics and one concerning Leibniz’s rejection of  Cartesian dynamics. 
Leibniz grounds his critique of the Cartesian metaphysics in an argument that a substance 
must have “a form of some kind” such as to provide it with “genuine unity,” as opposed to being 
87 A further difficulty in relating Kant to Leibniz is textual-historical. During Kant’s life many of Leibniz’s works 
remained unpublished, and among the published works it is not clear which Kant read (for discussion, Garber 2008, 
p. 65). I find these textual considerations not especially worrisome, because as Kant’s early works attest, his
philosophical environment was saturated with Leibnizian thought in a way that doubtless provided Kant access to 
Leibnizian themes in ways that transcend text. 
88 Watkins 2006, p. 266. 
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a “mere aggregate.”89 Leibniz finds such genuine unities in the ‘soul,’ the ‘self,’ or ‘me’ (A 2:  
72; AG 89): 
each extended mass can be considered as composed of two or a thousand others; there exists only 
an extension achieved through contiguity. Thus one will never find a body of which one can say that 
it is truly a substance. It will always be an aggregate of many. Or rather, it will not be a real entity, 
since the parts making it up are subject to the same difficulty, and since one never arrives at any real 
entity, because entities made up by aggregation have only as much reality as their constituent parts. 
A substantial unity requires a thoroughly indivisible and naturally indestructible being […] which 
can be found in a soul or substantial form, on the model of what is called ‘me.’ 
As Leibniz makes clear in the first passage, extension does not meet his criteria for 
substance-hood because it fails to provide for metaphysical unity. Extended matter is indefinitely 
divisible, and lacks metaphysically basic constituents. Therefore, Leibniz concludes, extended 
material cannot qualify as metaphysically basic. As Leibniz famously formulates his criterion (G 
II 96-97/AG 85): “I consider as an axiom this identical proposition, which receives two  meanings 
only through a change in accent; namely, that what is not truly a being is not truly a being.” 
In the second above passage, Leibniz posits the way his metaphysics meets this criterion, 
i.e., by the (re-)introduction of Aristotelian souls. That it is an Aristotelian notion of soul Leibniz
has in mind is clear from the way Leibniz divides ‘souls’ in broadly Aristotelian fashion according 
to their capacities, distinguishing the lowest class of self-sustaining souls (M 48) from souls with 
perception and memory (M 19) and from rational and apperceptive souls (M 82). 
In turn, Leibniz’s rejection of Cartesian dynamics centers on the Cartesian abandonment 
of substances as seats of irreducible forces. Cartesian dynamics centers on a law of conservation 
of total motion, on which physical bodies, conceived as quantities of extended matter, are subject 
89 The merits of this argument have been much discussed and critiqued, but for our interpretive purposes they need 
not concern us here. 
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to a constant amount of total force operating extrinsically on them. Leibniz thinks this view is 
untenable, and instead proposes a law of conservation of total energy, which concerns not the 
momentum of bodies but their capacities for exerting force on other bodies. For Leibniz, the 
Cartesian account is committed to either of two unacceptable accounts of substance-to-substance 
interaction. One option is for the Cartesian to adopt influx theory, on which momentum is 
“transferred” from body to body. For Leibniz, influx theory fails to acknowledge the fact that 
dynamic properties like momentum are accidental to substances, and therefore do not have the sort 
of independent existence that would allow them to transfer from one substance to another.90 The 
second option is for the Cartesian to revert to occasionalism, on which changes in momentum are 
directly occasioned by God (whether through intervention or systematic laws).91 For Leibniz the 
occasionalist undermines substances’ independence from the Divine, thereby collapsing the 
doctrine into incoherence (L 502). 
The above two features of Leibniz’s thinking—the insistence on substantial form and the 
insistence on intrinsic substantial forces—come together in a forces-based development of 
Aristotelian metaphysics. Leibniz divides intrinsic substantial forces along two axes, 
distinguishing passive from active forces and primitive from derivative forces. The difference 
between a substance’s active and passive forces is between forces the substance exerts on other 
objects and forces that resist other objects. The difference between a substance’s primitive and 
derivative forces is the difference between its capacity to  produce  force  and  the  actual  force  it 
90 As Leibniz writes (DL 131), 
Mass was looked upon the same way as water, and velocity in the same way as salt which was 
dissolved in water, or more confined in less water, and even withdrawn from one water and 
transferred to another. But I have already pointed out how this conflicts with the real metaphysics. 
For discussion, see Miller 1988, p. 252ff. 
91 See Jolly 2005, pp. 57-58 for doubts whether Leibniz’s arguments are effective against a law-based development 
of occasionalism. 
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produces on a particular occasion. Putting these together, we have: primitive active forces; 
derivative active forces; primitive passive forces; and derivative passive forces.92
The  hylomorphic  dimensions  of Leibniz’s substance metaphysics, then, are built out of 
substances’ primitive forces. Consider the following passage (LOC 285-7): 
substances have parts and species. The parts are matter and form. Matter is the principle of passion, 
or primitive force of resisting, which is commonly called bulk or antitypy, from which flows the 
impenetrability of body. Substantial form is the principle of action, or primitive force of acting. 
As this passage makes clear, Leibniz aligns the form of an entity with its primitive active force, 
while the substance’s matter is provided by its primitive force of passivity or ‘resistance.’ As such, 
Leibniz holds that (L 365): 
if anything is real, it is solely the force of acting and suffering, and hence […] the substance of a 
body consists in this. 
This exposition of Leibniz’s hylomorphism puts us in a position to reflect on the material 
character of Kant’s Empfindungen. Abstractly, we can note a structural affinity between Kant’s 
views and Leibniz’s metaphysics. Both share the association of activity (or in a term that Leibniz 
himself coins, ‘spontaneity’) with ‘unity’ and ‘form.’ Both also share the association of passivity 
with matter. But more specifically we can note a critical complication in Leibniz’s material 
conception of passivity that directly sheds light on Kant’s account of Empfindungen. The 
complicating point concerns Leibniz’s above-discussed dismissal of the idea that “mere 
aggregates” without form and unity can have metaphysically fundamental status. This objection 
would seem to apply to matter, when considered apart from form, and thus to passive force. By 
Leibniz’s own lights, how can passive force be metaphysically fundamental if it lacks form? 
92 One may wonder how this taxonomy of forces finds expression in Leibniz’s monadic period. The answer is that 
the forces appear to get reduced to fundamental capacities for perception and appetition. As such, Leibniz writes (G 
VI 615/AG 219. Italics original): “we attribute action to a monad insofar as it has distinct perceptions, and passion, 
insofar as it has confused perceptions.” In turn, appetitions can seem to constitute the later Leibniz’s equivalent of 
derivative active forces (see Rutherford 2005, p. 165, Adams 1994, p. 380, Bodelschweig Dissertation, p. 30). 
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To  resolve  this  tension  Leibniz  avails  himself  of  the  Scholastic  distinction   between 
primary  and  secondary  matter.  As  the  late  Scholastic  Eustachius  a Sancto Paulo explains 
the distinction: 
[Matter] is distinguished into primary and secondary. Primary [matter] is said to be that which, 
before all else, we conceive as entering into the composition of any natural thing, regarded as lacking 
all forms. … Secondary [matter] is said to be that very primary [matter], not, however, bare, but 
endowed with physical actuality [i.e., forms].93
In this way, the distinction between primary and secondary matter amounts to an opposition 
between matter without form and matter as informed. In a complicated passage, Leibniz applies 
the distinction between primary and secondary matter to his substance metaphysics (Disc. 300): 
Extended mass, considered without a substantial form … is not a corporeal substance, but an entirely 
pure phenomenon like the rainbow; therefore philosophers have recognized that it is form which 
gives determinate being to matter…But if one considers as matter of corporeal substance not mass 
without forms but a second matter which is the multiplicity of substances of which the mass is that 
of the total body, it may be said that these substances are parts of this matter, just as those which 
enter into our body form part of it, for as our body is the matter, and the soul is the form of our 
substance, it is the same with other corporeal substances. …But if one were to understand by the 
term ‘matter’ something always essential to the same substance, one might in  the sense of certain 
Scholastics understand thereby the primitive passive power of a substance. 
In this long train of thought, Leibniz progresses through the following reasoning.94 Pace 
the Cartesian, “extended mass” conceived as primary matter—lacking form—is not a substance 
but a “pure phenomenon like the rainbow.” By contrast, secondary matter—matter with form—is 
metaphysically real. Therefore, Leibniz suggests, we should account for a  (corporeal) substance’s 
matter by positing a “multiplicity of substances” of which “the mass” is “that of the total body” (I 
come back to this phrase below). Thus far, then, Leibniz seems to merely dismiss primary matter 
in favor of secondary matter. But in the final sentence Leibniz sounds a concessionary  note  by 
wheeling   back   around   to   redeem   a   notion   of   primary   matter.95   In  particular,  Leibniz 
93 Eustachius a Sancto Paulo 1648, p. 119. 
94 For a good discussion of this same passage, which informs my essay here, see Garber and Rauzy 2004, p. 33. 
95 This may not seem obvious from the sentence itself. Perhaps Leibniz has in mind a third sense of matter as “what 
is always essential to the same substance”? But as I note below, Leibniz explicitly equates primitive passive force 
with primary matter, closing this interpretative option. 
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equates this redeemed notion of primary matter with a substance’s primitive passive power. 
Here is how I think we should understand Leibniz’s thinking. For Leibniz, primary matter 
cannot be fundamentally real, since only genuine substances pass metaphysical muster. Leibniz’s 
choice of a rainbow to illustrate this point can seem unfortunate, since a rainbow is, in its own 
way, a real object, rather than “a pure phenomenon.” But it is not difficult to see the analogy 
Leibniz has in mind. Just as a rainbow, at least intuitively, admits of a sense in which it is an 
illusory object depending on realities of light and atmospheric properties, so primary matter 
conceived by the Cartesian as “extended mass” appears metaphysically independent, but in reality 
requires more fundamental metaphysical analysis. As Leibniz writes (AG 171-172), 
I don’t think that extension can be conceived through itself, but I think it is a notion that is resolvable 
and relative … Something must always be assumed which is either continued or diffused, as 
whiteness is in milk, color, ductility and weight are in gold.96
On Leibniz’s reductive analysis of extended matter, then, it must itself already involve form, i.e., 
be “a multiplicity of substances.” But as Leibniz notes, this provides no complete analysis, since 
it leaves unanalyzed the “mass” of such substances. In turn, this is what Leibniz vindicates as an 
acceptable use of primary matter (Disc. 95): 
Primary matter is mass itself, in which there is nothing but extension and antitype or impenetrability. 
It has extension from the space which it fills. 
Given that Leibniz identifies “antitype or impenetrability” with “primitive force of resisting” (LOC 
285-87), we thus find that for Leibniz the primitive passive power of a substance is to be 
understood as its primary matter: something not metaphysically independent, and not to that degree 
“real,” but which nevertheless is a characteristic of metaphysical reality that may be discussed in 
abstraction from its informed existence. 
96 For similar passages, see AG 251; AG 261. 
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2.3 EMPFINDUNG AS PRIMARY MATERIAL 
Recall my claim: 
Empfindungen 
For Kant sensations are the primary matter of cognition. Sensations do not 
constitute independent mental states, but abstractions from mental states intended 
to capture a passive aspect of such states. 
I can now provide a different gloss on this claim: in my view, Empfindungen constitute the mind’s 
primitive passive force in Leibniz’s sense.97 That is, just as for Leibniz items can be described as 
“material” in a sense that equates to a passive aspect of informed reality rather than itself an 
independent level of existence, so, I suggest, Kant intends Empfindung to be understood as 
“material.” To see the initial plausibility of this claim, reconsider the passage cited in the 
introduction in which Kant describes sensation as “material” (R619 AA 15: 268): 
The first building block [Grundstück] of our cognition is Empfindung. One designates [Empfindung] 
the representations in which the mind is viewed as merely passive, to the extent it is affected 
[gewirkt] by the presence of a thing. [The Empfindungen] constitute at the same time the material 
of all our cognition. 
From our reflections on Leibniz, we can now note two points concerning Kant’s description 
of sensation as the “material” of cognition. 
First, it is wrong to assume, as Falkenstein does, that “the ‘matter’ of appearance, 
presumably, is […] the stuff it is made of.”98 Kant need not be understood as suggesting that 
sensation “constitutes” cognition. This would prejudice a reading in favor of secondary matter 
opposed to primary matter. In fact, it seems plausible that Kant does intend Empfindung as material 
in   a    primary    rather   than   secondary   sense.   This   is   in   part   because   of   the  apparent 
97 One may doubt this analogy. Surely Empfindung is not for Kant a “force.” But not implausibly Kant follows 
Leibniz in thinking that affection requires the meeting of two forces, one exerting force, another meeting it—in 
some sense—with resistance. That is, affection may seem to depend on a type of passivity that includes a certain 
“impenetrability” to the effect exerted upon the affected substance. Thanks to Stephen Engstrom for bringing this 
difficulty to my attention. 
98 Falkenstein 1990, p. 66. 
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association in Kant’s thinking between the passivity of Empfindungen and their material character, 
which plausibly follows Leibniz’s usage. In fact, Kant’s emphasis on sensation as the product of 
affection seems in line with Leibniz’s invocation of primitive passive power. 
Second, reading Kant as having in mind a notion of primary material allows us to 
understand a characteristically qualificatory tone in Kant’s description of Empfindungen as mental 
states.99 Note Kant’s above characterization of Empfindungen in which “the mind is viewed as 
merely passive.” This expression is plausibly read as indicating that sensations are not in 
themselves mental states, but rather an element of the mind that we (or, perhaps, the mind itself) 
find when we consider the mind in its passive aspect. Recall some further places in which Kant 
sounds a similar note when describing Empfindung: 
[Empfindung is] the effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are 
affected by it. (A34) 
That perception (Perzeption) [i.e., representation with consciousness] which relates solely to the 
subject, as the modification of its state, [is Empfindung]. (A320/B376) 
Appearance is a representation of the senses, to the extent it relates to an object; sensation: if it 
relates merely to the subject. (R683; AA 15) 
In each of these passages, Kant speaks as if to suggest that by Empfindungen we merely isolate an 
aspect of our cognition. Sensation is the effect of an object “insofar as we are affected by it.” An 
appearance is sensation “to the extent that” it relates merely to the subject. In these various cases, 
I submit that Kant does not posit independent states of cognition which precede the  activity of the 
understanding, but rather merely highlights the primary material component of hylomorphic 
compounds that are states of genuine cognition (e.g., Anschauungen). 
99 I should here note a qualification concerning my reading of Kant’s account of sensation in this paper. As in the 
Stufenleiter, Kant frequently associates sensation with consciousness, as opposed to representation (or aspects of it) 
simpliciter. This feature of Kant’s view is not in any clear tension with my account. For example, the presence of 
consciousness may allow for the sort of perspective on the mind that allows for singling out Empfindung as the 
mind’s passive aspect. But Kant’s mention of consciousness nevertheless indicates that significant sophistications of 
Kant’s account of sensation are beyond the purview of the relatively simple-minded Leibnizian theme presented in 
this paper. 
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Now turn to Kant’s description of the spontaneous side of the equation, which underlies 
the above-discussed “constructivist” views (B130): 
The combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and 
cannot, therefore, be already contained in the pure form of sensible intuition. For it is an act of 
spontaneity of the faculty of representation; and since this faculty, to distinguish it from  sensibility, 
must be entitled understanding, all combination—be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination 
of the manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts—is an act of the 
understanding. To this act the very general title ‘synthesis’ may be assigned... 
Here my reading differs in two, I think plausible, respects from ordinary readings. First, by 
“manifold” I understand not an independently given quantity, but rather in Leibnizian vein a 
“mere” manifold—that which is infinitely divisible, and therefore does not possess the unity 
requisite for metaphysical existence.100 If I am correct, this point applies  to  Kant’s Empfindungen 
and the “manifold” in which for Kant they are presented. Since the “deliverances” of sensation are 
not already informed and therefore do not as such constitute “unities,” there really is not a 
“manifold” of them either. As Leibniz captures the spirit of the point (G II 118; G II 267): 
There are not several beings where there is not even one which may be truly a being. 
For where there is not true unity, there is not true multiplicity. 
Second, given this point, pace the constructivist, my reading suggests that there is an 
important sense in which Kant speaks metaphorically when he invokes spontaneity as “combining” 
the sensory manifold. Prior to the activity of the understanding, there are not really multiple 
Empfindungen, and Empfindungen therefore cannot be “combined.” Rather, on my understanding, 
Kant’s “combining” is like Leibniz’s informing: giving first unity and existence to. 
100 To be sure, this concerns existence at the relevant level. Of course there are aggregates of informed items, e.g., 
intuitions or concepts. But a) such aggregates will not have existence on some further level, i.e., without further 
form a mere manifold of concepts will not, say, amount to a judgment, and b) insofar as no unity is present at all, 
such as in the case of Empfindungen, there is no genuine aggregate either. 
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In further support of my reading, consider a few more passages in which Kant describes 
the role of Empfindungen. These are passages concerning the role of sensation in inner sense, e.g., 
(Anthr. AA 8: 153; italics original). 
The senses can be divided into outer and inner sense. The first is that, where the human body is 
affected by corporeal things; the second that where it is affected by the mind. 
There are various remarkable aspects to this passage, the most prominent perhaps its mention of 
“the human body.” This may seem to lend support to Falkenstein’s above-discussed view that 
sensation should be seen as a distinctly bodily phenomenon. But abstracting from Falkenstein’s 
specific commitment, the point I want to draw attention to is Kant’s methodology of introducing 
senses to accommodate types of affection. To be sure, this point may seem neutral since any 
account of Empfindungen will center on their role in affection. But I suggest my account lends 
particular salience to Kant’s individuation of senses according to the types of affection they 
accommodate. At any rate, Kant’s positing of “inner sense” may seem to lend particular urgency 
to conceiving Empfindungen in terms of mere affection, as on my account. Consider the 
following question: if sensations are themselves representations (or mental states of some 
independent sort), do they in turn affect the subject? If so, the result would seem a regress of 
Empfindungen. But if not, how do Empfindungen play a role in awareness? This difficulty is by 
no means obviously inescapable.101 But it is nevertheless worth noting that on my account no 
such difficulty ensues, since Empfindungen are not mental states beyond their affective character. 
A further benefit of my account is that it gives a compelling reading of Kant’s repeated 
characterization  of  sensibility  and  its  deliverances  as  apparently  opposed  to  an unspecified 
101 For example, Falkenstein’s view is unaffected by this worry, since for him Empfindungen are representational 
states of the body, thus stopping worries of a regress. But most readers of Kant do not hold the view that 
Empfindungen for Kant are bodily states. 
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“faculty of representations.” Reconsider elements from two passages that have been central to this 
chapter (A19-20/B34; B130. Italics mine): 
[Empfindung is] the effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected 
by it. 
[Combination] is an act of spontaneity of the faculty of representation; and since this faculty, to 
distinguish it from sensibility, must be entitled understanding, all combination […] is an act of the 
understanding. 
In both of these passages Kant places sense in relation to a “faculty of representation.” By contrast, 
if sensibility were itself a cognitive faculty, we might have expected Kant’s above comments to 
single out the understanding specifically. But on my account Kant’s mention of sense as distinct 
from a single faculty of representations is unsurprising. Kant’s view is just that. Sensation is 
nothing further than the passive aspect of a single faculty capable of representation. 
A final advantage of my account, I think, is the way it treats the disputes between George 
and Falkenstein. Recall that the dispute concerning the spatio-temporal character of Empfindung 
turns on passages in which Kant denies sensations spatio-temporal “magnitude,” such as 
(A183/B226): “In mere succession existence is always vanishing and recommencing, and never 
has the least magnitude.” For Falkenstein, passages such as these must be explained away since 
only if sensations are spatio-temporally organized can they account for the sense in which 
sensations allow for cognition by “corresponding” to the objects of intuition.102 But on my account 
both features of Kant’s account can be combined coherently. On my reading, what  Kant  affirms
102 Falkenstein hopes to avoid the consequences of this passage by suggesting that the items coming in “mere 
succession” are not Empfindungen, but rather changes in the nature of apprehension (Falkenstein 1990, p. 83): 
Even though the apprehension of the array of appearance is always successive and the parts follow 
upon one another, as Kant puts it at A89-B23, it may be that these ‘parts’ of the array are not 
minima sensibilia but just successive alterations in the (spatially articulated?) apprehension. 
As will be clear from the Leibnizian theme suggested in this paper, I am sympathetic to the idea that for 
Kant “parts” are not minima sensibilia. But as I have suggested, without implication of the understanding, 
“sensible apprehension” generally is in no better standing. 
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by suggesting that in a succession of Empfindungen “existence is always vanishing and 
recommencing” is that, properly speaking, there is no existence at all in mere sense. It is because 
Empfindungen are not genuine mental entities that they cannot possess magnitudes. As Kant 
explicates, it is only in synthesis that we meet magnitude (B210): “Apprehension, merely by means 
of sensation, fills only an instant […] As something in the appearance, the apprehension  of which 
is not a successive synthesis, proceeding from the parts to the whole representation, it therefore 
has no extensive magnitude.”103 
But pace Falkenstein, recognizing Empfindungen’s lack of magnitude is consistent with 
recognizing the role Empfindungen play in cognition by ‘corresponding’ to aspects of the object 
of intuition. Consider, for example, the following critical passages (B207-208; B209): 
Appearances contain in addition to intuition the matter for some object in general […] they contain, 
that is to say, the real of sensation as merely subjective representation, which gives us only the 
consciousness that the subject is affected, and which we relate to an object in general. 
Corresponding to this intensity of sensation, an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree of influence 
on the sense […] must be ascribed to all objects of perception, insofar as the perception contains 
sensation. 
These passages contain some complicated elements, in particular (i) the notion that in 
addition to ‘intuition,’ appearances also contain “the matter for some object in general,” which 
Kant equates to (ii) “the real of sensation as merely subjective representation, which gives us only 
the consciousness that the subject is affected,” which in turn (iii) we relate to an object in general. 
More specifically, Kant suggests there is (iv) a certain “intensity” to this sensation, which (v) 
“corresponds” to “an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree of influence on the sense” that (vi) “can 
be ascribed to all objects of perception.” 
103 Translated at Buroker 2006, p. 160. Note here Kant’s explicit association of magnitude with a move from “parts” 
to a “whole.” This is resonant with the Leibnizian theme I have been advocating as structuring Kant’s thinking. 
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I think these passages sketch out a path for my account to accommodate an appropriate role 
for Empfindungen in cognition. Consonant with my account, (i)-(iii) suggest that for Kant there is 
nothing to sensation but “the matter of some object” in the explicit sense of the role objects play 
in affecting the subject. But as (iv)-(vi) make clear, this is sufficient for sensations to, in some 
sense, contribute to cognition of objects, since the “intensity” of sensory affection can be correlated 
to an intensive magnitude that can be “ascribed to” objects. Insofar as I am correct in understanding 
Kant’s notion of sense along the lines of Leibniz’s “primitive passive power,” the upshot of the 
above passages is as follows. Even as Empfindungen are not themselves spatio-temporally 
determinate, nevertheless they constitute a form of “passivity” that cannot be understood without 
reference to external objects. To this extent I can side with Falkenstein against George in saying 
that Empfindungen are not wholly without referential character, even as I deny that they are any 
kind of representation in their own right. 
But Falkenstein provides a dilemma argument for the stronger conclusion that 
Empfindungen must themselves be spatially organized. In particular Falkenstein suggests there are 
five possible ways that Kant might account for cognition of objects in space, the only acceptable 
option of which entails that sensations are spatial. On Falkenstein’s presentation, we can cognize 
objects in space: 
(a) through the “manner in which sensations are disposed in our intuitions.”104 
(b) through the manner in which the mind synthesizes sensations in imagination. 
(c) from the nature of sensations themselves. 
(d) from rules provided by the pure concepts of the intellect, or categories. 
(e) from some mode of knowledge outside either the senses or the intellect. 
104 Falkenstein 1990, p. 72. 
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For  Falkenstein,  only  (a)  and  (b)  provide potentially acceptable accounts. Specifically: 
(c) would render cognition of space empirical, as opposed to a priori, for Kant105; (d) would render 
the relevant pure concept arbitrary, “for in what virtue of what rule would [sic] intellect array 
intuitions in space? It could not be because of any spatial characteristics of the experiences, if they 
have no such characteristics”106; and (e) conflicts with the fundamental constraints Kant places on 
the modes of human knowledge.107 In turn, (b) represents the sort of solution that follows from 
George’s sensationist view, on which sensations constitute certain non-spatial signs which the 
intellect synthesizes to produce spatial ordering. For Falkenstein, however, this  violates Kant’s 
precept that space is the form of intuition, rather than the product of intellectual synthesis.108 
Accordingly, for Falkenstein the only acceptable view is (a), on which sensations  are already 
spatially organized as the material of intuition. 
I cannot in this chapter fully address the difficulties associated with Kant’s account of 
cognition of (and in) space and time, notoriously encapsulated in Kant’s description of space and 
time as intuitions in the note at B160.109 But I think my account can plausibly avoid the conclusion 
of Falkeinstein’s argument. It is not clear what precisely Falkenstein has in mind distinguishing 
(b) and (d), as the synthesis of imagination is arguably guided by the categories. At any rate, 
Falkenstein’s arguments against (b) and (d) are hasty, especially his objection that spatial 
dimensions  must  already apply to   Empfindungen  at  pains  of  leaving  the  grounds for spatial 
105 That is, sensations would be the objects of cognition, a representation of such space being acquired in this 
empirical fashion. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Specifically, Kant’s division of the faculties, and the constraint that cognition is conditioned on sense-affection. 
108 A sophisticated version of this idea has been developed by Richard Aquila, for whom sensations are subject to 
the form of intuition, but the form of intuition isn’t itself spatial. Rather “there [is] something in intuitional states 
which […] is responsible for our being ‘intentionally directed’ towards a certain very basic spatial structure in 
appearances” (Falkenstein 1990, p. 74). See Aquila 1983, p. 68; 1989, pp. 6-12. Falkenstein rejects this view for not 
taking sufficiently seriously Kant’s description of space as a form of intuition. 
109 For helpful recent discussion of the state of debate on this topic, see Schulting and Onof 2015. 
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synthesis “arbitrary.” For Kant empirical cognition depends on a series of conditions. One such 
condition is sense affection. Another is the role of the spatio-temporal forms of intuition. But it is 
not at all clear that the latter must be explained in terms of the former at pains of being 
“arbitrary.” Indeed it is not clear that the two conditions of sense affection in Empfindung and  the 
spatio-temporal form of intuition must interact for Kant, such that Empfindungen gain spatio- 
temporal form as the matter of intuition. Again, this seems to assume a reading of Empfindung as 
material in a constitutive sense. As such, the question how and at what stage spatial structure comes 
to characterize the deliverances of receptivity is a subtle one. All my preferred form of Monism 
needs to claim is that Empfindungen do not as such possess extensive magnitude but that, as Kant 
himself writes (B210), such magnitude arises with synthesis, that is, with the sort of moving from 
parts to a whole that is distinctive of the unity of cognition. 
2.4 “THE GRUNDSTÜCK OF OUR COGNITION” 
But it may be objected that my argument in this chapter cannot be right, because Kant is a 
known critic of Leibniz precisely on the topic of sensation, famously accusing Leibniz of having 
“intellectualized the appearances” (A270/B326). I want to close my argument in this chapter by 
responding to this objection. 
Consider Kant’s objection in detail (A270/B326): 
sensibility was only a confused kind of representation for [Leibniz], and not a special source of 
representations; for him appearance was the representation of the thing in itself, although 
distinguished from cognition through the understanding in its logical form, since with its customary 
lack of analysis the former draws a certain mixture of subsidiary representations into  the concept 
of the thing, from which the understanding knows how to abstract. In a word, Leibniz 
intellectualized the appearances. 
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In a similar passage, Kant writes (R 695, AA 15: 308-9): 
Leibniz takes all sensations (deriving from) certain objects for representations of them. But  beings 
who are not the cause of the object through their cognitive states must in the first instance be 
affected in a certain way so that they can arrive at a representation of the object’s presence. Hence 
sensation must be the condition of outer cognitive states.110
The common tenor of Kant’s critique of Leibniz in these two passages is that Leibniz  fails 
to appropriately appreciate the conditioning role sensation plays on representation, as opposed to 
itself being a form of representation generically conceived.111 As Kant writes in R 695, Leibniz 
takes all contact with objects to consist in representations, rather than recognizing that “sensation 
must be the condition of outer cognitive states” for “beings who are not the cause of the object 
through their cognitive states.” A270/B326 elaborates this critique. For Leibniz, “sensibility was 
only a confused kind of representation”: a representation of an imprecise, unrefined kind, but not 
fundamentally distinct from intellectual representation generally. Leibniz therefore 
“intellectualized the appearances” by treating them as  of the nature of representations of the 
understanding. In particular, for Leibniz sensations are not a separable type of affection on which 
representation generally can be said to depend. This explains why Leibniz mistakes appearance 
for “the representation of the thing in itself.” By Kantian lights, Leibniz fails to see that objects 
appear to us not in themselves, but only to the extent that they affect us through sense. 
Kant’s critique of Leibniz in these passages might be thought to contradict my argument in 
this  chapter.  Does  Kant’s  critique of Leibniz not amount to a rejection of Monism in favor of a 
110 Note here Kant’s opposition between “sensation” and “representation” (“Leibniz takes all sensations (deriving 
from) objects to be representations of them.”). This fits my argument for Monism. 
111 An interesting phrase in A270/B326 is Kant’s mention of sensibility as “a special source of representations.” The 
Dualist doubtless reads this as suggesting that sensibility provides independent representations. On the other hand, 
my reading emphasizes Kant’s mention of a source of representations. As I continue to suggest, it is a sensible 
source for representations that Leibniz’s account misses, as opposed to sensible representations per se. 
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form of Dualism? 112 I do not think it does. Indeed I suggest that it is my reading in this chapter  of 
Empfindung as mere affection that illuminates the upshot of the above passages. The key lies once 
more in Kant’s post-Leibnizian debates with Wolff and Baumgarten. One central topic of 
contention was Leibniz’s commitment to a doctrine of ‘pre-established harmony,’ on which 
“substances are not only active but […] are causally self-sufficient.”113 As Leibniz writes (AG 
206): 
I do not admit any action of substance upon each other in the proper sense, since no reason can be 
found for one monad influencing another. 
[Two substances] act equally in the collision, so that half the effect comes from the action of one, 
the other half from the action of the other. And since half the effect or passion is also in one and half 
in the other, it suffices to derive the passion which is in one from the action which is in it, so that 
we need no influence of one on the other. 
As these passages make clear, Leibniz attempts to account for the appearance of interaction 
between substances through forces proper to the substances themselves, thereby denying any 
genuine effect of one substance on another. This doctrine was widely rejected by Leibniz’s 
followers, including the young Kant himself.114 
As Helge Svare details, in early works like LF, PM and NE Kant remains committed to the 
broad outlines of Leibnizian metaphysics, including especially the fundamental notion of 
substantial forces, and the reduction of extended matter to such forces: 
Leibniz is mentioned as a philosopher who understood more about the concept of force than others: 
Leibniz saw that a body possesses an essential force even prior to its extension. This he called its 
‘working force.’ Unfortunately according to Kant Leibniz’s followers misunderstood this concept 
and so his project may be understood as motivated by the intention to restore the theory of working 
force to its original state.115
112 Further question: how can my account of Empfindungen as Leibnizian passive force be accurate if Kant accuses 
Leibniz’s view of altogether lacking sensation? The answer here lies in the distinction between Leibniz’s early 
Aristotelian thought and Monadology. In Monadology Leibniz explicitly reduces passive force to a type of confused 
representation. It is this position Kant targets. 
113 Jolley 2005, p. 73. 
114 E.g., AzDM §602, Baumgarten 2014, §396-9. Kant PM, AA 1: 476. 
115 Svare 2006, p. 47. 
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But consider Kant’s following critique of the Leibnizian commitment to pre-established harmony 
(NE AA 1: 410; AA 1: 412): 
In a world that was free from all motion […], nothing at all in the nature of succession would be 
found even in the inner states of substances. 
it follows immediately from what we have demonstrated that, if the human soul were free from real 
connection with external things, the internal state of the soul would be completely devoid of 
changes. 
Kant’s thought in these passages is that a commitment to pre-established harmony is in 
direct tension with the independence of substances that Leibniz aims to preserve. A causally self- 
sufficient substance would simply cycle through its putatively representational states. But as Kant 
points out, it is not at all clear how such a substance could genuinely represent without standing in 
any relations to worldly states of affairs. Indeed, it is not difficult to see the problem Kant raises 
for the Leibnizian view. For example, what is a passive force if there is no genuine interaction 
between substances? And what is a derivative force? 
I suggest it is this same thought that motivates Kant’s critical objection that Leibniz 
“intellectualized the appearances.” On this understanding of Kant’s objection, Leibniz 
“intellectualized” appearances in thinking that the representational character of substances is 
autonomous and self-sufficient, and is not conditioned by genuine affection. If this is right, Kant’s 
critique of Leibniz is consistent with my reading of Empfindungen in this chapter. Indeed, Kant’s 
objection sheds further light on my account. Recall a last time R619: “The first building block 
[Grundstück] of our cognition is Empfindung.” I can now suggest that Empfindung is the 
Grundstück of cognition not in being the constitutive basis of cognition, but rather in the sense 
suggested by Kant’s objection to Leibniz, in providing the affection on which representation 
depends. 
69 
Last, consider the way my account contrasts with the historical narrative of Kant’s view 
typically offered by “constructivist” readers.116 On this narrative, Kant departs from the 
Leibnizian/Wolffian tradition of assuming representational character as essential to the substances 
that possess it (expressed e.g., by Wolff’s positing of a substantial vis  representiva).117 By contrast, 
the constructivist understands Kant as siding with the broadly Humean tradition of providing a 
positive explanation of intentional character on a basis of sensory stimulus. In particular, Kant is 
understood as replacing Hume’s associationism with an account grounded in a priori intellectual 
resources.118 But on my account Kant comes down on  the rationalist side of the opposition between 
Leibniz and Hume.119 Specifically, Empfindung is not foundational to a constructivist view of 
representational character grounded in sensory input. On the contrary, Empfindung serves as a 
condition on the proper rendering of a Leibnizian view, such that spontaneous representational 
character is understood to depend on affection, even as in Leibnizian fashion it is assumed as the 
form of the sort of substances subjects are. 
116 E.g., Kitcher 1993, pp. 77-85. 
117 As Kitcher writes (1993, p. 67), for Kant, “operations of actual capacities could not be explained by appealing to 
definitions, even definitions purporting to capture essences.” I dissent from this claim. 
118 Kitcher 1993, pp. 79-82. 
119 Consider, e.g., Kitcher’s invocation of A121: 
If cognitive states [Vorstellungen] reproduced one another in any order, just as they happen to 
come together, this would not lead to any determinate connection of them, but only to accidental 
heaps, and consequently would not give rise to any representation [Erkenntnis]. 
For Kitcher (1993, p. 79) this passage critiques Hume’s associationism on grounds it is “too promiscuous,” 
in that “the law of association operates in the same way in all cases, however, and so could not explain how 
we achieve different types of representation.” But Kitcher here wholly misses Kant’s overtly Leibnizian 
language: the point of an “accidental heap” is not that it gives rise to no representation in particular, but that 
it lacks (the relevant) unity altogether. 
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3.0 UNITY AND SUBSTANTIALITY IN KANT’S SUBJECT 
In the B-edition of the first Critique, Kant appends a section (“Refutation of Mendelssohn’s 
Proof for the Permanence of the Soul” (B413-418)) specifically intended to dismantle an argument 
proposed in the Second Dialogue of Moses Mendelssohn’s Phaedon (1767), which seeks to 
establish the simplicity and incorruptibility of the soul. Kant famously characterizes this type of 
argument as (A351) 
the Achilles of all dialectical inferences of the pure doctrine of the soul. It is no mere sophistical 
play, contrived by a dogmatist in order to impart to his assertions a superficial plausibility, but an 
inference which appears to withstand even the keenest scrutiny and the most scrupulously exact 
investigation. 
Kant takes Mendelssohn’s argument to exemplify a foundational theme in the rationalist tradition 
of establishing the existence of a simple and unified human soul. In particular, the Achilles has 
since come to denote any argument that proceeds roughly from premises concerning the presence 
of a certain “unity” in mental goings-on—e.g., thoughts, inferences or visual or qualitative 
experiences—to the conclusion that there must exist a self that is in an important sense simple, 
unified or otherwise part-less.120 Thus in J.P. Schachter’s description, an Achilles argument 
[h]ypostasizes […] a ‘simple’ or indivisible substance which, by virtue of being simple, is then 
further inferred to be immaterial. […] it attempts to do this on the basis of experiential data 
consisting of various kinds of ‘unity’ discoverable in our experience, namely (a) the unity of multiple 
distinct perceptions in a single subject, (b) the unity of multiple ideas in a judgment, and 
120 Achilles arguments are not prominent merely in early modern and rationalist literature, but have seen an upsurge 
in interest in contemporary philosophy of mind as well. See e.g., Rovane 1998, 2012 and Burge 1996 for the claim 
that inference requires an absolutely simple subject, and Barnett 2008 for the argument that an intuition of the 
Achilles form underlies several important contemporary thought experiments in the philosophy of mind (Searle’s 
Chinese Gym, e.g.). See also Barnett 2010 for a positive argument that consciousness must be simple. 
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(c) the unity present in and underlying self-awareness […] For an argument to satisfy the Achilles 
template, it is not sufficient that it somehow make reference to the unity of consciousness; rather, it 
must use the unity of consciousness as the ground for an inference to a simple substance that is the 
subject of experience.121
Kant famously rejects the Achilles argument as a “paralogism”: an argument that is  bound 
to compel us due to the structure of reason, but the appeal of which is ultimately illusory and which 
we can learn to resist (A341/B399).122 As some commentators have noted, it can seem surprising 
that Kant rejects the Achilles. This is for two reasons. 
First, a unified conscious subject plays an important role in Kant’s critical account of 
cognition. Consider, for example, Kant’s powerful suggestion of the importance of unity in 
subjectivity (A354; italics mine) 
It is obvious that if one wants to represent a thinking being, one must put oneself in its place, and 
thus substitute one’s own subject for the object one wants to consider (which is not the case in any 
other species of investigation); and it is obvious that we demand absolute unity of the subject of 
thought. 
After the initial suggestion in this passage of a relation between representing thought and one’s 
own subjectivity, Kant further seems to positively claim that an absolute unity of the subject is 
required for understanding another as a thinker. Just so, Stephen Engstrom’s interpretation of the 
Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception grounds “the generality of representation that all 
concepts share in common” in “the identity, or oneness-in-many, of the primitive act of 
consciousness itself.”123 Of this “primitive act of consciousness” Engstrom further writes: 
This act is also simple: Kant describes the subject’s “discursive consciousness” of this act, or the 
“pure apperception of its mental action” as “simple,” adding, “The I of reflection contains no 
manifold in itself and is in all judgments always one and the same, […]” (Anthr. 141; cf. B135, 
B138).124 
121 Schachter 2008, p. 177 italics original. 
122 For discussion of Kant’s notion of a paralogism, see Harper 2008, pp. 235-237, pp. 244-245. For Kant’s belief 
that paralogisms stem from the nature of reason itself, Michelle Grier 2001. See also Grier 1993. 
123 Engstrom 2013, p. 7. 
124 Engstrom 2013, fn. 13. Compare also Sassen 2008 (p. 216, fn. 6): “Kant himself advanced at least a portion of an 
argument like the one we find in the Second Dialogue of the Phaedon in the Transcendental Deduction of the 
Categories in the second or B-edition of the Critique (B130-40).” 
72 
Second, Kant’s pre-critical metaphysical thinking—as attested by metaphysical lectures, 
Reflexionen and notes dated to the middle and late 1770s, i.e., close to the publication of the first 
edition of the Critique in 1781—seems to positively endorse ontologically substantial accounts  of 
the “I” that Achilles arguments are typically intended to establish. So Kant writes in a note dated 
to the period 1775-1777 (R 4785, 17:707), “The understanding itself (a being that has 
understanding) is simple. It is substance.”125 This apparent contrast with Kant’s critical view in the 
Paralogisms has led some commentators to suggest that Kant’s thinking undergoes a volte- face 
around 1780, accepting something like the Achilles until into the 1770s before rejecting it in the 
Critique. As Pierre Keller writes, 
Kant did not free himself from commitment to the project of rational psychology until quite late in 
his career. Kant still thought of the subject of thought as theoretically knowable in the substantial 
terms suggested by the four basic paralogisms that he identifies in rational psychology into the 
middle of the 1770s. His discovery of the fallacies involved in inferences from self-consciousness 
to substantive claims about the nature of the self or the soul was the last important innovation in  his 
thinking prior to the publication of the Critique in 1781.126 
But against the consensus, in this chapter I will argue for the following claims: 
(1) The Continuity of the Paralogisms: Appearances in the Paralogisms section 
notwithstanding, Kant’s critical philosophy is consistent with his late pre-critical 
work in holding to a conception of the self as a simple, noumenal substance. 
(2) The Specificity of the Paralogisms: Kant’s criticisms in the Paralogisms of 
the Achilles are targeted at specific, identifiable versions of such arguments 
advanced by Kant’s rationalist predecessors, as opposed to arguments of the 
Achilles variety simpliciter. 
Taken together, I suggest (1) and (2) provide room for a third claim that can seem surprising: 
(3) Kant’s Critical Achilles: Kant’s critical thought offers a version of the 
Achilles argument. 
125 Cited at Messina 2014, p. 36. 
126 Keller 1998, Chapter 8, n. 1. Similarly, Corey Dyck considers Kant’s metaphysical writings from the 1770s one 
of the main targets of Kant’s critical thinking (Dyck 2014, pp. 10-11). By contrast, recent work by Julian Wuerth 
(e.g., 2014) represents the opposite tendency, arguing for continuity between Kant’s metaphysical and critical 
thought. 
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If (1)-(3) are true, it reorients our understanding of Kant’s relation to the German rationalist 
tradition criticized in the Paralogisms. On my suggested view, it is Kant’s advocacy of a change 
in the nature of the Achilles argument as advanced by previous German rationalists that has 
confused commentators into thinking of Kant as dismissive of such arguments.127 In  particular (in 
terms that will become clear), Kant dismisses a broad and (for Kant, associatedly) empirical 
Achilles in favor of a narrow and pure Achilles.128 
I will proceed as follows. In §1 I introduce Lennon and Stainton (2008)’s helpful distinction 
between “narrow” and “broad” Achilles arguments. In §2 I turn to Kant’s critique of the Achilles 
in the Paralogisms section of the Critique. In §3 I raise a dilemma for the consensus understanding 
of the Paralogisms, suggesting the common reading cannot be held together with a plausible 
reading of Kant’s metaphysical writings. In §4 I resolve this dilemma by suggesting a reading of 
the Paralogisms as tailored to address specific arguments proposed by Kant’s predecessors 
Alexander Baumgarten and Christian Wolff. But my argument is not merely  textual.  In  §5  I 
associate   my   reading   of   the   Paralogisms   with   a   positive    philosophical   understanding
127 For an excellent exposition that similarly sees important vestiges of rationalist views of the self in Kant’s 
metaphysics of mind, see Tester Dissertation, e.g., p. 12: 
The tendency to overlook the rationalist background of Kant’s discussion and the profound influence 
of rationalism upon his thought have led interpreters to misunderstand the actual arguments that 
Kant is targeting in his discussion of rational psychology and more importantly to overlook aspects 
of Kant’s discussion that reveal a commitment to positive metaphysical doctrines very similar to 
those proposed by the rational psychologists and continuous with the rationalism of his pre-critical 
writings. 
For more work sympathetic to significant linkages between Kant’s critical thinking and his rationalist 
predecessors, see Wunderlich 2001, 2005, Proops 2010, Watkins 2005, Wuerth 2010a, 2010b, 2014 Dyck 
2008, 2011, 2014. 
128 In this regard my reading of Kant will depart markedly from the consensus (the locus classicus of which is at 
Strawson 1966, pp. 155-170). On the standard view the Paralogisms are read as a rejection of the sort of “dogmatic 
metaphysics” that proceeds in independence from experience. But I argue the opposite is true, and a form of 
empiricism is Kant’s target. 
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of Kant’s view of the relation between self and self-consciousness, which centers on a version of 
the Achilles. In §6 I discuss objections. 
Before proceeding, I want to register a note on the philosophical substance at stake in 
defending claims (1)-(3). Because it may seem of limited philosophical interest to know whether 
Kant endorses an Achilles argument, or whether Kant accepts an account of the self as 
metaphysically substantial and simple. But my suggestion is that this impression is wrong and that 
there are significant philosophical and explanatory benefits in appreciating substantial language in 
Kant’s critical views.129 Central to Kant’s thinking is the claim that the apperception expressed by 
“I think” lies at the heart of the mind, and must be capable of accompanying all representations. 
In this context, Kant frequently speaks of the “form” and “unity” of representations. But it has not 
been clear how to understand this language, and what might justify the universal application of 
apperception to mental states. Here I will argue that apperception is central to Kant’s Achilles 
argument, and more specifically, is constitutive of a type of substance. If this is correct, I suggest 
it gives us a new purchase on the strength of Kant’s apperception claim. If apperception is 
constitutive of a substance, then it is intelligible how representations, as accidents inhering in this 
substance, must conform to the substance’s apperceptive nature. Apperception, we might say, 
provides a new way for accidents to inhere in the substance it informs, thus demanding conformity 
of the accidents to the substance’s apperceptive nature.130 Moreover, this construal also adds an 
axis to the debate about the tenability of Kant’s account of apperception, viz. the role of 
apperception in accounting for the unity or simplicity of the conscious mind. Whether unity 
and  simplicity  are  important properties of consciousness, and whether apperception is plausibly
129 For an excellent exposition of the explanatory benefits of substantial language in understanding Kant’s view of 
the intellect, see Boyle Forthcoming. 
130 Of course, this is not yet to justify thinking of apperception as fundamental to experience, a task I undertake in 
the next chapters. 
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constitutive of them, can accordingly be used to motivate arguments for and against Kant’s 
doctrine of apperception. 
3.1 ACHILLES: NARROW AND BROAD 
In their illuminating analysis of the structure of Achilles arguments, Lennon and Stainton 
(2008) distinguish “narrow” and “broad” versions of the argument.131 Lennon and Stainton’s 
distinction turns on whether the Achilles seeks to establish the limited conclusion of the  existence 
of a simple and unified soul (narrow) or whether this conclusion in turn serves as a premise for 
stronger claims about the nature of the soul, such as its immaterialism or immortality (broad). 
Table 1 The Narrow Achilles and the Broad Achilles 
Narrow Achilles Broad Achilles 
P1:  Unification  of  representations  takes P3:  If  the  human  soul/mind  is  a  simple, unified 
place. substance, then it is not material. 
P2: Only a simple, unified substance can P4:  If  the  human  soul/mind  is  a  simple, unified 
unify representations. substance, then it is immortal. 
C1: The human soul or mind is a simple C2:   The   human   soul/mind   is   immaterial  and 
unified substance.132 immortal.133 
131 Lennon and Stainton further note a “narrowest” Achilles argument characterized by one particular reductio to 
support P2, and a “broadest” Achilles argument that moves from C1 to conclusions beyond the nature of the soul 
(for example, contemporary philosophers of consciousness interested in feature-binding, non-modular mental unity 
or phenomenal integration might argue from premises about the unity of mental phenomena to a variety of 
conclusions, such as empirical hypotheses concerning the faculties that a developed cognitive science will posit). 
Here I will not be concerned with arguments of either the narrowest or broadest Achilles varieties. 
132 Lennon and Stainton 2008, p. 3. 
133 Lennon and Stainton 2008, p. 5. 
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It is not coincidental that Stainton and Lennon focus on immateriality and immortality as 
conclusions for the broad Achilles. For purposes of understanding Kant’s criticism of the  Achilles 
below, it is relevant that the Achilles was typically invoked to establish broadly theological 
conclusions about the incorporeality and imperishability of the soul.134 It is helpful to very briefly 
sketch such arguments. The immateriality of the soul is frequently taken to follow from its 
indivisibility. On these arguments, spatiality is intrinsically tied to indefinite divisibility. In turn, 
material existence conforms to spatiality. It follows that if the soul is indivisible, it cannot be 
material. In turn, immateriality is thought to imply imperishability. Here the thought is that 
destruction must be a matter of dissolution. Accordingly, the broad Achilles concludes, the soul as 
simple substance is indestructible and persists after death.135 
In addition to the distinction between narrow and broad forms of the Achilles it is also 
helpful to distinguish between two neoplatonic archetypes of the argument. One of the earliest 
Achilles arguments is arguably found in the work of the neoplatonist Plotinus (1992 IV 7.6): 
If something is going to perceive anything, it must itself be one and must apprehend by the same 
[sense], both if several impressions are [perceived] through many sense organs, or many qualities 
[are perceived] in one object, or if one sense organ [perceives] a complex object, for example, a 
face. For there isn’t one [perception] of the nose and another of the eyes, but one identical 
[perception] of all of them together. And if one [sense-object] enters through the eyes, and another 
through the hearing organ, there must be some one place which they both go. Otherwise, how could 
we state that they are different from each other, if the sense-objects did not all come together to one 
and the same place? Therefore, this place must be like a center point, and the perceptions coming 
from all places, like the lines coming from the circumstances of the circle, must terminate here. And 
the thing that apprehends these perceptions must be of this sort, really one. 
Close reading reveals that in this brief paragraph Plotinus manages to raise three different grounds 
on which to mount an Achilles argument. The first takes as its experiential datum the unity of a 
perceived object, specifically a face. As Plotinus suggests, a perceiver is not separately aware of 
the eyes, the ears and the nose, but rather perceives them as aspects of a unified face. 
134 This, for example, is the structure of the Mendelssohnian argument that is Kant’s original example of an Achilles. 
135 For trenchant assertions of both the infinite divisibility of matter and the imperishability of substance, see Leibniz 
(AG 79). 
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The second of Plotinus’ arguments invokes the unity of sense information deriving from  different 
modalities, such as seeing and hearing. Plotinus’ third argument expands on the argument from 
different modalities by drawing on the ability of subjects to compare and contrast the various 
representations issuing from them. As Plotinus writes, “how could we state that they are different 
from each other, if the sense-objects did not all come together to one and the same place?” For 
Plotinus, these three considerations serve the same conclusion that there must be a “thing” that is 
in an important sense simple.136 
But as helpfully discussed by Coope (2013), Henry (2008) and Cory (2014), there is a 
different neoplatonist Achilles in the vicinity, which departs not from a unity found in  experience, 
but rather a unity found in a distinctive type of reflection. The second neoplatonist version of the 
Achilles argument is provided by Proclus (the argument is also expressed in the neoplatonist work 
Book of Causes, which is in part based on Proclus’ work.)137 As Ursula Coope writes, for example, 
“Proposition 7 in the Book of Causes (based on proposition 15 of Proclus’ (1963) asserts that since 
an intelligence ‘reverts upon its essence’ it must be an ‘undivided substance.’”138 
Table 2  The Plotinian Achilles and the Proclean Achilles 
Plotinian Achilles Proclean Achilles\ 
P1: Unification of representations takes place. P1:Unity characterizes reflective 
P2:  Only a  simple,  unified  substance  can unify consciousness 
representations. P2:   Only  a  simple,   unified   substance can 
C1: The human soul or mind is a simple unified possess this unity 
substance C1:  The  human  soul  or  mind  is  a  simple 
unified substance. 
136 Plotinus does not use specifically substantial language, which is a feature of subsequent developments of the 
Achilles. 
137 For discussion, see Coope 2013, p. 8. 
138 Coope 2013, p. 8. 
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For my purposes, there are two major distinctions between these two arguments. The first 
distinction concerns P1. The Plotinian argument departs from a process of “unification” among 
representations. The productive character of this premise renders salient a grounding of the 
existence claim in a quasi-empirical epistemology on which the subject introspects the product of 
what is subsequently inferred to be a process of unification (as is the case, e.g., in Plotinus’ 
observations concerning the awareness of a face).139 By contrast, the Proclean argument departs 
from a “unity” in reflective consciousness which carries no productive associations. This renders 
plausible that the claim of this unity is not grounded in introspection, but can be understood purely 
conceptually from the notion of reflection.140 
The second distinction concerns the grounds for P2. The Plotinian argument seems to 
depend on an explanatory inference on which only a hypostasized simple substance can serve to 
explain the phenomenon recorded in P1. By contrast, the Proclean argument may be understood 
as giving a constitutive gloss on the grounds for P2. The simple substance is not inferred to explain 
the reflective unity recorded in P1. Rather, the claim is that a substance is constituted by the sort 
of unity implicated in reflective consciousness. This is indeed Proclus’ own intended development 
of the argument. In Coope’s characterization, “Proclus […] claims that reversion to oneself is 
cognition of oneself ([CT], ii. 286. 32) and that in reverting on itself a thing constitutes itself as 
the  kind  thing  it  is  (so  that  all  and  only  those  things  that  are   revert   on   themselves   are 
139 To be sure, the connection is not compulsory. A Plotinian argument could, e.g., depart from a priori premises 
concerning a process of unification. But as I discuss below in regards the influential Wolffian variety of rational 
psychology, in fact the premise is typically understood as relying on empirical grounds. 
140 To be sure, if the unity of Proclean reflection is intended to be a priori this does not rule out the role of the cogito 
in arguments for the unity of reflective self-consciousness. Although I cannot here defend this as an analysis of the 
cogito, the suggestion is that the cogito merely constitutes thought acting out its own nature: displaying its unity to 
itself, rather than observing a unity in some further state of consciousness. This is in line with the structure of the 
“Merian” cogito in §4 discussed below. 
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authupostata).” 141 To be sure, at this point it is unclear what is supposed to motivate a 
constitutive conception of the relation between reflection and a simple subject, or in Proclean 
vocabulary, the relation between reflection and “self-constitution.” I address this issue in §5 
below.
3.2 KANT’S CRITIQUE OF THE ACHILLES IN THE PARALOGISMS 
The  consensus  on  Kant’s rejection of the Achilles is grounded in the Paralogism section 
of  the  Critique,  in which Kant seems to diagnose and disarm the sway of arguments close to the 
Achilles.  Consider  the  First  and  Second  Paralogisms  as  stated in the A-edition (A348; A351 
emphasis original):142 
I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible judgments, and this 
representation of myself cannot be used as predicate of any other thing. 
Therefore I, as thinking being (soul), am substance. 
A thing whose action can never be regarded as the concurrence of many acting things is simple. 
Now the soul, or the thinking I, is such a thing. Therefore, etc. 
Cursorily stated as they are, these two arguments are clearly intended to invoke the two  conjuncts 
of the conclusion of an Achilles: the status of the self as substantial and simple.143 In particular, 
141 Coope 2013, fn. 34. 
142 In the A-edition, Kant provides distinct sections treating inferences to the status of the soul as a substance (First 
Paralogism); inferences to the simplicity or unity of this substance (Second Paralogism); inferences to the persistent 
identity or personality of the self (Third Paralogism); and a treatment of the ideality of the objects of experience 
(Fourth Paralogism). Likely due to its divergent subject matter as concerned with objects rather than the self, 
discussion of the Fourth Paralogism in the B-edition is moved to the Refutation of Idealism (although for discussion 
of its relevance to the Paralogisms, see Grier 2001). 
143 As several commentators have noted, Kant’s cursory statement of the Paralogisms is plausibly associated with 
the intention to capture extremely familiar forms of argument. (Plausibly indeed, given Kant’s association of the 
Paralogisms with inevitable forms of Transcendental Illusion, Kant takes the arguments to be familiar from the 
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the First Paralogism infers to the existence of the subject as substance on grounds of its peculiar 
nature as being essentially the  subject  of  predication  (I  come  back  to  this  argument  in 
detail below). The Second Paralogism comes close to the Plotinian paradigm of an Achilles 
argument, by arguing from an explanandum of an action—in this case, thinking—that brooks no 
multiple subjects to an explanans of a simple subject. Kant further illustrates this type of thought 
in the famous “verse argument” (MH 28:44) 
A whole out of many simple substances that are thinking, thinks first when all the thoughts of each 
simple substance are unified in it. If each of 100 persons knew a verse from Virgil by heart, would 
they therefore know all of Virgil by heart?144 
To appreciate Kant’s vivid example, consider my entertaining a verse. There seems to be a certain 
unity to my consideration of the various lines. This can seem to imply that consciousness must in 
an important sense be simple or unified. Otherwise, if my consciousness were relevantly divided 
into parts, should not each part entertain only some part of the verse, while the whole of the verse 
is lost in the disparity of its lines? As Kant likewise writes (A352), 
Representations…distributed among different beings, never make up a whole thought…and it is 
therefore impossible that a thought should inhere in what is essentially composite.145
Kant characterizes a paralogism as an argument both the major and minor premises of 
which are (R 5552, 18: 218-219) “correct,” but which is false in virtue of its form, since the “middle 
term in both premises is taken in different meanings.” How does this formal characterization apply 
to  the  representation  of  the Achilles in the Paralogisms? Kant writes the following (B410-411) 
The whole procedure of rational psychology is determined by a paralogism, which is exhibited in the 
following syllogism: 
structure of reason itself). But one central claim of this paper is that Kant’s ambitious presentation of the 
Paralogisms has blinded interpreters to the specific rationalist arguments they reference. 
144 For an extended development of this type of argument, see also (ML1 28: 266) 
145 Compare also Kant’s comment that (MVi 29:1034) “a composite as such simply cannot think.” 
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That which cannot be thought of otherwise than as subject does not exist otherwise than as subject, and is 
therefore substance. 
A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject. 
Therefore it exists only as subject, that is, a substance. 
In the major premise we speak of a being that can be thought in general, in every relation, and therefore  also 
as it may be given in intuition. But in the minor premise we speak of it only insofar as it regards itself, as 
subject, simply in relation to thought and the unity of consciousness, and not as likewise in relation to  the 
intuitions through which it is given as object to thought. Thus the conclusion is arrived at fallaciously, per 
sophisma figura dictionis. 
Kant’s presentation focuses on the argument advanced in the First Paralogism, accusing 
the argument of a sophisma figura dictionis, i.e., a fallacy of equivocation. To see where the fallacy 
is supposed to lie, we should consider in some more detail the argument targeted in the First 
Paralogism. Take Kant’s representation of the argument in his metaphysical lectures (ML1, 
28:266): 
The I means the subject so far as it is not predicate of another thing. What is not predicate of another 
thing is substance. The I is the general subject of all predicates, of all thinking, of all actions, of all 
possible judgments that we can pass of ourselves as a thinking being. I can only say: I am, I think, I 
act. Thus it is not at all feasible that the I would be a predicate of something else. [...] Consequently, 
the I, or the soul through which the I is expressed is a substance. 
We can capture the argument advanced here as grounded in a distinction between merely 
accidental and essential ways in which a representation can occupy the subject position in a 
judgment. While representations of (e.g.) actions and thoughts can accidentally serve as the subject 
of a judgment, they also admit of a predicative role as accidents and determinations of a thinker or 
agent. By contrast, the “I” is essentially a subject: it grounds determinations, but cannot itself be 
predicated of a further substance. The argument concludes that the self must be an irreducible 
existent, i.e., a substance. 
How is this argument a paralogism? Given the definition of a paralogism, it follows that 
the premises of the argument are “correct.” That is, Kant must accept both the major premise 
asserting  that  if  an  item is essentially a subject then it must exist as a substance, and the minor 
premise  discharging  the  antecedent  by  claiming  that  the  self  only  exists as subject. Instead, 
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Kant’s criticism is that the argument equivocates on the notion of a subject. The major premise 
treats the subject as “a being in general,” i.e., at least potentially an object: something that, in 
Kant’s view, must be amenable to being given in intuition. But the minor premise is grounded only 
in the subjective unity of thinking: it is the subject as she finds herself in self-conscious thought.146 
Therefore, even as the premises of the paralogical argument are correct, the conclusion is invalid 
since the minor premise fails to discharge the major premise. 
But thus stated, Kant’s critique can seem puzzling. What is wrong with the subject, as she 
encounters herself in relation to the unity of thought, taking herself as a “being in general”? Perhaps 
it is true that what the subject encounters in consciousness is not inherently a subject,  but in that 
case the minor premise would be false—the argument would simply be unsound, rather than a 
paralogism.147 But if it is correct that the thinking self must be a subject, then why   is the rationalist 
wrong to infer the existence of this subject as “a being in general”? Here Kant adds a helpful note 
(B411, note α): 
‘Thought’ is taken in the two premisses in totally different senses: in the major premiss, as relating 
to an object in general and therefore to an object as it may be given in intuition; in the minor premise, 
only as it consists in relation to self-consciousness. In the latter sense, no object whatsoever is being 
thought; all that is being represented is simply the relation to self as subject  (as the form of thought). 
In the former premiss we are speaking of things which cannot be thought otherwise than as subjects; 
but in the latter premiss we speak not of things but of thought (abstraction being made from all 
objects) in which the ‘I’ always serves as the subject of consciousness. The conclusion cannot, 
therefore, be ‘I cannot exist otherwise than as subject,’ but merely, ‘In thinking my existence, I 
cannot employ myself save as subject of  the  judgment [therein involved]’ This is an identical 
proposition, and casts no light whatsoever upon the mode  of my existence. 
This passage contains significant positive claims that shed light on the foregoing difficulties. It is 
not  that  Kant  thinks  there  are  merely  insufficient  grounds  to posit “a being in general” from 
146 As Kant also characterizes the fallacy behind the paralogism in a Reflexion (R5552 18: 218-9), both the minor 
and major premises are “correct” but the argument is “false in virtue of its form,” since the “middle term in both 
premises is taken in different meanings”. 
147 Note, relatedly, that the same point applies to Kant’s rejection of the “verse argument.” Kant does not deny that 
thought possesses a unity that requires a single thinking subject, on pain of the argument not being a paralogism. 
Rather, the complaint is merely that the thinking subject is not an objective entity. This observation will structure the 
modest reading of Kant’s criticism of rationalism provided below. 
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encountering the subject in thought. Rather, it is positively that “no object whatsoever is being 
thought” when the subject of thought is considered; rather this is merely to attend to the “form of 
thought” in “abstraction […] from all objects,” which is such that “‘I’ always serves as the subject 
of consciousness.” So the observation in the minor premise is merely that the “I” in thinking can 
formally be employed only as subject, a use of “subject” entirely different than the “subject” of 
the major premise, which is a thing or existent in general. 
Unlike the A-edition’s four distinct Paralogisms, the B-edition contains merely the  unified 
discussion quoted above. So how is the rationalist’s general sophisma figura dictionis supposed to 
bear on the simplicity established in the Second Paralogism? The answer is that (on Kant’s 
diagnosis) simplicity in the relevant sense is a spatial, experiential concept. As Kant writes, 
simplicity is the claim that the soul “does not consist of many subjects in space” (R 18:299).148 But 
the application of this concept to the soul trades on the conception of the self as an object of 
intuition, which Kant has shown is not found in self-conscious reflection. Equally it follows that 
incorporeality and immortality cannot be established for the self, since these properties are 
established through inferences from simplicity. 
3.3 A DILEMMA FOR FUNCTIONALISTS 
Given the tenor of the Paralogisms, there is a broad interpretative consensus around the 
claim  that  Kant  rules  out a substantial conception of the self, and more specifically, arguments 
148 On this definition the self is of course simple, but because it is not a “thing” at all: not because  it is a  simple thing. 
Indeed, Kant in fact rejects that the self has any actual location in space, describing its association with a body as 
involving the (ML1, 28:225) “analogue of location, but not its place.” See also (MMr 29: 879). 
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for such a conception along rationalist lines.149 In particular, broadly functionalist interpretations 
(e.g., Kitcher 1993, 2011; Dyck 2014; Bird 2006; Brook 1994) take Kant to suggest that there is 
nothing to the self apart from relations between mental states.150 On this view, Kant sees the self 
(and, potentially, its simplicity) as a merely formal property of the cognitive process. These 
interpretations rely on Kant’s apparent comments in this direction, such as “the notion of the self 
serves only to introduce all thinking as belonging to consciousness” (A341/B399), or Kant’s claim 
that the self “is only the formal condition, namely, the logical unity of every thought, in which I 
abstract from every object” (A398). As Graham Bird characterizes the Paralogisms, for example: 
The primary objection to the paralogistic argument rests on the belief that merely from the logical 
or grammatical point that a logical subject of judging cannot be a predicate, we cannot infer that 
such a subject is a real substance.151 
As Bird articulates the common functionalist reading, it is the existence of a substantial self that 
the paralogistic argument illicitly derives from the merely logical role the “I” plays in thought. On 
Kitcher’s specific development of the functionalist view, Kant’s conception of the positive self is 
best rendered as an “I”-rule, which provides a form of “synthesis” of the manifold of cognition, 
just as other rules do. As Patricia Kitcher has expressed the view fueled by these passages, 
[Kant] does not have a metaphysically loaded account of a unified consciousness. He takes the ‘unity 
of self-consciousness’ to indicate only relations of necessary connection across mental states.152
Accordingly,  Kitcher’s  explication  of Kant’s  argument  in  the Paralogisms  is  that the 
149 The latter claim is more precise: it is in principle consistent to take Kant to accept a substantial account of the 
self, while rejecting rationalist arguments for this conclusion. 
150 The approach seems true of Longuenesse as well, who writes (1998, pp. 7-8) “the Critique warns us [in the 
Paralogisms chapter] not to consider the Gemü t or mind, the whole of our representational capacities, as a substance.” 
Cited at Boyle Forthcoming, n. 23. 
151 Bird 2006, p. 631 
152 Kitcher 2013 p. 6. See also Kitcher 1990, 2011, and for a sophisticated development of the view Brook 1994. 
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rationalist mistakes “I” for an independent representation, i.e., a representation of a substance, 
where in fact it is merely a condition on cognition, i.e., can only operate in the presence of 
cognition.153 In particular, for Kant we can represent “I” only when abstracting from its role in 
ongoing object cognition. Accordingly, the “I” associated with the unity of the subject is a  wholly 
“empty” representation (A341-2/B400, A345/B406, A346/B404).154 
Proponents of the broadly functionalist sort are aware that at the very least until close to 
publication of the Critique Kant seems to accept an account of the self as simple, noumenal 
substance. Critical here are Kant’s pre-critical metaphysical lectures, and especially ML1, which 
are lecture notes thought to stem from the mid-to-late 1770s. As illustrated e.g., by passages like 
(ML1 28:266) and (MH 28:44) Kant’s metaphysical lectures seem strongly rationalist in bent,  and 
portray arguments close to those in the First and Second Paralogisms. For example (ML1 28: 225-
6): 
The concept of I expresses: I. substantiality.—Substance is the first subject of all inhering accidents. 
But this I is an absolute subject, to which all accidents and predicates can belong, and which cannot 
at all be a predicate of another thing. Thus the I expresses the substantiale; for that substrate in 
which all accidents inhere is the substantiale. This is the only case where we can immediately intuit 
the substance.155
The voluminous nature of these texts and the temporal proximity of ML1 to the Critique impose   a 
burden  on  functionalist  readers to explain their suggestion of a sharp break between Kant’s pre- 
153 E.g., Kitcher 2011, p. 194; Kitcher 2003, p. 9 
154 Andrew Brook 1994 has a similar view, on which both the presence and the unity of the self are conditions on the 
possibility of representation of the subject, instead of amounting to awareness of a substance and its attributes (p. 171; 
p. 173)
(2) From the point of view of what it would be like to be a subject of representation, we must 
picture   the   subject   a   simple   being   and   cannot   picture   it   as   a   plurality   of   any   sort 
(3) If I am aware of myself as subject, I must appear to my self to be one and cannot picture 
myself as a plurality of any sort 
155 I return to Kant’s mention of “immediate intuition” in §3.5 below. 
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critical and critical thought. In this way, Patricia Kitcher (2011, pp. 186-188) has argued that  ML1
is not representative of Kant’s later  views since Kant’s argument in  the Paralogisms must be 
understood as relying on the Transcendental Deduction, which Kitcher argues did not figure  in 
Kant’s thinking in the mid-1770s (as allegedly exemplified in Kant’s notes of the Duisburg 
Nachlaß (1775)).156 
But Julian Wuerth (2010a; 2010b; 2014) has provided an impressive array of textual 
evidence to suggest that the dismissal of ML1 and similar texts is unjustified.157 In agreement with 
Wuerth, I hold 
The Continuity of the Paralogisms: Appearances in the Paralogisms section 
notwithstanding, Kant’s critical philosophy is consistent with his late pre-critical 
work in holding to a conception of the self as a simple, noumenal substance. 
First, Wuerth shows that it is not true that the themes that Kitcher suggests mark Kant’s 
departure from ML1—in particular relevant versions of the Transcendental Deduction—are 
exclusive to Kant’s critical period. They occur equally in documents that plausibly precede ML1.158 
Second, Wuerth shows that the rationalist themes from ML1 occur both in the Critique itself, and 
in the metaphysical lectures from long after the critique, such as MD, MMr and MVi.159 For 
example, in a note taken from Kant’s own copy of the Critique (and hence  obviously post-critical), 
Kant   notes  the  noumenal  character  of  the  self  as  substance  (R CV, 23:34): 
156 This approach is represented also by Dyck (2014, pp. 183-184), who, despite noting “little [initial] discontinuity” 
between the pre-critical and critical views, suggests we should nevertheless appreciate “the dramatic changes” in 
Kant’s view in the metaphysics of the subject, to the effect that the critical Kant “now advances the I think 
considered apart from any claim of existence as the only viable basis for the proper subject of rational psychology.” 
157 Wuerth largely focuses on providing textual evidence against the functionalist view, but at one point also 
emphasizes the worry that functionalist accounts are insufficiently capable of accounting for personal identity, 
insofar as they seem to embrace a Parfittian account on which appropriate relations between mental states between 
different individuals should seem to be capable of allowing for existence of a single subject. In his discussion, Karl 
Ameriks (2000, pp. 261-2) sees this problem, but by Wuerth’s lights Ameriks fails to take sufficiently seriously that 
the possibility of Kant accepting a substantial soul “can still be a natural solution” (Wuerth 2014, chapter 2, fn. 7). 
158 See Wuerth 2014 Chapter 3, section 8. 
159 For just some examples of the enormous array of critical and post-critical textual support Wuerth (e.g., 2014, p. 
21) adduces: A350-1; A356; A365-6; A399-403; Prol 4: 334-5; R6001; MMr, 29: 770-1, 772, 904, 912; MvS, 28:
551; MFNS 4: 542-3; VSGE, 2: 359; ML2 28: 590-2; MD 28: 681-6; MK2 28: 754-6 759; MVi 29: 10125-7, 1032 
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“the I is noumenon; I as intelligence.” Just so (R6001 18:420-1): “The soul in 
transcendental apperception is noumenal substance.” And as Kant writes in the post-critical 
Metaphysik Mrongovius (MMr 179 29: 771) “If we leave aside all accidents, then substance 
remains, this is the pure subject in which everything inheres or is the substantial.”160 Indeed, the 
Critique itself grants that (A350–1; A359), 
one can quite well allow the proposition The soul is substance to be valid. 
it is permitted to me to say,’I am a simple substance,’ i.e., a substance the representation of which 
never contains a synthesis of the manifold. 
The evidence of Kant’s substantial conception of the self engenders a dilemma. How can 
we take Kant’s argument in the Paralogisms seriously if Kant elsewhere accepts a positive 
substantial conception of the self? How can we take Kant’s positive substantial conception of the 
self seriously if he dismisses the rationalist arguments for it in the Paralogisms? 
3.4 KANT’S CRITIQUE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 
In this section I resolve the above dilemma by defending: 
(2) The Specificity of the Paralogisms: Kant’s criticisms in the Paralogisms 
of the Achilles are targeted at specific, identifiable versions of such 
160 Kitcher is aware of this evidence, but her commitment to a purely functionalist account compels her to deny it 
expresses Kant’s view. Referring to (MMr 179 29: 771), Kitcher writes (Kitcher 2011, chapter 11, fn. 3), 
The ‘Metaphysics Mongrovius’ asserts exactly what [Kant] is denying in his published work […] 
When presumed to be accurate and read on its own, this passage suggests that Kant believed the 
cognizers have some cognizance of a substantial ‘I.’ In the published work, he is clear that this 
hope of Rationalist metaphysics must remain unfulfilled 
But Kitcher’s attempt to isolate (MMr 179 29: 771) as unpublished material lacks plausibility given the sheer 
volume of Kant’s remarks concerning a substantial conception of the self. It is more satisfying to cohere these 
remarks with the Paralogisms than to disregard them. 
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arguments advanced by Kant’s rationalist predecessors, as opposed to 
arguments of the Achilles variety simpliciter. 
If (2) is true it promises to resolve the tension between Kant’s arguments in the Paralogisms 
and Kant’s substantial conception of the self. The Paralogisms serve to diagnose particular (if 
profound) errors in the Achilles arguments proposed by Kant’s rationalist predecessors, 
specifically Baumgarten and Wolff. On this Kant’s concern is the form of an Achilles argument 
rather than the argument per se. This is the claim I defend. 
As has recently been noted by several commentators, the arguments sketched in the 
Paralogisms bear a strong resemblance to lines of argument advanced by German rationalists.161 
Consider, for example, Steven Tester’s recent focus on Alexander Baumgarten’s Metaphysics— 
the textbook of Kant’s metaphysics lectures—as a target of Kant’s thinking in the First 
Paralogism.162 Like the argument in the First Paralogism, Baumgarten explicitly proceeds from the 
principle that each accident must have sufficient grounds in a substance since any accident or 
determination must have a ground, which cannot ultimately in turn be an accident or determination, 
on pain of regress (§22). Baumgarten further fits Kant’s target of a rational psychologist in 
inferring from the conclusion that the self must be a substance to various other attributes, including 
freedom (§755), personality (§641, §754), simplicity (§744) and immateriality (§757). If Kant’s 
First Paralogism plausibly represents Baumgarten’s thinking, Corey Dyck in his recent Kant and 
Rational Psychology (2014) has provided a plausible target of Kant’s Second Paralogism in 
Christian Wolff. Wolff’s argument for the existence of a simple soul strikingly recalls Kant’s 
representation of the “verse argument.” Wolff argues that the activity of thinking must be a matter 
of  motion  (DM 738),  and  that  the  motion  of  different  bodies  could  not  explain  the unified 
161 Important here are Dyck 2011, 2014, Tester Dissertation. 
162 Tester Dissertation, p. 32. Citations from Baumgarten 2013, unless otherwise specified. 
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character  of  this  particular  motion  (DM 739-742).  Thinking must, consequently, be done by a 
unified subject.163 
For presentational purposes I rely here on Tester’s and Dyck’s detailed discussions of 
Wolff and Baumgarten, and nothing in my cursory presentation can establish Wolff and 
Baumgarten as the main target of Kant’s First and Second Paralogisms (much less the exclusive 
target).164 But reflecting on Kant’s responses to the specifics of Baumgarten’s and Wolff’s 
arguments helps locate the upshot of the Paralogisms as far more targeted than assumed by 
functionalist readers. 
First consider Kant’s diagnosis of Baumgarten’s argument as an instance of Transcendental 
Illusion.165 This concerns Baumgarten’s employment of the principle of  sufficient reason. Kant 
agrees with Baumgarten that it is natural to infer from the fact that the  self does not seem to admit 
of use as a predicate, to the claim that the self must be a substance. Kant makes clear in the 
Prolegomena that even as ultimately this argument rests on a confusion, its motivating idea is 
natural (Prol. 4:334). 
Now it does appear as if we have something substantial in the consciousness of ourselves (i.e., in 
the thinking subject), and indeed have it in an immediate intuition; for all the predicates of inner 
163 For discussion, see Kitcher 2011, p. 48. As Richard Blackwell has made clear (Blackwell 1961, p. 346) Wolff’s 
argument has elements that are closer to a Proclean than a Plotinian Achilles by focusing specifically on the activity 
of reflection: 
Wolff indicates that one might argue that perception could occur in matter by means of the various 
parts of matter producing and sustaining the proper motions. However, there is no way in which 
apperception could occur in a material body. Hence the consequence is that since the soul does 
exercise cognition, it must be immaterial. […] From the immateriality of the soul Wolff then 
concludes that it lacks part, extension, shape etc. In short, the soul is an immaterial simple substance. 
In this sense Wolff’s argument approaches the character of the Achilles I attribute to Kant in §5 below. 
However, as I show below Wolff’s argument nevertheless retains the properties that place it in Kant’s  target 
area: (i) an empirical epistemology, (ii) a conclusion asserting empirical substantiality and (iii) a commitment 
to the claims of a broad Achilles. 
164 Nor is that my claim, which would contradict the clearly broad application of Kant’s arguments. 
165 For detailed discussion of Kant’s notion of a Transcendental Illusion see Michelle Grier 2001. See also Grier 
1993. 
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sense are referred to the I as subject, and this I cannot again be thought as the predicate of some 
other subject. It therefore appears that in this case completeness in the referring of the given concepts 
to a subject as predicates is not a mere idea, but that the object, namely, the absolute subject itself, 
is given in experience. But this expectation is disappointed. 
So why must the expectation of finding an absolute subject in experience be disappointed? 
As Tester argues, Kant suggests Baumgarten’s employment of the principle of sufficient 
reason constitutes a common conflation of a respectable “logical” use of the principle on which 
reason seeks to (A 307/B 364) “[f]ind the unconditioned for conditioned cognitions of the 
understanding, with which its unity will be completed,” with a misguided “metaphysical” use of 
the principle that assumes (A 307–8/B 364) “when the conditioned is given, then so is the whole 
series of conditions subordinated one to another, which is itself unconditioned, also given.” That 
is, when confronted with the nature of thinking, for Kant it is natural to seek the substantial grounds 
of this activity. As Kant writes (Prol. 4:333) 
Pure reason demands that for each predicate of a thing we should seek its appropriate subject, but 
that for this subject, which is in turn necessarily only a predicate, we should seek its subject again, 
and so forth to infinity (or as far as we get). 
However, “through misunderstanding” this legitimate principle has (A309/ B366) 
been taken for a transcendental principle of reason, which overhastily postulates such an unlimited 
completeness in the series of conditions in the objects themselves. 
Kant’s last comment here is telling. The mistake in Baumgarten’s illusion-driven 
application of the principle of sufficient reason is that it seeks the ultimate grounds in the objects 
given in experience. The Baumgartian Achilles rests on a natural if misguided objectification of 
the grounds of our thinking: the fact that reason naturally inquires after these grounds does not 
mean that when some accident of the self is given in experience, so is the self as its source.166  As 
166 Especially relevant here is Kant’s notion of phenomenal substance or substantia phaenomenon (for discussion, 
see Wuerth 2014, pp. 97-100). For Kant the genuine grounds of all accidents must be a noumenal substance, but the 
mind is inclined to analogize a similar relation between accidents and substances in appearance, thus giving rise to 
substantia phaenomenon (ML1, 28: 1523; R4675, 17: 648; R4494: 17: 572). This notion of phenomenal substance 
plays a critical role for Kant’s account of object cognition, since its perdurant character allows for the cognition of 
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Kant explicitly notes (Prol. 4: 333; emphasis removed), 
human understanding is not to be blamed for its inability to know the substantiale  of things […] but 
rather for demanding to cognize it determinately as though it were a given object.167 
Turn now to Kant’s specific critique of Wolff’s rational psychology. As Dyck’s discussion 
emphasizes, Wolff’s rationalism is distinctive in being partially grounded in empirically-informed 
premises.168 Dyck notes that in this sense the common perception of Wolff as merely an expositor 
of Leibniz is false. That is, where Leibniz’s rationalism seeks to ground metaphysical conclusions 
through reason alone, Wolff maintains a “mixed methodology” which, to be sure, can go beyond 
experience, but does not proceed in abstraction from it.169 As Wolff himself writes (AzDM §261), 
his approach is to “derive that which is found to be in [the soul] by means of experience.”170 One 
telling example of Wolff’s partially experiential approach to rationalism is the inferential 
characterization of Descartes’ cogito (DM §504): 
If there is something in a being that can be conscious of something, that thing is a soul. There exists 
in me something that can be conscious of something. Therefore a soul exists in me (I, a soul, exist). 
As this passage illustrates, Wolff takes the cogito to infer from a premise concerning the 
existence of consciousness to the existence of a being capable of such consciousness. This raises 
the   question   how   the   minor   premise  is  justified,  which  Wolff  answers  by  appeal  to  an 
objects in time (B226-7). Accordingly, the Transcendental Illusion holding sway over Baumgarten’s thinking is to 
confuse what is properly noumenal substance with substantia phaenomenon. As Steven Tester puts the point 
(Dissertation, p. 51): 
[the] illusion consists in thinking that the application of the principle of sufficient reason will lead 
to an ultimate unconditioned ground of the attributes of thought that is an appearance to which 
spatial and temporal conception of substance applies. In contrast, Kant argues that the principle of 
sufficient reason will lead to a ground of the attributes of thought that is not an appearance but a 
thing in itself. 
167 I come back to Kant’s mention of an “inability to know.” 
168 As Dyck writes, “In contrast to the narrowly rationalistic approach to the soul which would proceed completely 
independently of experience, the rational psychology pioneerred by the theorists of the German tradition relies 
essentially upon empirical psychology.” (Dyck 2014, p. 9) 
169 Dyck 2014, p. 13. 
170 I use the translation of Dyck 2014. See Dyck 2009 and Dyck 2014, pp. 5-10 for discussion. 
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“indubitable experience”  which,  as  an experience, is gained “when we attend to our sensations” 
(DL c. 5, par. 1).171 
The reason it is important to point to Wolff’s “mixed,” i.e., significantly empirical, version 
of rational psychology is that it is this aspect of Wolff’s approach that Kant criticizes. For example, 
against Wolff Kant insists that properly understood rational psychology “is built on the single 
proposition I think” and does not contain “the least bit of anything empirical (A342/ B400).”172 
Just so (ML1, 28:262; emphasis removed): 
In  rational  psychology  the  human  soul  is  cognized  not  from  experience,  as  in  empirical 
psychology, but a priori from concepts. Here we are to investigate how much of the human soul  
we can cognize through reason. 
Likewise,  Kant frequently frames his opposition to the paralogical arguments explicitly in terms 
of their reliance on a quasi-empirical epistemology of the self (A354-55; emphasis removed): 
This proposition [the ‘I think’], however, is not itself an experience…We have no right to 
transpose it onto a … concept of thinking being in general. 
171 Wolff’s understanding of the cogito as an inference grounded on empirical experience of consciousness is not 
idiosyncratic. The Wolffian German rationalist Georg Friedrich Meier similarly makes explicit that (2007, §481) 
Daily experience teaches us that we think. This is so undeniable that even if one wanted to doubt it, 
doubting consists in thinking and, therefore, convinces us all the more we think. We are, accordingly, 
thinking beings. Now the same undeniable experience tells us that we consist of a number of parts, 
many of which we do not experience that they think [….] Consequently, distinct experience tells us 
that our thoughts are to be encountered in a part of us. Consequently, there is in us a thinking being, 
[or] a part which thinks, and therefore can think. This part exists because other otherwise it could 
not think and one can always infer the existence of the cause from the existence of the effect. It 
follows that we have a soul, or a soul exists in us 
Similarly, it is this aspect of the cogito that the Piëtist philosopher Crusius criticizes Descartes for failing to 
make explicit: 
[“I think”] should be: I am conscious that I think, therefore I am. If one wants, therefore, to infer 
our existence from the existence of our thoughts, one must at the outset establish the existence of 
our thoughts themselves by means of a sensation, namely, from inner sensation or consciousness. 
For these passages and further discussion, see Dyck 2014, Chapter 6. 
172 For discussion see Tester Dissertation, p. 23 
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Indeed, close reading of Kant’s unified B-edition exposition of the Paralogisms reveals the 
same explicit focus, taking the rationalist to conceive of the self as (B410-411): “a being that can 
be thought in general, in every relation, and therefore also as it may be given in intuition.” 
Similarly, it is resistance to an empirically-grounded brand of rational psychology that informs 
Kant’s rejection of the cogito as framed by Wolff.173 Where the Wolffian cogito is an inference 
from empirical grounds, Kant holds that (AC 25: 14-15) “I am, that is […] not an inference,” 
(A354-55) “[n]or is the simplicity of myself (as soul) really inferred from the proposition [I think].” 
In this regard, Kant follows philosophers like Leibniz, Spinoza and, according to Thiel, especially 
the French philosopher Johann Bernhard Merian.174 On the approach represented by these 
philosophers, thought does not provide empirical grounds for an inference to the existence of a 
thinker, but is itself already existence-involving by, in Thiel’s terms, “[specifying] the manner in 
which I exist.” As Merian writes (1751 §99; emphasis removed) 
When one sets the verb alongside it, one finds that thinking means as much as to exist under a 
certain modification, and that the proposition I think, is the same as I exist thinking. 
As Leibniz expresses the same thought (NE 411): 
To say I think therefore I am is not really to prove existence from thought, since I think and to be 
thinking are one and the same, and to say I am thinking is already to say I am.175
173 See Thiel 1996, 1998, 2001, 2011 
174 Thiel 1996. Kitcher and Dyck both feel compelled to suggest that Kant accepts only the “I think,” rejecting any 
use for “I am.” As Dyck writes (2014; p. 174), 
At the root of [the paralogical argument] is transcendental illusion, which Kant also characterizes in 
terms of conflating the formal I think with the empirical I am, a misidentification famously expressed 
in the Cartesian cogito, ergo sum. 
It has been the aim of this paper to undermine the suggestion that the “I am” must be empirical, and that Kant 
consequently rejects it. There is also textual evidence Kant does not reject the “I am.” As Kant writes, (R4676, 17: 
656; emphasis original) “When something is apprehended, it is taken up into the function of apperception. I am. I 
think. Thoughts are in me.” 
175 Compare Spinoza on the same point: I think, therefore I am is a single proposition which is equivalent to this, I 
am thinking. (1987, 1: 234) 
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Thus Merian writes that the self (§95) “is immediately present to itself in the sense in which, 
without exception, its thoughts are.” 176 
The upshot of raising Kant’s resistance to Baumgarten’s and Wolff’s specific versions of 
rational psychology is that it sheds light on the nature of Kant’s arguments in the Paralogisms. 
Consider that for Kant, cognition (Erkenntnis) depends on the impact of objects on the senses.  As 
Wuerth states the point, 
In our relation to all other things [other than, for Wuerth, the self], Kant tells us, we deal only with 
the effects of these things on us, which as such are colored by our manner of actively receiving these 
effects, in the case of humans by imposing the pure forms of intuition on them.177
It follows that since—pace the rational psychologists—the “I” is not an object of sensory affection, 
we can have no cognition of the subject, much less of properties like its simplicity or its 
immortality. This invalidates the inferences of rational psychology. As Kant writes (MMr, 29:771) 
“[of the substantiale] we cannot make the least concept, ie., we cognize nothing but accidents.” 
Similarly (A356), “I do not cognize the real simplicity of my subject (in extent of being empirically 
real).” Accordingly, this is the mistake of rational psychology: it takes the “I” as an object of 
intuition and therefore as an object of cognition, claiming knowledge of the various properties 
asserted in the Achilles. Such knowledge is the “expectation [which] is disappointed” (Prol 4:333). 
176 In what sense the “I think” of the cogito is supposed to “specify” the existence of a thinker is not intended to be 
clear at this point. I hope to illuminate this difficult issue in §5 as well as the next chapter. Here the priority is Kant’s 
rejection of the distinctively empirical aspect of the Wolffian philosophy. 
177 Wuerth 2014, p. 127. For a book-size development of this aspect of Kant’s view, see Langton 1998. Wuerth 
helpfully relates (chapter 3, fn. 3) the effect-dependence of Kant’s cognition to Kant’s adherence to the principium 
generale commercii, i.e., the thought that—as Leibniz famously denies—substances not only do genuinely interact, 
but that moreover (R 4704, 17: 681) “all influence in the world is partly the effect of the active on the passive, partly 
the counter effect of the latter.” Adherence to this principle goes a significant way to motivating Kant’s view that 
objects can only be known through their effects on the knowing subject. Interestingly, Wuerth accepts that a 
substance suffering an effect itself involves not merely passivity, but a form of activity as well. From this Wuerth 
(2014, pp. 73-75) concludes that sensibility must itself be partially active, and moreover, that this activity itself 
produces the merely phenomenal character of appearances by placing objects in space and time. In this respect 
Wuerth’s view resembles that of Allais 2009, discussed above in Chapter 1. As I argued there (as well as more fully 
in Chapter 2), I think it is a mistake to think of Kant as positing two fundamental representational faculties. 
95 
3.5 KANT’S PURE ACHILLES 
We should now return to the Achilles as discussed in §1. As Julian Wuerth writes, Kant’s 
central target is the broad Achilles: the inferences from the existence of the soul as a substance to 
various other attributes. 
[I]n attempting to make sense of Kant’s argument against the rational psychologists, it should always 
be remembered that Kant repeatedly emphasizes that the sole purpose of the rationalists’ ventures 
in psychology is to establish the immortality of the soul.178
As Kant himself explicitly notes, rationalist concern with the soul resides primarily in its supposed 
permanence, and especially its immortality (Prol. §47): 
Though we may call this thinking self (the soul) substance, as being the ultimate subject of thinking 
which cannot be further represented as the predicate of another thing, it remains quite empty and 
inconsequential if permanence—the quality which renders the concept of substances in experiences 
fruitful—cannot be proved of it. But permanence can never be proved of the concept of a substance 
as a thing in itself, but only for the purposes of experience.179 
For Kant the predicates of the broad Achilles fail because they lay claim to the status of cognition, 
and more specifically, since they are associated with an experiential concept of substance and 
depend on spatio-temporal structures applicable only to experience. As  Kant writes (A356): 
one by no means […] cognizes anything about the soul that one really wants to know, for all these 
predicates are not valid of intuition at all, and therefore cannot have any consequence that could be 
applied to objects of experience; hence they are completely empty.180
178 Wuerth 2014, p. 116 
179 Just so in the post-critical (MMr 29:912; italics mine), 
one believes to be done with [the question of immortality] since substance is perdurable. But since 
the soul is recognized as substance only through the I, we do not at all know whether it  is substance 
in the sense that as such it could not perish. 
Note the expressions I emphasize. Kant does not deny that the soul is recognized as substance, but merely 
notes that this is “only through the I.” And the conclusion is specifically limited to the claim that the soul is 
not known to be substance “in the sense that” it is imperishable. This fits my claims in this paper. 
180 This tenor of Kant’s critique extends to Mendelssohn’s Achilles argument for the immortality of the soul 
mentioned at the outset of this paper (the criticism is at MFNS 4:542-3). 
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As this last passage compellingly suggests, this—pace the functionalist reading—is the 
significance of Kant’s assertion (A356) that the “I think” is merely “empty,” of no “value,” and is 
of no “use in concreto.” As Kant stresses (A356), 
everyone must admit that the assertion of the simple nature of the soul is of unique value only insofar 
as through it I distinguish this subject from all matter, and consequently except it from the 
perishability to which matter is always subjected. It is really only to this use that the above 
proposition is applied, hence it is often expressed like this: the soul is not corporeal. 
In this section I will argue that it does not follow from the “emptiness” of rationalist discourse that 
Kant rejects a substantial account of the self (much less does the positive functionalist claim follow 
that the “I” must be understood merely in terms of functional relations between mental states.)181 
By contrast, I suggest Kant’s critique of the  empirically-oriented Wolffian/Baumgartian approach 
makes room for a distinct, purely rationalist substance- metaphysics of the self. In particular, I will 
defend: 
(3) Kant’s Critical Achilles: Kant’s critical thought offers a version of the Achilles 
argument. 
Consider the following contrast Kant draws (A546/B574): 
the human being, who is otherwise acquainted with the whole of nature solely through sense, is 
acquainted with himself also through pure apperception. 
Consider similarly (SGE 20: 359), 
[T]he simple is not given in outer intuition. In the inner there is the simple but only in the subject of 
consciousness…insofar as it thinks not insofar as it has an intuition of itself through the inner sense 
therefore it is also not given for knowledge. 
181 Compare (A356; A350–1): 
Now mere apperception (“I”) is substance in concept, simple in concept, etc., and thus all these 
psychological theorems are indisputably correct. Nevertheless, one by no means thereby cognizes 
anything about the soul that one really wants to know, for all these predicates are not valid of 
intuition at all, and therefore cannot have any consequence that could be applied to objects of 
experience; hence they are completely empty. For that concept of substance does not teach me that 
the soul endures for itself 
one can quite well allow the proposition The soul is substance to be valid, if only one admits that 
this concept of ours leads no further, that it cannot teach us any of the usual conclusions of the 
rationalistic doctrine of the soul. 
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In both of these passages Kant explicitly opposes cognition through sense to the  subject’s relation 
to herself. For Kant the self is “acquainted” with herself through “pure apperception.” Likewise, 
there is simplicity in the self “but only in the subject of consciousness…insofar as it thinks not 
insofar as it has an intuition of itself. ” Compare similarly (B429; B277 emphasis original): 
In the consciousness of myself in mere thinking I am the being itself, about which, however, 
nothing yet is thereby given to me for thinking. 
of course, the representation I am, which expresses the consciousness that can accompany all 
thinking, is that which immediately includes the existence of the subject in itself, but not yet any 
cognition of it,  thus not empirical cognition, i.e., experience. 
Here Kant seems still stronger in stating the above contrast. In self-consciousness “I am the  being 
itself” and such consciousness “immediately includes the existence of the subject in itself”—but 
these are not experiences and therefore not cognitions. 
Julian Wuerth has described Kant’s epistemology of the self as “immediatism.”182 On 
Wuerth’s view, Kant’s consistent view throughout the pre-critical metaphysics lectures, the critical 
period and the post-critical lectures is that a subject has immediate access to herself as a noumenal 
substance simply in virtue of being this substance. As Wuerth characterizes his reading in an 
important passage (2014, p. 76): 
Our relation to ourselves is the one instance in which we do not relate to a substance by virtue 
solely of its effect on us, but instead by virtue of being the substance, and, as rational substances, 
by necessarily being conscious of being a substance, and so of having powers by means of which 
we ground accidents. This view that we can have some form of epistemic access to our own 
noumenal selves but not to other noumenal substances is therefore not inconsistent, but is instead 
of a piece, with the guiding idea behind transcendental idealism. For in this lone instance can we 
be conscious of being the something that is active in addition to being conscious of any effects of 
this activity. Rather than reflecting an immature epistemology that fails to recognize the barriers 
precluding epistemic access to other things in themselves, Kant’s immediatism therefore reflects 
the unique place of our relation to ourselves within this system of transcendental idealism.183
182 Wuerth 2006; 2010a; 2010b; 2014 
183 For Wuerth, the main shift in Kant’s pre-critical and critical views—and the origins of the Paralogisms—is not the 
abandonment of a previous commitment to rational psychology, but rather a change in the shape of Kant’s 
“immediatist” epistemology. In Kant’s pre-critical metaphysics lectures, Kant conceives of the subject’s access to 
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Wuerth’s “immediatism” has strong textual support. Both in the pre-critical and critical 
writings Kant stresses the opposition between cognition of objects through sense and “immediate” 
access to the self. 
But I suggest Wuerth does not succeed in fully clearing up the philosophical questions 
surrounding Kant’s view. First, Wuerth does not explain what might motivate “immediate” self- 
access and why it should it be non-sensuous. Second, nothing in Wuerth’s account makes obvious 
why the subject accessed in apperception should be a substance.184 This is where I suggest 
attributing to Kant an Achilles argument has explanatory value.185 
Table 3  Kant’s Pure Achilles. 
In the terms of §1, this is a narrow Proclean Achilles. The argument has two distinctive 
features. The Kantian Achilles fills out the “unity” or “simplicity” of P1 in terms of a  constitutive 
identity between the subject and the object of an act of reflection. At P2  the argument moreover 
asserts  this identity  to  be metaphysically primitive. I flesh out this argument below, but let me 
herself as an “immediate intuition.” As Kant writes in the pre-critical metaphysics lectures (ML1, 28: 226), 
[our access to the soul] is the only case where we can immediately intuit the substance. Of no  thing 
can we intuit the substrate and the first subject; but in myself I intuit the substance immediately183
Kant pre-critical “immediate intuitions” are to be sure not properly experiential in not facilitating any cognition since 
they are wholly “indeterminate” and fail to reveal any attributes ((R4493 17: 572 “the predicates are missing.”). 
Nevertheless, the critical Kant moves away from mentioning intuition altogether in this context in favor of an 
apperceptive immediatism. 
184 To be sure, if access to the self is not through sense it is obvious the self cannot be phenomenal, and therefore 
might seem noumenal. But the question is why the self should be any “item” at all. Wuerth seems to argue simply 
from Kant’s comments in this area, and not to aim to explain Kant’s commitment. 
185 I should explicitly note that this is an interpretative claim. I defend the merits of this view of self-consciousness 
in the next chapter. 
Kant’s Pure Achilles 
P1: There is a constitutive unity between the subject and the object of apperception. 
P2: The unity at P1 is metaphysically primitive in such a way as to be constitutive of a simple, 
unified substance. 
C1: The human soul or mind is a simple unified substance. 
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first indicate how the Achilles helps answer the questions left by Wuerth’s account. Where 
Wuerth’s account might seem to posit an unexplained non-sensuous epistemic relation a 
subject bears to herself, the Achilles explains this relation. A subject’s self- 
consciousness is constitutive of her being. It follows that self-awareness is “immediately” provided 
by being the subject. It also follows this self-awareness could not be sense-mediated, since the 
object and subject of self-awareness are identical and sense mediates access of one item to another. 
Per P2 the Achilles also explains Kant’s use of substantial language about the self. 
In his discussion of Kitcher’s Kant’s Thinker, Sebastian Rödl (2013) suggests that 
Kitcher’s progress notwithstanding, her work requires further development in the area of the way 
self-consciousness involves a “certain consciousness of unity: a consciousness of unity which is 
nothing other than this unity.”186 Rödl describes here a remarkable relation between (a form of) 
consciousness and (a form of) unity: a consciousness of a unity that is at the same time itself the 
unity in question. Rödl’s identifies this peculiar consciousness with the activity of synthesis, and 
the unity with synthetic unity.187 As Rödl fills out Kant’s characterization of synthesis (B130; 
translation Rödl added), “Combination [synthesis; S.R.] is a representation [consciousness; S.R.] 
of the synthetic unity of the manifold.”188 Pace Kitcher who argues that the identity of the “I” 
requires an account beyond the nature of apperceptive awareness, Rödl further identifies this 
synthetic unity with the identity of self-consciousness as expressed by the “I,” noting that “The 
unity of the subject is its [reflective] act […] Such is the unity of a thinker.”189 
186 Rödl 2013, p. 216. 
187 It follows that for Rödl synthesis is not an activity productive of unity, since (2013 p. 216) “synthesis were 
production, it could not be a consciousness of unity, for the unity produced would be different from the synthesis 
that produced it.” 
188 One may take exception to Rödl’s characterization of B130. It does not matter to my purposes. 
189 Rödl 2013, p. 216. Rödl’s reading—to which I am sympathetic—is in some sense in agreement with Melnick 
2009, in that both take the “I” to be constitutively related to some activity. But where Rödl takes the activity to be 
reflective, Melnick characterizes it as a “marshaling” that produces order from diversity. I think that Rödl’s 
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Rödl’s conception of a “consciousness of unity which is nothing other than this unity” 
provides the type of unity that lies at the heart of Kant’s version of the Achilles. A first step in 
appreciating the way Rödl’s view might support a form of the Achilles is to consider a view of 
self-awareness on which it is an activity that takes the “I” both as its subject and its object. The 
point is illustrated by the above-discussed Merian conception of the cogito. On this conception, 
the reflective awareness embodied in the subject’s self-consciousness of her thinking finds not 
merely an act of thought, but in this same act a subject of thought—the “I” of the “I think.” But 
this “I” is the very same “I” that is the subject of the original act of self-reflection. That is, this  act 
of self-reflection is executed by the “I” and at the same time finds this “I” as the object of its 
awareness. 
But pointing to an (alleged) identity of object and subject in self-consciousness is not 
sufficient to see how the reflective act bears a distinctive unity (much less a substantial unity). Any 
reflexive act bears the same subject and object. By contrast, the second step in appreciating Rödl’s 
view is the suggestion that the reflexivity of the self-conscious act is constitutive of both its subject 
and its object. The “I” of reflection is constitutively related to the awareness it bears of itself. (By 
identity, so is the “I” that is the object of self-awareness.) It is popular to say that the “I” is an 
expression that refers de jure to the subject of the locution.190 But this is to focus merely on the 
expression and miss that the “I” expresses the reality of a version of consciousness. That is, the “I” 
evinces (since it presupposes) a subject that would say “I.” It is in this way that the “I” is 
constitutively associated with self-awareness: “I” is merely the articulation of the type of reflexive 
act   displayed   by   the  subject’s  awareness  of  herself.   To  put  matters  in  a  slogan,  the  “I” 
conception is required as the background against which to understand the “order” of thought, and I do not see how 
Melnick’s suggestion of a mere creation of order can constitute a self. 
190 E.g., Peacocke 2014 
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is essentially “double”:  its  nature is such that it is always at once the subject and the object of an 
act of awareness. 
These are various substantive commitments about the character of a thinking self, but it is 
worth stressing that the conception of the self as constitutively associated with self-awareness  has 
a rich historical heritage. A locus classicus is Augustine’s conception of the perpetually self- 
knowing mind.191 As Ursula Coope has suggested, a similar commitment may seem to be found in 
the Thomistic understanding of the intellect: 
Reason (ratio), however, is not only able to direct the act of inferior parts, but is also the director of 
its own act (actus sui directiva). For the ability to reflect on itself is peculiar to the intellectual part. 
For intellect understands itself and similarly, reason can reason about its own act.192
Although the passage does not explicitly suggest a constitutive conception (merely  stating 
that the “ability to reflect on itself is peculiar to the intellectual part”), it is plausible to understand 
Aquinas as endorsing the Proclean thought that “the intellectual part” is constitutively associated 
with its self-reflective character. Finally this line is famously expressed by Sartre when he writes 
“The Ego is an object apprehended but also an object constituted by reflective knowledge.”193 
Still, even if the above three steps are granted, it is nevertheless a further question why the 
constitutively  reflective  “I”  must  be  considered a substance.194 Consider in this regard a 
191 Augustine 2002, 10.5.7, 14.6.9, 15.15.25. See also 9.3.3, for a parallel to Kant’s conception of sense-independent 
apperception: “Just as the mind itself gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the senses of the body, so [it 
gathers knowledge] of incorporeals through its own self. Therefore it also knows itself through itself.” Cited and 
discussed at Cory 2014, pp. 19-21. 
192 Aquinas (2008: preface.) Discussed at Coope 2013, p. 8. For a treatment that places Aquinas in opposition to the 
neoplatonist tradition, see Cory 2014, chapter 1 
193 The present citation is from Sartre’s 1937 The Transcendence of the Ego, translated in Sartre 2004. Discussed at 
Peacocke 2014, pp. 220-221. There are complexities to Sartre’s account (such as a priority of consciousness to self- 
consciousness (Sartre 2004, p. 34)) that I am not here in a position to discuss. For much more discussion of Sartre’s 
view of self-consciousness, as well as its relation to Kant’s view, see Béatrice Longuenesse’s recent (2017), 
especially Chapter 3. Of course, the thesis also has a rich history in German Idealism, for example in Fichte (1845), 
who calls the “I” “unconditioned” and “self-grounded.” See Neuhouser 1990, p. 43. 
194 One might here recall the considerable evidence so far: (i) Kant repeatedly speaks of the “I” in substantial terms; 
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broad version of the Proclean Achilles provided by Aquinas (2014, II.49): 
No body’s action reflects on the agent, for it is proved in the Physics that no body reflects on itself 
except in respect of a part, so that, namely, one of its parts be mover and the other moved.195 
Evidently this argument is not available to Kant since it relies on a spatial concept of part, and 
Kant’s self is neither part-bearing nor part-less in this sense. But the argument displays a more 
abstract structure which may serve to illustrate why Kant would speak of the self in substantial 
terms. 
In a more abstract sense, reflection might at first glance seem to be a “bipartite” activity: 
an activity in which one “part” reflects on another “part.” But by Proclean lights this conception 
does not articulate genuine reflection, but rather maintains the logical structure of one item relating 
to another (specifically, the reflecting state relating to the reflected state). By contrast, genuine 
reflection requires one item relating to itself.  I want to suggest this is an abstract sense  in which 
reflection is “partless” that can support the above argument in a Kantian setting. If Kant accepts, 
in broadest outline, the Leibnizian view that a substance is defined in terms of an “activity” with 
a certain “unity” the question is whether reflection can be understood in light of some non-
reflective activity or must be considered sui generis. It must be sui generis: no non- reflective 
activity relates to itself in the way reflection does. This self-relation is constitutive of reflection. 
Accordingly, reflection as an activity possesses a distinct “simplicity” or “unity” that marks it 
as  a  type  of substance. Since reflection is constitutive of the “I,” we can accordingly say that the 
(ii) once freed from empirical associations Kant has no obvious grounds for resistance to a substantial view (iii) Kant’s 
usage of the terms “form” and “unity” as associated with the “I” tracks directly the Leibnizian conception of  a 
substance, providing salient precedent. Moreover, resistance to attributing a substantial subject to Kant may in part 
derive from remaining “objective” associations with the realm of substances. But for Kant substances are emphatically 
not objective (neither are the substances of Leibniz’s Idealism). 
195 As Coope notes, Aquinas supports this inference through a neoplatonist reading of Aristotle’s conception of self- 
movement, discussed at (1999, VII, lecture 1.890). As Aquinas also writes (ST Ia 187 a3 ad3) “But it is not possible 
that anything material should change itself, rather one is changed by another.” 
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subject is a substance.196 
3.6 OBJECTIONS 
But finding a substantial conception of the self in Kant is controversial. Here I want to 
discuss an especially subtle objection raised in a recent comment by Matthew Boyle on 
Longuenesse’s treatment of the Paralogisms197: 
Longuenesse notes the parallel between Kant’s general remarks on substances, powers, and acts and 
his talk of mental acts and mental powers, but suggests that “one should approach this parallel with 
caution” since “the Critique warns us [in the Paralogisms chapter] not to consider the Gemüt or 
mind, the whole of our representational capacities, as a substance” (1998, pp. 7-8). [But] Kant 
himself – according to the lecture notes of one of his students, anyway – mentions the power of 
thinking in a general discussion of the relation between substance, power, and act. These lectures 
were given in 1783, shortly after the publication of the first edition of the First Critique, and in them 
he repeats essentially the same criticisms of Rational Psychology that he makes in the Paralogisms 
chapter. It seems, then, that he must not think there is a tension between bringing the framework of 
substances, powers and acts to bear on the mind in this way and his attack on the fallacious 
conclusions of the rational psychologists. Closer examination of the Paralogisms bears this out. 
What Kant denies in the Paralogisms is that we are entitled to infer that the “I” that thinks is really 
a substance in itself (which would entail its permanence, immutability, etc.) from the fact that it 
must be conceived in terms of the logical categories characteristic of substances. He does not deny 
that we must conceive of our mind as having the logical nature of a substance, and thus of our 
mental powers as having the kind of unity the powers of a substance have. On the contrary, he 
affirms this, although he denies that it entitles us to draw the conclusions of the Rational 
Psychologists: [E]veryone must necessarily regard Himself as substance, but regard his thinking 
only as accidents of his existence and determinations of his state… [O]ne can quite well allow that 
the proposition The soul is substance holds, if one only admits that this concept … cannot teach us 
any of the usual conclusions of the doctrine of rational psychology, such as the everlasting duration 
of the soul through all alterations, even the person’s death – [if only one admits, in other words] that 
it signifies a substance only in idea but not in reality. (A349-351) The connection I am drawing 
between Kant’s remarks about our power of understanding and his thinking about the categories of 
substance, power, and act does not require any claim about the real nature of the subject to whom 
these  powers  belong;  it  simply  brings out the consequences of regarding the mind as a substance 
196 There is one more step that Kant takes here, which I do not defend here but explore in the next chapter. This to 
equate the apperceptive character of the “I” with the nature of the understanding. Provided this relation between 
reflection and thought, the above reasoning puts us in a position to appreciate Kant’s 1775-1777 note ((HN, 17:707.18-
28) cited in the introduction, that “The understanding itself (a being that has understanding) is simple. It  is substance.”
There are two notable features in this passage: Kant’s use of substantial language, and Kant’s curious insouciance 
about the distinction between the understanding and a being with understanding. We are now in a position to 
understand both of these elements. The understanding is reflective and therefore simple and constitutive of a substance: 
that substance is the “being with understanding,” or the “I.” 
197 Thanks to Tyke Nuñez for reference to this passage. 
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“in idea,” as Kant says we must (cp. also A672/B700). The kind of unity our mental powers 
possess is logically speaking the kind of unity that the powers of a substance possess, even if we 
cannot conclude that this logical unity corresponds to the sort of real unity that rationalist 
metaphysicians sought to infer from it. This is a difficult topic, however, which deserves a fuller 
treatment than I can give it here.198 
As Boyle himself remarks, this footnote clearly does not amount to a full reading of the 
Paralogisms. Nevertheless Boyle makes an extremely interesting suggestion, which displays 
significant sensitivity to the themes suggested in this chapter, but also diverges from my reading 
in a critical respect. Boyle shows sympathy to the suggestion that understanding Kant’s conception 
of the relation between the “I” of apperception and its representations involves taking seriously 
Kant’s talk of the self as substance. But nevertheless Boyle’s view reads the Paralogisms as 
denying “that we are entitled to infer that the “I” that thinks is really a substance in itself (which 
would entail its permanence, immutability, etc.),” and conversely holds that Kant gives a merely 
logical gloss on talking of the self as a substance. For Boyle, it is speaking as though the self were 
a substance that helps Kant articulate his view of apperception. In this way, Boyle’s view seems 
to occupy an attractive middle ground between the position defended here and the consensus 
functionalist view, which disavows substantial talk. In particular, Boyle’s alternative raises the 
question what could be gained by insisting that Kant holds a substantial conception of the self: the 
alternative seems to retain all the advantages, without any of the interpretative costs. 
But I have several brief responses against Boyle’s suggestion, which in conjunction I take 
to suggest the superiority of my view over Boyle’s suggestion. First, if for Kant the “I” is not a 
substance, then there is a question why in a “logical” sense it should be regarded as such. To be 
sure, this question seems answerable, but it is an unexamined feature of Boyle’s suggestion that  it 
is  plausible  or  even  intelligible  to think the self must be considered “logically” substantial if it 
198 Boyle Forthcoming, fn. 23 
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is metaphysically precisely not. By contrast, if Kant’s self is substantial the answer is 
straightforward. 
Second, Boyle’s insistence on rejecting a substantial interpretation of Kant’s view of the 
self is unmotivated. As I have argued, Boyle is wrong to take the Paralogisms to target the self as 
a “substance in itself.” Kant’s criticism in the Paralogisms centers explicitly on treating the self  as 
an object. Specifically, the criticism centers on the idea of access to the self as mediated through 
sense affection. But for Kant to speak of an object (as potentially given in intuition) is emphatically 
not the same as speaking of a substance. And Kant’s critique of the self as accessed through 
sensibility serves precisely to exempt and make room for access through pure apperception. So 
once the treatment of the self as objective has been rejected, it is unclear what further arguments 
are supposed to lead Kant to reject the self as substantial.199 
Third—and perhaps most fundamentally—there is a second level on which Boyle fails to 
motivate his sharp distinction between attributing to Kant genuine and merely “as if” substantial 
language. My suggestion is that Boyle’s distinction depends on an inflated and inappropriately 
demanding conception of “substance.” On the monadic conception which served as the 
background for much of Kant’s thinking, the foundational feature of a substance is its possession 
of a “true unity,” a “form,” all conceived on the model of (AG 89) “what is called ‘me’.” These 
are all features that characterize Kant’s view of apperceptive consciousness, which moreover 
admits  (as  Boyle allows) of characterization  in  substantial  terms.  To  be sure Kant  might   be 
199 Indeed, Kant explicitly notes that the sense of “substance” at issue in the Paralogisms is the (A349) “empirically 
usable concept of a substance,” since substance as it figures in pure thought cannot be found to ground the properties 
the rationalist is interested in. 
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thought to reject Leibnizian substance talk, but on what grounds?200 What is to stop Kant from 
thinking of apperception in actual substantial terms, as opposed to merely “as if”? This question is 
especially salient in light of Kant’s specification of a bad notion of substance as empirical (A349). 
The fundamental point is that despite Boyle’s appreciating the relevance of substantial talk to 
Kant’s view of self-consciousness, he retains the functionalist commitment to sharply 
distinguishing Kant’s talk of a “logical” and a “substantial” characterization of the subject and its 
unity in thought. But if I have been correct in this chapter, this dichotomy is false: the “logical” 
unity of the subject can ground and indeed be its substantial unity.201 
200 Indeed, there are significant independent grounds for thinking that Kant does not fundamentally abandon the 
presuppositions of the Leibnizian philosophy. For powerful arguments for this thought see the work of Anja 
Jauernig. 
201 An admitted remaining source of discomfort is Boyle’s citation of Kant’s comment that (A351) the “I” “signifies 
a substance only in idea but not in reality.” There are two responses, however. First it is to be granted that Kant’s 
consuming focus in the Paralogisms is the negative case against the substantial self of rational psychology: the 
confinement the “I” to the realm of ideas may seem a rhetorical flourish in this regard, not to be taken to rule out any 
substantial self in a sense different from that of rational psychology. More satisfyingly, however, I submit that 
Kant’s notions of “idea” and “reality” are sufficiently complicated to make room for my reading, as they would if 
“reality” could be understood in empirical terms, and “idea” in terms of self-consciousness. But clearly this passage 
requires further explication than I am giving it here. 
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4.0 EXPERIENTIAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND PERCEPTUAL LOOKS 
[There is] something at the heart of the problem [of perception], something which is rarely 
made fully articulate in discussion of it […] that the more fundamental problem here is one 
concerning our knowledge of our own minds. 
MGF Martin (2000, p. 198) 
[It] is also the same “I” who has sensory perceptions. 
René Descartes (CSM ii. 20; AT vii. 29) 
There has been significant recent attention to so-called self-representational theories of 
consciousness.202 On the self-representational view, (certain) conscious mental states of mature 
human subjects represent not merely their objects, but also themselves and/or their subject.203 One 
reason why philosophers have been attracted to self-representational accounts of consciousness is 
to explain the so-called “lucid” character of (certain) conscious states.204 The lucid character of 
conscious states consists in their intimate connection to a form of “immediate knowledge.” 
That is, it  seems  the conscious  character of  (certain) mental  states  is  intimately related to the 
202 E.g., Kriegel and Wiliford 2006; Brook and Raymont 2006; Carruthers 1996; 2000 (Chapter 9); Caston 2002; 
Gennaro 1996, 2002; Hussack 2002, 2003; Kobes 1995; Kriegel, 2003a, 2003b, 2005; 1996a, 1996b, 1997 (Chapter 
7); Smith 1986, 1989 (Chapter 2), 2004; Van Gulick 2001, 2004; Williford 2005. 
203 In Peter Carruthers’ terms (2006, p. 300; italics original) “it seems that conscious experiences, in their distinctive 
subjectivity, somehow present themselves to us, as well as presenting whatever it is that they are experiences of.” I 
say “certain” conscious states because there is controversy over whether self-representation extends to all conscious 
states or only to some, and over whether the paradigmatic examples are sensations or cognitive states. I will return to 
these issues below. 
204 The same phenomenon has been described in terms of the “luminous” nature of certain mental states (Williamson 
2000, chapter 4), their “self-intimating” nature (Armstrong 1968) and their “transparency” (Boyle 2011.) 
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ability  of  the  subject  to know of their presence and their nature in some special, immediate 
way.205 As Keith Lehrer writes, 
The knowledge of the conscious state is somehow intrinsic to it. Such knowledge is unlike 
descriptive knowledge, where we might search for the representation of a state or object known. 
Representation of the conscious state is somehow contained in the conscious state itself yielding 
immediate knowledge of the state. […] My reason for describing the representation as lucid is that 
the content of the representation of the state somehow incorporates the state itself. The 
representation is somehow contained in the state itself rather than being something extrinsic to it.206 
Lehrer’s characterization of lucidity is complicated and at places obscure, but the thought clearly 
involves (at a minimum) the idea that a conscious state being available for knowledge by the 
subject is somehow part of the state’s conscious nature. Specifically, on Lehrer’s self- 
representationalist thought the lucid character of consciousness is supposed to be explained by the 
state representing not merely its objects, but also itself.207 
But there has been a relative neglect of self-representation in philosophical accounts of 
perceptual consciousness specifically.208 Sometimes the idea is dismissed on grounds of unduly 
complicating the contents of experience. 
If one seems to see a table, for instance, one does not seem to see the very subjective episode 
which is one’s apparent seeing of a table; nor does one seem to see a subjective episode of any 
other sort. Is one’s apparent seeing of the table posited by the visual episode itself in some other 
manner? An affirmative reply to that question is highly counter-intuitive. Anybody who always 
ascribes to visual episodes self-referential contents—ones which make those very visual episode 
somehow part of what the episodes themselves posit—seems to provide an overly complex 
account of the nature of visual experience in general.209
But more typically the concerns motivating self-representational accounts of consciousness are 
205 Importantly, to point out the lucid character of conscious states is not to commit to the infallibility of our 
knowledge of such states: lucidity concerns the peculiar immediacy with which we access our own states, not our 
“infallibility” in doing so. I will return to the notion of infallibility in §5 below. 
206 Lehrer 2006, pp. 410-11 
207 Of course the explanation invoking self-representation need not (and perhaps cannot) be simple, but must be 
embedded in a more developed account securing that such self-representations are known or knowable. 
208 Although the idea goes back at least to Aristotle, “for, unless a man can perceive and see without being aware of 
it, the eye must see itself (Sense and Sensibilia 437a27-28). A more recent exception is John Searle 1983 for whom 
experience represents itself and its own causal antecedents: “Part of the conditions of satisfaction of the visual 
experience of seeing […] is that the experience itself must be caused by what is seen” (1983, p. 48). For Searle’s 
more recent commitment to a similar self-referential component in perceptual representation, see Searle 2014, p 58. 
209 Gregory 2013, p. 21 
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simply ignored. Consider for example the way philosophers of perception frequently employ the 
subject’s immediate reflective access to experience to support one philosophical account of 
experience or another. In one example, a major motivation for so-called naïve realist conceptions 
of perceptual experience is that naïve realism supposedly captures the way experience seems 
reflectively to the subject (e.g., Martin 2006, p. 354). On this view, it seems from reflection that 
an experience e of an object o would not be the sort of experience it seems to be if e did not present 
the subject with o.210 This form of argument turns on perceptual experience having a reflectively 
available conscious character, such that it (arguably, at least) lends pre-philosophical support to 
certain philosophical accounts of experience over others.211 But while there has been debate over 
the methodological merits of using reflective access as a source for philosophical theorizing, less 
attention has been paid to what the reflectively available character of experience itself entails for 
accounts of perception.212 For example, it is not commonly thought that debates about perceptual 
content are really debates about the subject’s relation to her own mental states, but in this chapter 
I argue there are such important links. 
In particular, I will argue that some version of a self-representational theory of perceptual 
consciousness is instrumental in defending theories that attribute representational contents to 
experience      from      potent      anti-representationalist      objections.213      Specifically,     self- 
210 For a similar approach, Dorsch Forthcoming. 
211 It is notable that proposing arguments of this form does not depend on the debate about transparency of 
experience. The arguments do not need to depart from premises concerning qualitative characteristics of experience 
that are ruled out by transparency claims. All that is required for the relevant types of arguments is that they depart 
from any reflectively available characteristics of experience at all. In this way, transparency claims are themselves 
frequently grounded in the relevant type of argument. After all, transparency, if it is true of experience at all, is 
typically thought to itself be reflectively available as one of experience’s hallmark features. 
212 For an insightful discussion of the role of introspection in the philosophy of perception, Soteriou 2013, pp. 18-22. 
213 I associate the view expressed in this paper with the self-representationalist class of views of consciousness, but 
strictly I reject a notion of self-representation (see §2). Accordingly, it is more appropriate to describe the present 
view as operating with a notion of self-consciousness rather than a notion of self-representation. However, 
contemporary popular views of self-representation come by far closest to the main claims suggested here, and since 
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representationalism can answer anti-representationalist worries to the effect that (i) 
representationalists have not provided a compelling positive argument for why experiences should 
be thought of as involving contents in any non-trivial way, and in particular, (ii) 
representationalists have failed to derive such contents from the way in experience things look 
(such objections can be found, e.g., in Travis 2004, 2013; Breckenridge 2007; Wilson 
forthcoming). Briefly, I will argue that these objections take insufficiently seriously that you are 
the subject to whom experience, in one way or another, makes objects manifest. Specifically no 
significance is attached to the way you, in addition to relating to objects, relate to yourself. But the 
suggestion I develop in this chapter is that you are a thinker, and you relate to yourself the way 
thinkers do. Specifically, the claim is that this is a critical feature of your subjective perceptual 
consciousness, and that it grounds a conception of perceptual content.214 
In §1 I introduce two recent objections to the notion of representational perceptual content. 
In §2 I suggest that these objections turn fundamentally on how to conceive of the lucid character 
of phenomenal experience, and I reject two familiar conceptions of lucidity. In §3 I introduce an 
account of lucidity that I derive from Kant, on which lucidity is understood in light of the self-
conscious nature of the subject, which is in turn associated with her capacity for thought. In §4 I 
detail the way the Kantian view provides a representationalist response to the objections discussed 
in §1, and I labor to explain how the Kantian account accommodates a suitable  role  for  perceptual 
phenomenology    in    accounting    for    the    subjective    availability   of   perceptual   content. 
the Kantian thesis in the background her is frequently understood in terms of self-representation, it is felicitous to 
place the current view in this context. 
214 Here it is noteworthy that it is commonly held against representational views that they too closely assimilate 
perceptual experience to the nature of thought. But as I have argued through this dissertation, thinking is not merely 
one more activity a subject may engage in (departing from the deliverances of perceptual experience, e.g.) but rather 
exhibits a character that is fundamental to the subject herself: her particular form of self-consciousness.  Accordingly, 
the representationalist’s assimilation—partial to be sure—of perceptual experience to thinking, far from counting 
against representationalism, expresses its fundamental insight. 
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In §5 I consider objections. 
4.1 TWO REQUIREMENTS ON THE ARGUMENT FROM LOOKS 
It has been very common to attribute to perceptual experience representational contents 
(Tye 1995, 2000, 2009; Pautz 2010; Harman 1990; Siegel 2010; McDowell 1996; Peacocke 1992). 
This view is commonly called “representationalism” or the “content view.” But recently it has 
been pointed out that the positive motivation for representationalism is underdeveloped. Arguably, 
the rings on trees or the layers of sediment in a soil sample represent temporal properties. Arguably, 
a map represents the Venetian Lagoon. Presumably perceptual experience implicates 
representation in some further sense. But what specific sense, and why? In  the absence of positive 
argumentation for representationalism, non-representational views of perception have been 
resurgent (Campbell 2002, 2014; Travis 2013; Brewer 2011; Fish 2009). 
One popular way for representationalists to respond to the demand for a positive  argument 
is to reason from the way in experience the environment looks.215 So Wylie Breckenridge writes, 
One reason that I sometimes hear in support of [the content] view (at least in conversation) is the 
following: 
(1) When something looks a certain way, it makes sense to ask whether or not it is the way it 
looks. 
[…] The claim is not always formulated in this way—sometimes it is formulated as follows: 
(2) Visual experiences can be assessed as veridical or non-veridical, or as accurate or inaccurate, 
or as correct or incorrect. 
215 E.g., Siegel 2010 
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When I ask what is meant by (2), I typically get (1) as a reply, so I take it that they express the 
same claim.216
As Breckenridge here illustrates, claims about visual looks have frequently been taken to 
support claims about visual contents. Looks can seem to be accuracy-evaluable, and contents are 
understood in terms of such evaluation. Accordingly, the latter seem perfectly placed to explain 
the former. One example of such an argument is Susanna Schellenberg’s “Master Argument.”217 
On this argument, if a subject is visually aware of her environment, then she is visually aware of 
it being some way. But if she is aware of her environment being some way, then her experience 
has a content to the effect that her environment is that way.218 Accordingly, experience has content. 
Presumably for Schellenberg visual awareness of the environment as being some way is a matter 
of the environment looking that way in the relevant experience. Accordingly, Schellenberg’s 
“Master Argument” is an argument from the nature of looks to a conclusion of experiential content. 
But recently anti-representationalists have argued against the connection between visual 
looks and content. Here I discuss two such objections, provided by Breckenridge (2007) and Travis 
(2004; 2013). For Breckenridge, visual looks are not sufficient to ground a representational 
conception of experience. On Travis’ stronger argument, there positively is no sense of looks 
appropriate to vision that can plausibly be associated with representational content. For Travis, far 
from  providing  an  argument  for  representationalism, representationalists face a challenge how 
216 Breckenridge 2007, p. 117 
217 Schellenberg 2011, pp. 719-20 
218 As critics have noted, Schellenberg’s argument may in this respect merely seem to presuppose a distinctly 
representational understanding of the “way” in experience the environment is present: it is unclear why the relational 
presence of a property, or some merely phenomenal way of appearing, should be insufficient to capture the intuitive 
sense in which perception presents the environment being some way. 
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to make their account coherent with the way in experience the environment looks. 
Breckenridge (2007) grants the claim that the sort of looks that characterize visual 
experience are plausibly associated with questions concerning their correctness or incorrectness 
(claim (1) above). However, for Breckenridge (1) fails to support the claim that experience has 
content (claim (2) above). In particular, Breckenridge considers assertions of e.g., walking or 
talking some way (e.g., “proud” or “American”).219 In such examples Breckenridge suggests the 
question of correctness plausibly arises (“John talks American, but is he?”), but the presence of 
content in the sense intended for perceptual experience is deeply implausible. Moreover, 
I take it that the move from (1) to the claim that visual experiences have representational content is 
supposed to be an inference to the best explanation [...]. I have just argued that this inference is too 
strong to be a good one. The similarity in form between the fact in (1) and [facts about the 
applicability of correctness to cases of walking some way, talking some way, etc.] suggests that they 
be given a uniform explanation. So if the explanation just given is the best explanation of the fact in 
(1), then corresponding explanations are the best explanations of [facts about the applicability of 
correctness to cases of walking some way, talking some way, etc.] 
That is, Breckenridge provides a reductio of the move from (1) to (2) grounded in the 
assumption that the argument is supposed to be an inference to the best explanation. For 
Breckenridge, the applicability of correctness to “walks”-talk and “talks”-talk seems of the same 
kind as the applicability of correctness to looks-talk. Accordingly the former’s explanation must 
proceed along similar lines as it does for the latter. But the application of correctness to “walks”- 
talk and “talks”-talk does not ground an abductive inference to content. Accordingly, such an 
abductive inference cannot be sustained in the case of looks-talk either. 
But     thus     stated     Breckenridge’s     argument    begs    the    question    against    the 
219 Breckenridge intentionally chooses the non-adverbial grammar of phrases like “John talks American,” but argues 
that such phrases are grammatical and that, moreover, using ungrammatical sentences in arguments is not 
problematic (Breckenridge 2007, p. 120). One way to approach my criticism of Breckenridge below is to suggest the 
grammar is not unproblematic, and serves to import representation where it isn’t present. 
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representationalist.220 In sentences like “John walks proud,”  John’s  way of  walking may be some 
indication that he is, in fact, proud, raising the question whether the sentence is true.221 In effect, 
Breckenridge argues the same is true for the “looks”-sentences associated with visual 
experience.222 But the representationalist holds that experience does more than indicate the 
presence of some environmental facts, and represents them to be the case in a stronger sense. That 
is, Breckenridge is wrong to assume that argument from looks to content is intended (in general, 
at least) to be an inference to the best explanation, and moreover, wrong to assume that “looks”-
sentences are intended to fall in the same class as “walks”-sentences or “talks”- sentences. 
But even if Breckenridge’s negative argument fails, in the vicinity there is a legitimate 
positive challenge to the content theorist. As several commentators have pointed out, assigning 
content to a state comes cheap.223 For example, evaluation in terms of correctness is sufficient 
grounds to associate experience with some form of content, but such grounds cannot give a 
stronger association than applies to “walks”-talk or “talks”-talk. As such, Breckenridge’s challenge 
is that evaluation for correctness is by itself insufficient to ground an account of experiential 
content. As Schellenberg points out the difficulty (Schellenberg 2011, p. 720; italics original) 
On the weakest way of understanding this relation [between the way things look to the subject and 
220 I should qualify this point by noting that Breckenridge’s challenge seems aptly directed at Siegel 2010’s 
argument for perceptual content, which invokes abductive reasoning from visual looks. 
221 More precisely, there seem to be two possible readings: “John does a particular type of walking, i.e., walking 
proudly”; or “John walks like a proud person typically walks.” Neither is representational, and for the latter the 
question of accuracy arises, but only as constituting a possible expression of John’s pride. 
222 Breckenridge effectively accepts this characterization of his view, describing the upshot of visual experience in 
terms of evidential import, and suggesting that any intuitive differences between vision and the walking and talking 
cases can be explained by the fact that the evidential support they provide is weaker than it is in the visual case. If I 
am correct in this paper, it is wrong to characterize the sense of “looks” that grounds representationalism in terms of 
providing evidence for a proposition (i.e., so-called “evidential” looks, see Chisholm 1959 and discussion of Travis 
2013 below). 
223 E.g., Vuletic Dissertation, pp. 8-12 
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content], it is simply one on which content is associated with the experience. This way of 
understanding the relation is too weak to give support to the content thesis: it does not give  support 
to the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world. 
Accordingly, the content theorist faces the following challenge, 
Strong Content: The representationalist must show why the way things in 
experience look supports perceptual content in some at least more fundamental 
sense than looks merely being evaluable for correctness. 
An important second challenge to the notion of experiential content has been provided by 
Charles Travis (2004, 2013). The nature of Travis’ argument has attracted considerable 
controversy, and I here follow an understanding provided by Keith Wilson (Forthcoming).224 Like 
Breckenridge, Travis questions the link between (1) and (2). But while Breckenridge questions the 
inference from looks to content, Travis makes the stronger claim that there is no sense of looks 
appropriate to visual experience that meets Strong Content. In particular, Travis distinguishes two 
different sorts of looks to which visual phenomenology may seem to give rise: evidentiary looks 
and comparative looks (or “thinkable looks” and “visual looks”), and argues neither can ground 
Strong Content.225 
On the evidentiary sense of looks, the way some scene or object looks may be taken as 
evidence for some proposition: a painting may look to be a Van Gogh.226 Correctness arises for 
this sense of looks the way it arises for “walks”-talk or “talks”-talk: visual experience provides 
some indication to believe some proposition (i.e., the way things, by the lights of that visual 
experience, look). But evidentiary looks are not distinctly visual: that the painting looks to be a 
Van Gogh is not a feature of my visual experience itself. Evidentiary looks therefore cannot meet 
Strong Content. 
224 See Brogaard 2010. 
225 For classic discussions of the senses of looks, see Chisholm 1959, Jackson 1977. For discussion see Martin 2010, 
pp. 163-165. 
226 The relation between evidentiary looks and the propositions for which they provide support need not be strictly 
evidentiary. It is merely that the accuracy of the relevant content is somehow indicated by the relevant look. 
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On the comparative sense of looks, some scene or object presents a look that is comparable 
to the look of some other scene or object. These looks make explicit reference to the way things 
visually are for a subject, and are arguably properly experiential. But these looks cannot support 
Strong Content, because any look in this sense is ambiguous between any number of comparative 
looks: a wax imitation of a lemon looks as much like a wax imitation of a lemon as it does like a 
lemon. If this is correct, it is unclear what content is associated with a comparative look.227 If a 
wax imitation looks like a lemon this is not because my experience represents the wax imitation 
as a lemon. The experience is not incorrect insofar as the wax imitation is not in fact a lemon. The 
experience presents the subject with the look of the wax imitation, which is comparable to the look 
of a lemon. 
On Keith Wilson’s detailed exposition of Travis’ argument (Forthcoming, p. 10), Travis’ 
reasoning is as follows (Wilson characterizes the type of representation required by Strong Content 
as “p-representation”): 
P1 If visual experiences were p-representational then their content would be recognisable in virtue 
of how, in experience, things perceptually appear, or look […] (Looks-indexing) 
P2 Visual looks are incapable of making p-representational content recognisable since they are 
comparative and so equivocal between multiple contents. 
P3 Thinkable looks are incapable  of making p-representational content recognisable  since  they 
are not wholly perceptual. 
P4 There is no further notion of looks that is both wholly perceptual and capable of making p- 
representational content recognisable. 
C1 (From P2 through P4) The content of visual experiences cannot be recognisable on the basis  
of how things look […] 
C2  (From P1 and C1) Visual experiences are not p-representational. 
In this argument, P2, P3 and P4 state Travis’ above-discussed claims concerning the relation 
between looks-sentences and content. These claims are supplemented by the pivotal claim in P1 
that  the  contents  of  experience  must  be  subjectively available  by being  (in  Wilson’s terms) 
227 As the focus on “recognition” in P1 below makes clear, the issue for Wilson is not that looks must determine or 
contribute the contents of experience (for this understanding of Travis, Burge 2010, p. 344; Siegel 2010, p. 62)), but 
rather how the subject becomes subjectively aware of the contents of her experience. 
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“recognizable” from the look of the experience. Wilson calls this commitment “looks-indexing,” 
and writes that it constitutes “the pro tem assumption that the most plausible way for the 
representationalist to satisfy [the subjective availability of perceptual content] is for experiential 
content to be recognisable to the subject — or “indexed” to use Travis’s term […] — on the  basis 
of how things visually appear, or look.”228 So consider, 
Looks-Indexing: If visual experiences have content then their content must be recognizable in 
virtue of how, in experience, things perceptually appear, or look.229
Does the representationalist need to accept “looks-indexing”? Do the contents of 
experience have to be recognizable from its looks? As Wilson notes, it may seem a salient target 
for opposition to Travis. For example, while it is true that some philosophers of perception take 
phenomenology to ground content (Horgan and Tienson 2002, Kriegel 2010), others take content 
to serve as a supervenience basis for phenomenology (Schellenberg 2011, Dretske 2003).230 If 
Looks-Indexing were rejected, the representationalist would be free to motivate her account 
differently, and no difficulty would obviously ensue. 
But as Wilson also notes, rejecting Looks-Indexing should not be considered so 
straightforward. There is a genuine theoretical question how a subject relates to her experience 
such that the contents of it are experientially available to her.231 As Wilson situates the challenge 
to the representationalist, she faces a dilemma: either she can reject the subjectively available 
character of perceptual contents and provide some reason why experience should involve content 
228 Wilson Forthcoming, p. 14 
229 Modified from Wilson’s P1 
230 An interesting third option is to deny that experiential looks and perceptual content can come apart in the way 
apparently required by Looks-Indexing (this arguably is the view expressed in McDowell’s response to Travis in 
(McDowell Manuscript1). Wilson briefly discusses this option (Wilson Forthcoming, p. 32), and below I will 
express sympathy for this view, but argue that it is not inconsistent with accepting Looks-Indexing. 
231 Indeed, for Wilson “[it is one] of Travis’s major contributions to the debate” to draw attention to this question, 
which has been ignored or glossed over by many other philosophers of perception.” (For discussion Wilson 
Forthcoming, pp. 25-26.) 
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in  a  way  that  does  not  rely on its subjective availability, or she can find some alternative, non- 
looks-indexed explanation for their subjectively availability. As Wilson frames the dilemma: 
To give a decisive argument in favour of representationalism, then, its proponents must either (a) 
identify some unique role that the representational content of experience is supposed to play which 
cannot be adequately explained, or is superior to the explanation given, by their anti- 
representationalist opponents, or (b) identify some distinctive mechanism by which experiential 
contents are tokened such that they are cognitively available to the perceiver, but which cannot in 
turn be co-opted by the anti-representationalist to explain the content of the resulting perceptual 
judgements or beliefs.232
In either (a) and (b) Wilson takes the representationalist to face an uphill battle establishing 
her view over non-representationalist alternatives. If representational contents do not capture what 
is subjectively available to a subject in experience, then the representationalist faces the task of 
providing an account of what renders her account explanatorily superior to non- representational 
accounts. This task is complicated by the fact that representationalism is an account of conscious 
experience, thereby making it dubiously useful to invoke e.g., representational characterizations 
of cognitive processes that fall short of subjective consciousness. On the other hand, if 
representational contents are subjectively available but not looks-indexed, then the 
representationalist must explain how this form of subjective availability fits a representational view 
specifically, rather than being generic between representational and non-representational 
accounts.233 After all, it is typically the association between looks and correctness that is supposed 
to motivate the content view of conscious experience. 
My argument in this chapter is that the representationalist does not need to fall into either 
(a) or (b), since she should reject P4. Here is the way I think she should do so: 
232 Wilson Forthcoming, p. 36 
233 The problem may not seem entirely straightforward, but the dilemma is essentially this: either the 
representationalist abandons grounding her account in the conscious character of experience, or she grounds her 
account in some other feature of conscious experience than the way things look—but it seems hard to see what this 
feature would be such that representationalism would be better positioned to explain the conscious character of 
experience than anti-representationalism. 
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Argument from Self-Conscious Looks 
SL1: In experience, things self-consciously look some way to the subject. 
SL2: If things self-consciously look some way to the subject, then the way things look is 
expressible as p, where p expresses a representational content.234 
C: Experience has representational content. 
Dialectically, the upshot of the Argument from Self-Conscious Looks is that there is a 
properly visual sense of looks that is not captured by Travis’ division between evidentiary and 
comparative looks. 235 When a subject suffers conscious phenomenal experience, then there is a 
way things self-consciously look to her. How for example? If I am visually confronted with a red 
cube, then I may be self-conscious of it looking to me that there is a red cube in front of me. The 
suggestion is that this is a sense of looks not captured by either evidentiary or comparative looks. 
The look of my experience is not some evidence for there being a red cube in front of me, in the 
way that some painting may look to be a Van Gogh. Likewise I am not registering some look  that 
the red cube shares in common with other items. It looks to me that there is a red cube in front of 
me. The look is a fact apparently made manifest to me. Accordingly, P4 is false. 
I think that many philosophers will grant something on which SL1 depends, i.e., that mature 
human perceptual experience has a self-conscious character. For example, a philosopher who does 
without perceptual content like John Campbell nevertheless describes perception as integrating 
the environment “into the subjective life of the thinker” (Campbell 2002, p. 6). 
234 I think it ultimately follows from an appreciation of the self-conscious grounds of positing representational 
contents that these contents must be conceptual, but I argue this in Chapter 6. 
235 I should make clear what type of response I am not intending to make on behalf of the content theorist. Some 
philosophers (Byrne 2009, Schellenberg 2011, Glüer 2014) have responded to Travis by arguing that there is a 
distinctly phenomenal sense of looks, which is properly visual but not comparative. For example, the way my coat 
looks grey to me: it may be thought that it phenomenally looks to me to be grey. But Travis’ point is precisely that it 
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seems hard to isolate such a sense of looks. The grey coat phenomenally presents a look that is typical of grey  things, 
but that can in fact be presented by objects of any number of sorts, including e.g., blue or beige coats in dim light. 
Accordingly, to insist on a non-comparative but nevertheless distinctly phenomenal sense of looks may seem  to beg 
the question against Travis. I will not rely on the phenomenal non-comparative sense of looks in this paper. For 
discussion of this response to Travis and its inadequacy, see Wilson Forthcoming, §4.3. 
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Likewise, relationalist Mike Martin grants that reflection on animal experience involves 
reflection  on  the  merely  conscious enjoyment of states we enjoy self-consciously (Martin 2006, 
p. 379; Martin 1998, p. 99).236 On the contrary, I take it that philosophers will resist the claim  that
there is some relevant sense of looks associated with the self-conscious character of experience, 
and specifically will reject the association between perceptual self-consciousness and perceptual 
content. These claims will be the burden of the rest of this chapter. 
236 One illustration of the self-conscious character of experience is through the familiar observation that perception 
contains a certain orientation to the self (Carruthers 2006, p. 300.) 
it is plausible that the contents of perceptual experience contain an implicit reference to the self 
(Bermudez 1998). Objects are seen as being closer or further away, for example, or as being above 
or below. Closer to or further from what? The only available answer is: oneself. Equally, when  one 
moves through the world there is a distinctive sort of “visual flow” as objects approach, loom larger, 
and then disappear out of the periphery of the visual field. The experience of visual flow is normally 
apprehended as—that is, has as part of its intentional content—motion through a stationary (or 
independently moving) environment. Motion of what? Again the only available answer is: oneself. 
As Peter Carruthers notes, it is very plausible that the subject is in some sense implicated in the nature of perceptual 
experience. Perception has an egocentric character, on which things appear in various positions vis-à-vis the 
perceiver, e.g., to their right or left, far away or nearby. 
One might merely grant that owing to the specifics of the visual senses (the way the eyes are placed in the 
face, e.g.) perception involves a certain egocentric geometric orientation on the environment. Some philosophers have 
argued that this is the only relevant way the self-referential character of perceptual orientation should be thought to 
figure in the specification of perceptual content (e.g., Gregory 2013, chapter 2.) 
But it is plausible that there is more to the standpoint from which experience is enjoyed than its geometric 
properties. Compare Christopher Peacocke writing about visual imagination (italics original) 
[visualizing] always involves imagining from the inside a certain (type of) viewpoint, and someone 
with that viewpoint could, in the imagined world, knowledgeably judge “I’m thus-and- so,” where 
the thus-and-so gives details of the viewpoint. (Peacocke 1985, p. 21. Emphasis original.) 
I cannot argue for this claim here, but I think Peacocke’s emphasis on the subject-referring aspect of a viusal 
viewpoint illustrates that for human subjects the viewpoint of experience transcends geometry to include a more robust 
sense of self-awareness. One’s perceptual orientation seems to be seamlessly integrated with the perceiver’s 
experience of time and their movements: things do not seem to disappear when they are out of view, and the limits of 
one’s visual field arguably do not strike one as proper limits of what is visible but as already integrated in one’s 
capacity to enjoy the broader visual world by reorienting one’s focus, one’s face and one’s whole body. More deeply, 
we may think that a perceptual perspective understood simply in objective geometric terms would not as such be 
intelligible to the subject as providing a realm of visible reality in the way perceptual experience does. It is not at all 
obvious that some geometrically apportioned space populated by objects is simpliciter intelligible as a realm of the 
visible: a stretch of the three-dimensional world presented to the subject for visually accessing. 
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4.2 EXPLAINING LUCIDITY 
My suggestion is that at this point the dialectic between representationalist and anti- 
representationalist views on the nature of “looks” comes to turn fundamentally on how to conceive 
of the “lucidity” that is paradigmatic of certain mental states.237 
At least some of our mental states are lucid or in some way immediately available (or “self-
intimating”) to their subject. The example is often pain, but take a thought. How do you know what 
you are presently thinking? Both the presence of the thought and some aspect of its nature—its 
content—are perspicuous or lucid to you. Just so, it seems part of the nature of phenomenal 
conscious experience to make itself available to its subject in this lucid way. How  do you know 
the character of your phenomenally conscious experience? It is perspicuous to you. You somehow 
possess these states as lucidly yours. What is this? 
One response is that there is nothing to be said in this area, and that the phenomenal 
character of consciousness is primitively lucid in a way that defies exposition. Perhaps there are 
accounts to be given of subjective access to thoughts, beliefs or desires, but not so for 
phenomenally conscious experience. Insofar as my argument below is from an account  of lucidity 
to a notion of perceptual content, this response may be dialectically appealing to anti- 
representationalists. But I do not think this response is satisfactory, and I think it is unavailable to 
anti-representationalists. 
Even if the lucid character of phenomenal consciousness is in an important sense 
primitive,  it   is  nevertheless  uncontroversial  that  lucidity  concerns  some  relation  between  a 
237 My purposes in this paper do not require me to give a precise account of mental lucidity. For example, I do not 
need to settle whether lucid states are by their nature known or whether they are merely available for knowledge. 
Likewise, I do not need to settle whether lucidity is an essential feature of conscious states per se, or whether merely 
certain (types of) conscious states are lucid. It suffices for my purposes to put in place a broad picture of the relation 
between the subject and her lucid conscious states that can abstract from these more particular questions. 
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conscious state and its subject, thus meriting an exposition of this relation. Perceptual 
phenomenology implicates a subject, insofar as a notion of “what it is like” presupposes a subject 
for whom there are ways things can be. As Matthew Soteriou writes, “conscious sensory 
experiences have phenomenal properties that determine what it is like for one to be the subject of 
them.”238 Accordingly, it should be legitimate to investigate the relation between the subject and 
her lucidly conscious mental states, and to argue on this basis where appropriate. Moreover, anti- 
representationalists frequently hold that the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by 
objects and properties located in the distal environment (Fish 2009). But features of the 
environment are not primitively lucid. Lucidity concerns the way the subject has those features 
available in her experience. Accordingly, anti-representationalists are poorly positioned to rely  on 
lucidity as primitive. 
Why did I suggest that the debate over “looks” concerns at least in part the “lucid” aspect 
of perceptual experience? Consider that the lucidity of phenomenal experience plausibly underlies 
Looks-Indexing. An investigation of conscious experience bottoms out in what the subject has 
immediately available to her. And I take it that this is how things visually are to her, i.e., how 
things look. That is, I take it as safe to accept 
Lucid Looks: What the subject has lucidly available in conscious visual 
experience can be described as a way things look to her. 
Accordingly, if experience has content, such content had better be available to the subject 
from   the   way   things   look.239    As   such,  the  debate  between  representationalists  and  anti- 
238  Soteriou 2013, p. 1 
239 Relatedly there is a natural understanding of looks-talk on which it seems practically definitional for the 
representationalist to accept that the question of the subjective availability of experiential content must be  answerable 
through a form of looks-talk. For example, how—if at all—is it available from my experience that my coat seems to 
be grey (where this is supposed to express some content)? Because that is how the coat looks to me. This answer 
seems so innocuous that it seems hard to conceive what other relation might obtain between experience and 
subjectively available content. 
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representationalists about the nature of “looks” comes to turn on this question: when things are 
visually lucid to the subject such as to look some way, are there grounds for associating this looking 
with content? The aim in the following is to mount an argument for the claim that there are. 
To prepare the ground for my preferred Kantian view, let me set aside two well- established 
alternative accounts that explain lucidity in terms of representational content.240 The point of 
discussing these views is to note a common mistake among them, and to distinguish them from the 
Kantian thesis being advanced here. Representation is irrevocably a form of intentionality: it is in 
the nature of representation to take an object (Lycan 2001, p. 4; Drummond 2006, p. 208). But I 
will suggest that the type of self-awareness that makes a state lucid is not a matter of such 
intentionality. Now, clearly anti-representationalists will likely not be attracted to representational 
views of lucidity. But discussion will suggest that explaining lucidity requires a view of the subject 
that grounds the Argument from Self-Conscious Looks. 
Perhaps some mental state M is lucid because M is the object of a reflecting state M*. 
Higher Order Theory (HOT): a mature human state M is lucidly conscious if it 
is represented by a higher-order (or “reflecting”) state M*.241 
240 Before I continue, I should note that may aim is not to say anything conclusive about the debate between self- 
representational views and their competitors like the well-known Higher-Order Theory (HOT) (Rosenthal 1986) or 
Higher-Order Perception (HOP) (Armstrong 1968) views, or about the various debates about self-consciousness 
more broadly. For the former debate, e.g., Gennaro 2004. On the latter, the debate is largely between “epistemic” 
and “constitutive” accounts (Peacocke 2014) or “reasons” and “no reasons” accounts (Martin 1998) or accounts that 
are “credulous” versus “incredulous” over the need to provide a transition from first-order to higher-order conscious 
states (Boyle 2011). Broadly, the debate is over whether there is a metaphysical, constitutive relation between first- 
order and higher-order conscious states, or whether there is an epistemic, reasons-based relation between conscious 
states and our knowledge of them. While my account in this paper belongs to the metaphysical, constitutivist 
tradition, I cannot here provide a full defense of such views. For important contributions to the debate, Evans 1982, 
Moran 2001, Shoemaker 1994, Setiya 2012, Cassam 2015, Boyle 2009; 2011, Byrne 2005; 2009, Peacocke 1998; 
2014. For a very helpful exposition of some of the important considerations in the debate, Martin (1998, pp. 108- 
111). 
241 Locus classicus Rosenthal 1986. Both HOT and PSR (below) are familiar as accounts of consciousness. But it 
seems safe to think they intend to explain consciousness as a lucid phenomenon. Certainly for self-representational 
views this is uncontroversial. At any rate, they are easily adapted. 
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This is how Kant’s view has sometimes been understood, e.g., by Rocco Gennaro who suggests 
that some part of a first-order conscious state constitutes an unconscious higher-order 
representation of the state itself (which Gennaro calls a metapsychological representation (MET)): 
From the first-person point of view, we cannot expect to be consciously aware of all that is 
“presupposed,” to use a Kantian term, in a conscious state. […] we can understand the situation as 
follows: we passively receive information via our senses in what Kant calls our “faculty of 
sensibility,” some of which rises to the level of unconscious mental states. But such mental states 
do not become conscious until the more cognitive “faculty of understanding” operates on them via 
the application of higher-order concepts in the METs. […] however, the MET itself is not conscious; 
thus METs and their concepts are “presupposed” in conscious experience.242
As this passage details, Gennaro takes Kant’s account to involve the unconscious involvement of 
high-order representation of the self as having conscious states in order for the subject to have 
conscious visual states.243 On the assumption that Gennaro associates consciousness with  lucidity, 
this is a HOT theory of lucidity. 
But HOT engenders a regress.244 More importantly, HOT presupposes that first-order states 
have a self-conscious character where it should explain this character. A reflecting state  M* is 
supposed to explain lucidity by representing a state M, allowing for a lucid self-awareness of M as 
a  state  of  mine.  But how does M* single out M? It already presupposes that M is mine. In other 
242 Gennaro 2006, p. 237 
243 As I develop my account in Chapter 6, it will turn out especially unfortunate for Gennaro to associate concepts 
and the spontaneity of the understanding with unconscious representations. As I understand Kant, the basis for 
considering experience conceptual is its self-conscious character. 
244 As Drummond notes (2006, p. 202), 
[If] the subject is aware of the reflecting experience […] then the subject is aware of it only in 
another reflecting experience […] extrinsic to the reflecting experience […] and so on  ad infinitum. 
If, on the other hand, the subject is unaware of the reflecting experience […] (or some other 
reflecting experience in the chain), the reflecting experience is itself unconscious. 
It is not wholly clear why the latter option is problematic, and various higher-order (or partially higher-order) 
theorists have embraced this option (Gennaro 2006, pp. 227-228). On this type of view, we can become conscious of 
higher-order states but only when we introspect them, thus rendering the higher-order conscious through a still- 
higher order state. But this seems to me not to work: in introspection we are presumably intentionally conscious of 
our introspecting, and it does not seem plausible to posit an unconscious higher-order state to explain our 
consciousness of the introspecting higher-order state. Nothing in this paper will hinge on the regress objection to 
HOT. 
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words, the reflecting state M* already presupposes some self-awareness of M. 
It is impossible to conceive how one could be explicitly aware of […] experiences as one’s own 
without being aware in some way of these experiences as belonging to the same self directing its 
attention to them, that is, without being aware of the reflecting experience as belonging to the same 
self. This is impossible if the reflected experience is not self-aware. 
A sophisticated version of this objection has been raised by Martin (1998). Christopher 
Peacocke (1998; 2014) explains lucid first-personal awareness of M in terms of an intellectual 
second-order conscious state M* which is immediately justified by a non-conceptual, first- 
personal state M through a sui generis, non-observational rule of rationality R.245 But not all mental 
states fall under R (e.g., self-deceived states, unconscious beliefs, etc.) How is M distinctive? The 
only answer is that M is such as to be available for lucid awareness under R. Accordingly, 
Peacocke’s theory does not explain lucidity, but presupposes it.246 
Perhaps mental states are lucid not because they are represented by higher-order states, but 
because they represent themselves. 
Pure Self-Representationalism (PSR): a mature human state M is lucidly 
conscious if it is represented by M*, where M* is identical to M.247 
The idea that conscious human states represent themselves famously goes back to Brentano 
(1995) and Reid (1785), with Reid holding that experiences are “signs” both of their objects and 
of themselves, and Brentano often described as suggesting that conscious representations have a 
“double object.”248 So Brentano writes concerning the perception of a  tone (1995, p. 129): 
245 Peacocke 2016 describes R as “predicative transfer,” giving the example of moving from “this body is next to a 
ravine” to “I am next to a ravine”. 
246 Of course this need not be a problem, depending on the ambitions of an introspective theory. The point here is 
that introspection does not explain lucidity. 
247 Kriegel 2003. Why “pure” self-representionalism? On the one hand, philosophers have introduced versions of the 
idea that mix elements of self-representational and higher-order views. On the other hand, I think the view 
advocated in this paper is a form of self-representationalism, even as it does not explain lucidity through 
representation of the state or its subject. 
248 See Lehrer 2006 
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The consciousness that accompanies the presentation of the tone is a consciousness […] of the whole 
mental act in which the tone is presented and in which it is itself also given. Apart from the fact that 
it presents the mental phenomenon of the tone, the mental act of hearing becomes at the same time 
in its totality its own object and content.249
We can distinguish between various more detailed versions of the self-representational 
idea, e.g., the claim that any conscious state represents wholly both its object and itself (Kriegel 
2003) or the claim that some part of a conscious state represents its object and some part of the 
state represents itself (Gennaro 2006). In turn, either view can be distinguished from views on 
which conscious states represent not (merely) themselves but (also) their subject (Brook 2006). 
Self-representationalism is frequently considered as a way of fleshing out a Kantian view. 
Stripped down to its bare minimum, [Kant] held the view that common or garden representations 
present not just what they are about, not just their object. They also present themselves and they 
present oneself, their subject, that is to say, the thing that has them.250
But PSR does not work either. What is it for a state to represent itself? Representational 
states are (at least in part) individuated by their content. Say M has content C. So for M to represent 
itself to the subject, it presumably needs to represent C. But for M to have C is presumably already 
to represent that content to the subject. Either this representation is lucid or it is not. If it is lucid, 
then  M  does  not  need  to  represent  itself. 251  But if M’s representing C to the subject does not 
249 As Drummond 2006 notes, it is an interesting aspect of Brentano’s view that the self-representational aspect of M 
represents the whole state, including the self-representational aspect itself (which in turn represents the whole state, 
etc.). Drummond objects that Brentano seems to explain awareness of awareness of seeing, rather than self- 
awareness of seeing, but I find the recursive character of Brentano’s view much less obvious to interpret. Here I will 
not pursue ways it may be developed. 
250 Brook 2006, p. 89 
251 Consider here an objection. Presumably the proponent of PSR might reply: C is lucid, and this is so precisely in 
virtue of representing itself. That is, C can be a distinct sort of content: a content that represents itself, and 
accordingly is lucid. By not considering this option, I may appear to simply beg the question against PSR. There are 
two responses. 
First, my objection to PSR assumes a certain interpretation of its program: namely to account for lucidity 
by using the resources provided by garden variety, non-lucid intentional contents. This is in fact typically the 
intended interpretation for proponents of PSR. Kriegel (2009) explicitly rejects interpreting C as a distinct type of 
lucid, self-representing content. On Kriegel’s “partial self-representationalism,” contents cannot represent 
themselves, but only other contents. Accordingly, for Kriegel a self-representing state M will have two contents C 
and C*, where C represents some environmental reality, and C* represents C, but not itself. Kriegel then argues that 
“partial self-representation” can be sufficient for self-representation simpliciter. Kriegel’s rejection of distinctly 
lucid contents fits a more general way PSR is typically motivated by naturalist concerns: the aim is to reduce lucid 
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render M’s representing C lucid to the subject, then it is not clear why M’s representing M 
representing C to the subject would do so. If representation is not lucid, it is not clear why 
representation of representation is lucid. Self-representation is just more representation. 
The response on behalf of PSR is that content makes immediately available what it is 
content of, such that C makes available what it represents, and M representing M representing C 
makes available M representing C. But this is to misconstrue the explanandum of lucidity. Lucid 
awareness is not merely the ability to know one is in M, but a peculiarly first-personal immediate 
consciousness of being in M (signaled by the way the state “self-intimates”). A cognitive system 
might allow for knowledge of the subject possessing M without this being a matter of a subject’s 
lucid consciousness of M. Accordingly, a representation of M representing C does not account for 
a subject’s lucid awareness of being in M. 
The common failing of HOT and PSR is that representational intentionality fails to explain 
lucidity: that lucid states are immediately available to the subject as theirs. HOT presupposes that 
the states are lucidly theirs, and PSR presupposes that the states are lucidly available in the right 
way. To see the heart of the mistake, it is helpful to reflect more deeply on the point that lucid 
states are “mine.”252 Consider Sebastian Rödl’s reflection on the type of self- consciousness 
expressed in a first-person thought, 
consciousness to garden variety, naturalistically acceptable representational states. But distinctly lucid contents are 
not garden variety in this way: they do not explain lucidity through representational relations between ordinary 
contents. 
Second, it is far from clear that the idea of a content C that is lucid in virtue of representing itself works. C 
must represent C. What is the content of C? It includes representing C, which… And so on. A regress ensues. This 
may not in itself be problematic. But it jeopardizes the idea of C bearing a representational relation to itself. How 
can a state represent a content that is indefinitely regressive in this way? I leave this worry here. 
Thanks to Wayne Wu for bringing raising this objection to me. 
252 Prompting HOT theorists to respond by denying the existence of such an obvious phenomenological fact 
(Gennaro 2006, pp. 222-223). 
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When someone thinks in the manner expressed by a first person pronoun […] the identity of her 
who thinks with her of whom she thinks defines the manner of thinking, it is apprehended not in a 
separate act, in which the subject recognizes someone whom she thinks to be herself. Rather, the 
identity is comprehended in the first person thought itself.253
Rödl here denies that self-referring thought—thought involving “I” —should be thought 
of as picking out its object (the self) through a form of recognition, e.g., that this subject is “me.” 
Rather, no recognition is involved at all, and the self-consciousness expressed by “I”-thoughts 
itself already embraces the identity of the thinker and its object. 
A similar point applies to the “mine-ness” of lucid states. When a subject enjoys a 
conscious state as lucidly hers, the identity of the subject lucidly enjoying the state and the 
possessor of the conscious state are not established through some intentional attitude or act of 
representation, but are rather a sui generis constitutive aspect of a form of consciously enjoying a 
state, namely lucidly. That is, lucid states do not single out themselves as “mine,” and are not 
singled out as “mine” by other states (including through representation of the self “as” subject 
(Kriegel 2003)).254  HOT’s  problem is not really that it fails to account for the “mineness” of the 
253 Rödl Manuscript, p. 2. 
254 One illustration of this problem is the objection frequently raised against PSR to the effect that it over-distributes 
attentional focus between the objects of the representation and its subject or the state itself. Self-representationalists 
have responded to this objection by positing that self-representation is a form of peripheral attention (Kriegel 2003, 
p. 14; Gurwitsch 1985, p. 4). But the reference to peripheral attention is especially unfortunate, since it explicitly casts
self-consciousness as a particular variety of object awareness. As John Drummond writes (2006, p. 209), 
The theme-margin distinction […] cannot serve to underlie an account of self-awareness. Both the 
margin and the periphery belong to the objective content of experience. But what characterizes self-
awareness and differentiates it from object-awareness is precisely that the self is given as subject 
not as something that belongs to the objective field. 
As Drummond notes, self-consciousness does not involve (peripheral) attention since self-consciousness is not a form 
of object-awareness, and the self is not represented in such consciousness. Christopher Peacocke is  in sympathy with 
this point (Peacocke 2014, p. 45ff.) As Peacocke writes (p. 55) “Attention seems in its very nature to be directed to 
what the consciousness of, not the consciousness itself”; and more specifically pertaining to the subject, (p. 48), “to 
be an object of attention, the object or event must be given in perception, sensation or perhaps in certain kinds of 
sensory imagination or memory; and to be given in one of those ways is not to be given as oneself.” On the other hand, 
see Martin (1998) for a sophisticated discussion of the ways attention may be involved in self- consciousness, even if 
it is not a form of object-awareness. I am not committed here to denying the relevance of forms of attention to self-
conscious states, but only to diagnosing the concern over attention with respect to PSR as stemming from its 
representationalist commitments. 
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first-order state as though this would be required for the second-order state to  appropriately single 
it out. Instead, it signals that we should follow John Drummond (2006) in taking seriously the 
“dative” or “genitive” surface grammar of expressions of lucid states, in which objects  appear 
lucidly “to me” or experiences are “mine”—as opposed to the “accusative” grammar of object-
oriented intentionality.255 What is needed is an account of lucid states that is sui generis grounded 
in the nature of the awareness a subject possesses of her states, rather than reductively grounded 
in intentionality. 
4.3 LUCIDITY AS SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 
In the lectures known as the Anthropology Kant provides a stirring description of 
consciousness  of the “I” as a sea change in the development of mature human mentality (Anthr. 
7:127; emphasis original): 
The fact that the human being can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all 
other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person and by virtue of the unity of 
consciousness through all changes that happen to him, one and the same person […] This holds 
even when he cannot yet say “I,” because he still has it in thoughts, just as all languages must 
think it when they speak in the first person, even if they do not have a special word to express this 
concept of “I.” For this faculty (namely to think) is understanding. [….] When [a child] starts to 
speak by means of “I” a light seems to dawn on him, as it were, and from that day on he never 
again returns to his former way of speaking. –Before he merely felt himself; now he thinks 
himself. 
255 Conversely, we might—following Drummond—think that it is fundamental to the nature of intentionality that it 
presents the intentional object “as other.” But some philosophers associate this phenomenology rather with 
experiential intentionality specifically (Kriegel 2010; Rödl 2007; Frey 2010; Peacocke 2014, Chapter 2). However 
this issue is decided, I think the “mineness” of self-consciousness seems plausibly indicative of the non-intentional 
character of self-consciousness. 
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This passage contains several significant claims including, e.g., the claims that the “I” is 
constitutive of personhood and the unity of consciousness.256 But for my purposes, I want to 
abstract from some of these particulars to focus on two central aspects of the above passage: (i) 
Kant’s fundamental observation that “the human being [is such that he] can have the “I” in his 
representations”; and (ii) Kant’s association of this point with the faculty of the understanding, as 
expressed in the ability to think. My suggestion in this chapter is Kantian in explaining lucidity  in 
terms of (i) and (ii). A mental state is lucid or available for immediate knowledge because it is 
self-consciously possessed, which in turn is associated with the subject’s capacity for thinking. 
This I argue grounds the Argument from Self-Conscious Looks as an argument for perceptual 
content. 
Kant frequently emphasizes that self-consciousness—pure apperception—must  be sharply 
distinguished from intentional awareness (including “inner  sense”).257  Self- consciousness is 
(B161) “not indeed in, but with […] intuitions”; just so (Anthr. 7: 141-142) “the “I” of reflection 
contains no manifold”; and likewise, (B155) “[T]he I that I think is distinct from the I that intuits 
itself [in inner sense]; I am given to myself beyond that which is given in intuition.” I understand 
pure apperception for Kant as determining the form of a subject.258 Accordingly, let me state a 
Kantian account of lucidity as a claim about the subject of consciousness. 
256 There are no doubt interesting associations between the role of the “I” in consciousness and the unity and 
continuance of consciousness, but here is not the place to follow up on these leads. 
257 For some helpful discussion, Brook 2006 pp. 95-96. 
258 See Chapter 3 above. There I developed a reading of Kant on which the “I” contains a sui generis type of unity, 
on which the “I” is essentially reflexive in always being both the subject and object of a form of self-awareness. 
Although I do not need to directly rely on the further claim here, I argued that for Kant the sui generis reflexive 
unity of the “I” is a reason to think of the subject as a substance, and that its accidents (i.e., representations) inhere in 
in it way that conforms to this distinct unity. It is uncontroversial that Kant at least conceives of the “I” as 
significantly like a substance. That is more than sufficient for my purposes in this chapter. 
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Self-Consciousness: for certain mental states M, if M is a conscious state, then it is 
the form or nature of being the mature human subject of M to be self-conscious of 
M, where self-consciousness is a sui generis form of subjective consciousness.259 
Or to specify the thesis for the present purposes of understanding the nature of perceptual 
experience: 
Self-Conscious Experience: the form or nature of being a mature human subject 
of conscious perceptual experience is to be self-conscious of the experience, where 
self-consciousness is a sui generis form of subjective consciousness.260 
The upshot of Self-Consciousness is that Kant is not speaking loosely when he suggests 
that the “human being [has] the “I” in his representations.” In an example, if a judgment J that p 
is a representation of a subject S, then the form of J conforms to the self-conscious nature of S in 
including the “I.” J would be expressible as, “I think that p.”261 It is important to note that the 
suggestion is not that the self-referential form of J is part of its content, which is p. Rather, J is 
self-conscious. The “I think” is part of the form of J as a conscious state: the way it represents, not 
what it represents. 
How does Self-Consciousness relate to the questions of lucidity and self-representation 
discussed above? In brief, I suggest we can explain lucidity in terms of self-consciousness. In 
mature human beings, a state M is lucid because it is self-consciously possessed. The presence and 
(some aspects of)   the nature of M are lucid or perspicuous to me because the form of M includes 
259 Self-Consciousness is intended to underwrite Matthew Boyle’s suggestion that rationality should be conceived as 
“transformative” of the mind in which it is present (Boyle 2016). Boyle’s claim has sparked significant interest, but 
at least two points have remained unclear. First, what grounds the transformative conception of rationality? How are 
we supposed to understand the thesis that rationality “transforms” other mental states? Second, what is the exact 
extent of the transformative nature of rationality? Does rationality transform the nature of any mental state, or is it 
specific aspects of the mind that are affected? The development of Self-Consciousness below is intended to gain 
some initial ground on these questions. 
260 I consider below whether it is legitimate to extend Self-Consciousness in this way. 
261 Should J not be expressible merely as “p”? I take it as Kant’s main claim to deny that this properly expresses the 
form of mature human consciousness, which is inherently self-conscious. Now of course, a subject can simply judge 
“p.” But for Kant she would do so self-consciously in a way expressible as “I think that p.” As Rödl puts this point 
(Manuscript, p. 4) “being conscious of thinking a thought is not a different act from thinking this thought, the act of 
the mind expressed by p is the same as the one expressed by I think p.” 
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the subject’s possession of M, without incorporating this element into the M’s content C. 
Kant associates Self-Consciousness with thought. As Kant writes (Anthr. 7: 161)): 
Inner sense is not pure apperception, consciousness of what we are doing; for this belongs to the 
power of thinking.262
But for Self-Conscious Experience the association between self-consciousness and thought 
can seem problematic. Lucidity applies more widely than thought, but self- consciousness for Kant 
may seem associated merely with this activity. As Kant explicitly writes, self-consciousness is 
“consciousness of what we are doing,” but arguably experience is not something we do.263 Just so, 
Kant’s precise claim is (Anthr. 7:127; italics mine) “that the human being can have the “I” in his 
representations.” The modal characterization of this claim would seem suitable precisely to 
distinguish conscious thought (or even strictly self-referring thought) from experience. 
To see our way out of this dilemma I think we should see Kant’s association between self-
consciousness and the capacity for thought as expressing a fundamental insight from the rationalist 
tradition. In this light, the thought is most crisply articulated by briefly considering Kant’s view in 
light of a thought from Descartes.264 
On Katalin Farkas’ recent account of Descartes’ argument in the Meditations, the upshot 
of Descartes’s skeptical procedure—and the Cartesian discovery of the thinking self—is to provide 
a distinctly epistemological conception of the mind, such that when a skeptical scenario rules 
out  access  to  the external world, the cognizer is nevertheless left with a distinct subjective form 
262 Likewise, Kant writes (B153) that “synthesis […] as an act […] is conscious to itself, even without sensibility,” 
where the activity of synthesis for Kant is associated with the capacity for thought. See my argument in chapter 1 
above. 
263 This is consistent 
264 I am in this discussion helped by Katalin Farkas’s recent book The Subject’s Point of View (2008), the central 
thesis of which is that a helpful conception of the mind can still be found in Descartes. 
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of access to her mind. Specifically, Farkas takes Descartes to employ this distinctive 
subjective  accessibility to delineate the realm of the mental as a realm of phenomena knowable  to 
the subject in a way that they are not knowable to any other cognizer:265 
My proposal is that the mental realm is nothing but the subject matter of the cognitive  capacity that 
endows me with special access: that is, the area that is known by me in a way that it is known by no 
one else. […] We can conceive this thesis as creating a notion analogous to the notion of observable 
properties, which are also understood relative to a cognitive capacity: observable properties are those 
properties we can get to know through unaided perception. The thesis is that mental properties are 
the specially accessible properties.266
Accordingly, on Farkas’ reading the Cartesian view in effect settles on lucidity as distinctive of 
the mental. 267 
Farkas’ characterization of the Cartesian view offers a strategy for understanding Kant’s 
association of self-consciousness with the capacity to think. In particular, Farkas’ reading 
foregrounds the prominence of thought in Descartes’ conception of subjective mental life in 
general, as opposed to merely constituting one of its aspects. Consider that Farkas understands 
Descartes as giving a distinctly epistemic account of the mind, on which it is the nature of the 
mental to be knowable in a unique way. But to characterize the nature of the mental in terms of 
certain types of knowledge is to understand its nature in light of the subject’s capacity to think or 
judge. After all, it is states or acts of thought which are knowledgeable.268 Accordingly, on the 
Cartesian conception the mind as such must be understood in light of judgment. 
265 I am in this paper not committed to Farkas’ project of delineating the mental as such, and for  my purposes Farkas’ 
claims can be reformulated mutatis mutandis as concerning the nature of (certain) conscious states. 
266 Farkas 2008, p. 22-24. Of course this does not mean that these facts are not knowable to other cognizers 
simpliciter. Rather they are not knowable not in a distinctly first-personal way. 
267 Farkas’s aim is not to give an account of lucidity, e.g., not ruling out introspectability on the model of object 
perception. But if we understand the Cartesian conception of lucidity along the above-suggested Kantian lines of the 
sui generis self-conscious nature of the subject, it helps explain why Descartes might exempt self-consciousness from 
skeptical threat: self-consciousness is not a form of object-awareness, and one might think this leaves no room for a 
skeptical scenario to interpose itself between subject and object such as to undermine knowledge. This might explain 
why “internal” skepticism about access to our states seems much less worrisome than “external” skepticism about 
access to distal objects (Horgan, Tienson and Graham 2006). 
268 This may be denied by reference to acquaintance, which might be thought to constitute a form of knowledge that 
is not constituted in judgment. But even proponents of acquaintance might grant that knowledge by acquaintance 
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But the real value in considering Descartes’ view is the way Descartes’ subject comes to 
understand herself—as a self-conscious subject of mental states—in terms of thought. Consider 
Descartes’ famous characterization of the self as a thinker (CSM ii. 19: AT vii. 28), “But what, 
then, am I? A thinking thing, it has been said.” In Chapter 3 above, I have argued that the “I” is 
possessed of a distinctive unity constituted by an immediate type of reflection. I further suggested 
this immediate reflective character is associated with thought. As such, it is not coincidental that 
Descartes’ fellow rationalists emphasized that “I think, therefore I am” is not properly an inference, 
but better rendered as “I think, I am.”269 Thought itself includes the self- conscious being of the 
subject as encapsulated in the “I.”270 Kant himself agrees, writing  (B157α): 
The “I think” expresses the act of determining my existence. Existence is already given thereby. 
It is very a difficult question how precisely the self-conscious nature of thought relates to 
the existence and nature of the subject expressed by “I,” but here it is sufficient to merely sketch 
the rationalist thought. The “I” essentially reflects on itself, which (itself) in turn is nothing other 
beyond the subject that reflects on itself. The “I” in this sense possesses a constitutive reflective 
character. But such reflective character exists in the act of thinking. In thinking I am aware of 
myself as the self-conscious “I.” Reflective unity is attained in thought. As such, the existence of 
the self-conscious “I” is primarily associated with the subject’s thoughtful activity. The “I” is the 
“I” of thought first. The “I” is a thinker. 
should—in the human case—be understood in light of a further capacity for propositional knowledge. That is, even 
if first-personal access to the self is thought of as a form of acquaintance (Duncan 2015), then plausibly Farkas’ 
account still indexes the mental to the distinctively human capacity for knowledge through judgment in a way 
unavailable to animals. For more on the relation between the present view and animals, see §5 section (4) below. 
269 See my discussion of the so-called “Merian” cogito in Chapter 3 above. 
270 Notoriously Leibniz seems to hold that it follows that for any time t the subject depends for its existence on 
thinking at t (L p. 645; G VI 610), and there are places where Kant seems to assert the same. The deeper significance 
of this topic I cannot here approach. 
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Now consider the way Descartes expands on his characterization of the nature of the self- 
conscious subject (CSM ii. 19: AT vii. 28): 
But what, then, am I? A thinking thing, it has been said. But what is a thinking thing? It is a thing 
that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling and also imagines  and  has sensory 
perceptions.271 
As Farkas (2008, p. 10) notes, there seems a hesitant tone in Descartes’ inclusion of imagination 
and sense perception as activities of the “I.” But Farkas fails to register this hesitation in terms of 
the fundamental thinking nature of Descartes’ self-conscious subject.272 Insofar as Farkas is right 
to suggest that lucidity is not merely distinctive of thought, but extends to the mind more 
generally—including, e.g., sensation—then on the Cartesian conception the question is how such 
states are integrated into a self-conscious nature that has its home in the subject’s thinking  nature. 
Pace Farkas, this is what explains the qualified tone of Descartes suggestion that the thinker “also 
imagines and has sensory perceptions.” Imagination and sensory perception have  an imagistic 
quality, which is not associated with the capacity for thought as such. Accordingly, the hesitation 
stems from the fact that the thinking subject—the “I”—self-consciously possesses states that, 
unlike acts of affirmation, doubt and understanding, are not themselves (at least in their entirety) 
acts of her thinking capacity.273 
271 Cited at Farkas 2008, p. 10. 
272 Farkas explains the point in terms of Descartes’ distinction between the subjectively available aspects of sense 
experience and the actuality of operations of the sense organs (Farkas 2008, p. 10). 
273 Farkas’ failure to appreciate the Cartesian association between lucidity and thought serves to explain several 
interpreative problems that Farkas’ reading faces (by her own admission, Farkas 2008, p. 22). 
Prominent among these is the fact that, in marked contrast with Descartes himself, Farkas finds herself 
compelled to sharply distinguish “lucid” self-knowledge from knowledge of propositions such as “I exist” (Farkas 
2008, p. 26). For Farkas (2008, p. 27) these propositions express not an exercise of self-consciousness but of our 
recognition of the “contextually self-verifying” nature of certain propositions (e.g.. the fact that “I exist” is true 
whenever uttered). But if the self-conscious nature of thought is constitutive of the “I,” then this validates Descartes’ 
focus on propositions like “I exist” in his account of self-consciousness. (Here it is indicative that Farkas attributes  “I 
exist” and “I am here” the same status, where on my analysis it seems not coincidental that Descartes focuses merely 
on “I exist” (or “I am”) rather than an assertion of spatial location such as “I am here.”) 
Another example is Descartes’ connection between self-consciousness and a priori reason, which Farkas feels 
forced to deny. As Farkas admits, severing this connection is problematic for her understanding of Descartes’ view. 
For Farkas, the demon scenario is intended to isolate the subject’s view of her own mind as the capacity that 
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4.4 THE ARGUMENT FROM SELF-CONSCIOUS LOOKS 
If there is a constitutive relation between the subject’s self-conscious nature and her 
capacity for thought, then here is the way to support SL2 of the Argument from Self-Conscious 
Looks. 
Self-consciousness is not merely an additional feature of experience, but has an important 
role in shaping its nature. Recall Kant’s suggestive remarks on the transformative power of the 
“I,” such that through self-consciousness “a light seems to dawn” on the subject and “from that 
day [the subject] never again returns to his former way,” such that “now he thinks himself.” If it is 
correct that perceptual experience is self-consciously enjoyed by the subject, then experience  is 
in its nature wholly integrated into the self-conscious life of the subject. Perception presents things 
as available for the subject’s self-conscious life as a whole. Accordingly, the suggestion is that 
once self-consciousness is in play for perceptual experience, things appear in experience as 
“standing under” the structure of the subject’s self-conscious life. As such, the self-conscious 
nature of experience indexes experience to the broader nature of the self-consciously existing 
subject in a whole-to-parts order of explanation. If this is correct, then Kant’s conception of self- 
survives the skeptic’s challenge. But as Farkas notes, the cogency of any anti-skepticism relies also on reasoning, and 
consequently a capacity for introspection is not the only capacity exempted from Cartesian skepticism. Reason must 
survive as well. Farkas calls this unfortunate and unavoidable, and concludes that (2008, p. 22), “the demon is only a 
suggestive device, because it helps us to focus on the subject’s point of view.” But if I am correct in this paper, Farkas’ 
concession is unnecessary: to focus on self-consciousness as free from skepticism just is to focus on the subject’s 
capacity for thought. 
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consciousness results in two interestingly interrelated claims about the relation between the 
subject and her experience. On the one hand, it is the nature of experience to be self-conscious so 
as to implicate its subject in the way self-conscious mental states do. On the other hand, the self- 
conscious aspect of experience in turn renders its nature as dependent on the nature of its subject. 
Now,  imagine  that  I  am  self-consciously possessed of an experience of a red cube. My 
experience  presents  the  red cube as available to my self-consciously lived life: the nature of the 
experience  is  to  be u nderstood  in  light  of  my  self-consciousness. But the nature of my self- 
conscious life is grounded in my capacity to think. Accordingly, my experience involves the red 
cube  specifically  for  my  thinking  about  it.  But  the  best  way  to  express  the  idea that the 
environment  becomes  available  for  my  thinking is that there is, from experience, some way to 
think  the  environment to be. Because thinking is thinking things to be some way. Finally, a way 
things can be thought to be is expressed in terms of content.274 
If this right, then the Argument from Self-Conscious Looks meets Strong Content. Self- 
conscious experience represents things as some way or another because such is the way a thinker 
can take them to be, and the notion of a subject enjoying experience self-consciously can be 
understood only in light of her capacity to think about things. To be sure, these claims may be 
false, but if acceptable at all, the account clearly meets Strong Content.  Experience fundamentally 
involves content because it is fundamentally self-conscious. 
But would this account meet Looks-Indexing? Arguably not. If perception has contents 
self-consciously, it would not be difficult to see how such contents were subjectively available: it 
would be in the nature of experience to make its content available to the subject. But this might 
not meet  Looks-Indexing.  In his discussion of options (a) and  (b) as detailed above, Wilson  (p. 
274 I think in fact the representationalist is at considerable liberty in giving an account of perceptual contents while 
preserving the core of her view. See my discussion in Chapter 6. 
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32) briefly notes an alternative to (a) and (b)—call it (c)—on which the representationalist rejects
looks-indexing but insists on the subjective availability of contents, arguing that positing 
perceptual content eo ipso implies the subjective availability of such content and that consequently 
there is no task of explaining availability by reference to looks. But Wilson rejects 
(c) since, it seems to him, it (i) reduces perceptual phenomenology to what Mark Johnston (2006, 
p. 260) has called “The Wallpaper View,” i.e., a view on which phenomenology is epiphenomenal,
and plays no independent role in the subjective availability of experiential content; and moreover, 
(ii) it fails to accommodate the sense in which, supposedly, it is intuitive to think that visual 
phenomenology ‘shows’ the subject the contents of experience, as opposed to those contents being 
immediately known (as e.g., in the case of judgment). 
I think it is fair to describe the Argument from Self-Conscious Looks as a version of (c), 
but I think it is a mistake to suggest that it does not meet Looks-Indexing. Specifically, I think it 
is a mistake to suggest that a self-conscious view of experience does not appreciate the role of 
phenomenology in experience, or the role of experience in “showing” the subject the way it 
portrays the world as being. On the self-conscious view phenomenology is not supposed to be an 
empty wheel to an account of experience, nor does the view deny that experience in some way 
“shows” the subject how things are in her environment (i.e., what is the content of her experience). 
Rather, the point is that the phenomenal character of experience is itself self- conscious: in the 
experience of a mature human subject, the way things are phenomenally in experience is the way 
things look from a self-conscious point of view. Things look some way to the subject self-
consciously—this is the “look” to which the content of experience is indexed. Likewise, the self-
conscious look of the experience is what “shows” the subject how things stand in her environment, 
a state-of-affairs which can be expressed in terms of a content. 
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Does this meet Looks-Indexing? I believe it does. The anti-representationalist objection  as 
voiced by Wilson (and originated by Travis) seems to presuppose that Looks-Indexing can be met 
only on a conception of phenomenology on which it is somehow available independently of and 
prior to content being available, but the present view denies this commitment. Consider reflections 
on the same topic from Matthew Soteriou: 
an assumption […] that is sometimes made in representationalist accounts of experience is that […] 
if we specify the particular time, subject, and perceptual modality we have in mind, we can then ask 
after the content of the perceptual experience of the subject, within that perceptual modality, at that 
time—e.g., ‘what is the content of the visual experience you are having now?.’ This, I think, is 
symptomatic of a more general tendency to assume that it is possible to learn something about the 
experience one is having by first attending to it and then determining its nature. […] the assumption 
is that one can introspectively pick out, and home in on, some experiential state or event and then 
come to some judgment about the representational content of that experiential event or state. […] 
We can contrast this sort of assumption about experience with the sort of assumptions we tend to 
make about belief. […] We specify beliefs in terms of their contents, and the question, ‘what is the 
content of your belief that p.’ answers itself. [….] In other words, it doesn’t seem right to think that 
a subject can check what the content of a particular belief of hers is, by introspectively homing in 
on that target belief and then determining its content.275
Soteriou here draws a putative contrast between beliefs and perceptual experiences, such 
that it is common to take the former to be identified in terms of their contents while, supposedly, 
representationalists assume that perceptual experiences can be isolated prior to determining their 
contents through introspection. Soteriou goes on to deny this contrast, and suggest that the contents 
of neither belief nor experience should be considered independent of our judgments of them. But 
on the present understanding of representationalism, both Soteriou’s diagnosis and his solution are 
misguided. Representationalists need not hold that perceptual experiences are introspectively 
available prior to the availability of their contents. Their introspectively available character is 
constituted by their presenting contents to the subject. Moreover, the contents of neither beliefs 
nor perceptual experiences are determined (or accessed) through an act of introspective judgment, 
but are rather self-conscious. 
275 Soteriou 2013, p. 183 
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Compare further D.W. Smith’s idea (Smith 1986, 1989, 2004) that self-consciousness 
modifies the modality (or fundamental character) of sense perception. For Smith it follows that 
mature human experience is phenomenal in a way inextricably bound up with subjective 
consciousness’ self-referential character. As Smith characterizes such phenomenal character, “it 
[embodies] the ‘raw feel’ of an experience, its subjective quality, what it is like to have the 
experience, the way it is experienced or lived through.”276 The key aspect of Smith’s view is that 
the phenomenal character of experience includes its self-conscious character: to characterize 
experience phenomenally is to capture, in part, what it is like as self-consciously lived through.277 
In this way, on a self-conscious conception of perceptual experience, the phenomenology 
of experience becomes available through the self-conscious character of experience—and this is 
itself supposed to be associated with the experience having content. This is not to deny that the 
way in experience things are phenomenally (at least in the sense relevant to self-conscious looks) 
plays a role in the subjective availability of contents: it denies that phenomenology plays an 
independent role in such a way that it can be characterized in terms of the subject “recognizing” 
or “reading off” the content of her experience from a phenomenology somehow available 
independently from her self-consciousness. Perceptual contents are “looks-indexed” but not 
“phenomenal character-indexed” (insofar as the latter is understood independent of content).278 
Here it is telling that Wilson puts his criticism of option (c) in terms of a contrast between 
judgment and experience. As Wilson notes in line with Soteriou’s above comments, the contents 
of thoughts might seem readily available to self-consciousness without any need for being “read 
276 Smith 2004, p. 99 
277 Drummond 2006, p. 211 
278 It may doubted that this satisfactorily addresses Travis’ claim that phenomenology can be common between 
various ways the environment may be. I further discuss this worry in §4.5 below. 
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off” or “shown” to the subject in any way, but this might seem different with regard to the way 
experience makes available to the subject the way the environment is purported to be (and 
accordingly, what content the experience is supposed to possess).  But from the perspective of  the 
self-conscious conception of experience, Wilson misplaces the source of the distinction between 
experience and judgment. It is true that there is a unified explanation of the subject’s access to the 
contents of her states of thinking and her experiential states: both are states of self- consciousness. 
But where thinking is entirely active, or “spontaneous,” perceptual experience contains a passive, 
or “receptive,” element: perceptual experience involves self-consciousness  not of what one is 
actively thinking, but of how things strike one. It is this passivity that grounds the fact that 
experience “shows us” how things are in a way that thought does not. The  distinction between 
thought and experience need not lie in the relation between content and subjective availability.279 
4.5 OBJECTIONS 
(1) But for all the above, my argument may still seem to underappreciate considerations 
concerning the nature of phenomenology. In particular, self-conscious looks may seem to fail to 
specify a genuinely phenomenal sense of looks such as to be appropriately responsive to the anti- 
representatonalist considerations offered by Travis. Travis’ observation is that the phenomenal 
character  of  experience  seems  best  captured  by  comparative  looks.  These  are  plausibly 
279 This of course concerns merely the contents of certain conscious states, not contents generally. 
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indeterminate between different ways the environment might be: the coat can be grey or it can be 
beige in poorly or unusually illuminated conditions. If this is correct, how can any type of looks—
including self-conscious looks—hope to isolate a particular representational content associated 
with the phenomenal character of experience? Insofar as experience admits of a sufficiently strong 
sense of comparative looks, the question is raised again how phenomenal experience is supposed 
to make available one self-conscious look over another.280 
But the response is that while perceptual content needs to be indexed to the way the 
environment looks in experience, it does not need to be indexed to comparative looks. The look of 
the grey coat may be comparable to a look of a beige coat in dim light, but self-consciously it looks 
to be grey. Nor is this to deny a distinctly phenomenal sense of looks. Self-conscious looks are 
phenomenal. Say I see a flipped coin tracing its arch through the air. Comparatively the coin at t 
may look like an ellipse, and there is a phenomenal character to that look. But self- consciously 
the flipped coin at t may look like a flipped coin, and there is a phenomenal character to that. But 
how does experience have a self-conscious look given the nature of comparative looks? Given that 
experience is self-conscious, relatively sophisticated aspects of the subject’s self-conscious 
position in the world can be exploited to account for how things self- consciously look to be. For 
example, it may be that what experience presents self-consciously for thought is governed by some 
assumption of the way ordinary three-dimensional objects appear in appropriate illumination, 
thereby resolving the case of the grey coat and the coin.281 
280 To be sure, the topic here is not (as it never was) how phenomenology might determine or give rise to one 
content or another, but rather how it might contribute to making such a content subjectively available. 
281 To be sure, the point is not a commitment to any conception of “conditions of appropriate illumination,” or even 
to the relevance of the particular notion of “appropriate illumination.” The point is that an account of self-conscious 
experience is capable of placing the contents of experience against a background of various sophisticated conditions 
that shape a subject’s self-conscious presence in the world as a thinker (and a thinker informed by sight, 
specifically). The subject takes herself to be able to tell how things are by sight, and that inevitably depends on a 
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But this may not seem to fully address the problem of comparative looks. I have suggested 
that insofar as the way things experientially look is self-consciously available, there is reason to 
associate it with content. But comparative looks are available to the subject, even as they are not 
plausibly associated with content. This seems to engender a dilemma: either my  view is unable to 
account for the subjective availability of comparative looks, or Travis’ objection returns in the 
form of the question how contents may be grounded in comparative looks, which have been 
granted to be subjectively available but not be associated with content. But I think the dilemma 
can be avoided by denying that comparative looks are genuinely self- consciously available in the 
sense that self-conscious looks are. On this response, comparative looks are parasitic on self-
conscious looks. Suppose it self-consciously looks to me that there is a grey coat in front of me. 
Experience is self-consciously making available that the coat is to be thought to be grey. I can 
subsequently reflect that some phenomenal aspect of this self-conscious state might be 
indistinguishable from the situation in which I face not a grey coat, but a beige coat in bad lighting. 
I can thus attribute to my experience a comparative look as of a beige coat in bad lighting. But this 
phenomenal aspect is derived from the self-conscious availability of the scene in my experience, 
on which it looks to me that there is a grey coat in front of me.282 
(2) Another objection has been provided by Christopher Peacocke (2014). Consider 
Sebastian Rödl’s endorsement of the connection between thought and self-consciousness (Rödl 
2007, p. 11): 
sophisticated background of assumed conditions. “Conditions of appropriate illumination” serves merely as 
shorthand for an aspect of this background. 
282 Of course suitable reflection on aspects of my experience can lead me to question my experience, and even 
(given the self-conscious character of perception) change how things can self-consciously look to me. For example, 
I may not merely realize that a beige coat in bad lighting would look just like a grey coat, but I may remember that I 
do, in fact, own a beige coat, and that lighting in my wardrobe has been unpredictable recently. But this does not 
undermine the suggestion that, absent such reflections on illumination, the coat self-consciously looks grey to me. 
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Reflection on the nature of sensation cannot reveal how it is that sensation is represented in first 
person thought, because sensation is present in animals that are not self-conscious. If, in animals 
with thought, sensation is represented first personally, then this is because, first, the power of 
thought includes a power of first person knowledge and, secondly, sensation is caught up in thought 
in such a way as to be brought within the purview of this power. Therefore, the first thing we must 
consider in order to understand self-consciousness is thought, not sensation. 
As Rödl here notes, even recognizing that in creatures with the capacity for thought sensations are 
integrated into subjective self-consciousness, it does not follow that sensation is a primary focus 
for understanding self-consciousness, as opposed to merely something “caught up in thought in 
such a way as to be brought within the purview of this power.” But as Peacocke notes, it is not 
clear why this argument might not simply be repeated mutatis mutandis for perception (Peacocke 
2014, p. 97): 
Reflection on the nature of perceptual content cannot reveal anything about first person conceptual 
content, because perception is present in animals that are not self-conscious. If, in animals with 
thought, perception does have a first person content, then this is because, first, the power of 
thought includes a power of first person knowledge and secondly, the content of perception is 
caught up in thought in such a way as to be brought within the purview of this power. Therefore, 
the first thing we must consider in order to understand self-consciousness is thought, not 
perception. 
Peacocke’s objection is suggestive: if sensation as a capacity shared with non-rational 
animals can stand apart from the self-conscious character of thought, it may not seem obvious why 
the same could not be said for perception. 283 
But this is to mistake the upshot of Rödl’s remarks, both when it comes to the way sensation 
is shared in common between rational and non-rational animals, and what it means, respectively, 
for sensation and perception to be “caught up in thought in such a way as to be brought within the 
purview  of  this  [active]  power.” 284   The  answer  lies  in  what  has sometimes been called the 
283 For a forceful expression of this objection from the so-called “continuity” between rational and non-rational 
animals, see Burge 2010. For discussion of this objection, see also Boyle 2012, p. 420. 
284 Is there really a separable notion of “sensation” independent of perception, such that the two may come apart in 
how they relate to self-consciousness (once it is present in a being)? It is important to note that I am not committed 
to there being such a distinction. My argument is merely against Peacocke’s appropriation of Rödl’s argument. On 
Rödl’s (Kantian) conception, there is a distinct way to speak of a faculty sensibility. My point is that claims made 
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“divide and conquer” strategy for dealing with self-consciousness, i.e., the idea of accounting 
differently for self-consciousness of mental states like thought and states like sensation (e.g., 
Moran 2001; Boyle 2009). 
Sensation is the capacity to be affected. It does not involve the spontaneous capacity for 
thought because it is the passive capacity that stands over against the spontaneity of thought. 
Consider being afflicted by a pain, or struck by the blinding sensation of a bright light shone in 
one’s eyes. These are intentionally chosen examples of abrasive sensations but they illustrate that 
in sensation (not one’s awareness of it, but the state itself) one does not occupy a “standpoint”: one 
is struck by something that impacts one’s viewpoint, but the viewpoint is not included in sensation 
itself. Contrast perception. In a perceptual state, one occupies a viewpoint: a state of perception 
itself includes oneself—a perceptual state does not simply strike one, but rather it is a state in 
which one’s subjectivity is itself implicated. This is related to the fact that perception takes an 
object. Perception has a world, which in turn includes oneself, and the point of view from which 
one access it.285 
This contrast between sensation and perception yields two different ways in which 
sensation and pain are brought under self-consciousness (when it is present in a being with 
capacities for thought). Sensation, too, is integrated in self-consciousness, but as a state of which 
the subject can become aware, but which is not thought-involving in its nature. When self- 
conscious of a sensation, one’s self-consciousness subsumes a type of state  that does not involve 
about that faculty do not carry over to perception. I am not committed to sensibility being a distinct faculty in a 
correct metaphysics of mind. 
285 As I have suggested, the orientation that one finds in perception is intelligible precisely because perception does 
include one’s subjective view against which orientation can be understood. 
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the activity of the subject. It is different with perception. Self-consciousness changes the nature  
of perception since perception includes the subject itself.286 
Accordingly, this is the sense in which sensation is common to non-rational animals in and 
perception is not. That is, this is the sense in which self-consciousness “subsumes” sensation and 
perception in different ways. Animals, too, are creatures capable of affection. Passivity is a feature 
of their mental make-up as much as it is a feature of ours. Of course, perception, too, is something 
non-rational animals are capable of, but since it includes the self-coonsciousness of the subject in 
the human case, not in the way humans are. To be sure, perception for animals is equally shaped 
by a form of activity and is not exhausted by passivity, but this activity is not the understanding. 
Perception for them too “stands under” important features of their nature, but  such features are 
not rational. 
(3) But does Self-conscious Experience imply that the subject has infallible access to the 
phenomenology of her mental states? If so, this would seem problematic in two ways. First, it 
seems compelling views in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of perception depend on 
the claim that we can, at least in certain cases, be mistaken about the phenomenology of 
experience.287 Second, insofar as the broader view of self-consciousness invoked in this chapter 
implies subjective infallibility, this seems to conflict with obvious cases of self-deception and 
286 To appreciate the contrast between sensation and perception in this regard, it is helpful to consider the transparency 
of experience. The transparency of experience is the phenomenon that in experience we do not access sensory qualities 
in experience, but that experience is rather transparent to its objects: it is inherently  turned outwards. This is the sense 
in which in occupying a self-conscious perceptual standpoint, one occupies a state determined by the nature of one’s 
activity, viz. thought’s relation to objects. The sensory passivity of one’s experience does not exhaust one’s experience, 
and as transparency shows, is indeed relegated to (relative) inaccessibility. 
287 One example is Martin’s sophisticated suggestion that the apparent phenomenology of non-veridical experiences 
be explained negatively in terms of a failure of self-insight, rather than positively by accepting that such experiences 
have phenomenology (Martin 2006). 
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blindness towards one’s own mental states. But Self-conscious Experience does not imply 
infallibility. The two problems can be treated slightly differently. 
On the first version of the objection, the point is not to confuse self-consciousness with 
introspection. Introspection is, arguably, a matter of judgment concerning one’s own states. Self- 
consciousness (as it occurs in experience) is not itself a matter of judgment. This distinction is 
captured by Kant’s distinction between pure apperception and inner sense. Only in the latter case 
is self-awareness a matter of judging—based on some “inner evidence”—matters to be some  way 
with oneself. This distinction opens up space for fallibility. It is with judgment that the possibility 
of error arises, and accordingly, introspection can be understood to be fallible. Self- consciousness 
does not err, but neither is it infallible, since it does not judge. 
On the second version the objection takes the account to universally predicate the property 
of self-consciousness s over members of some mental state kind M, while it is open to the account 
to propose s as a categorical generalization over M or as predicating s as a teleological essence 
claim concerning M. That is, M may categorically instantiate s, or it may be part of the nature of 
properly formed members of M to instantiate s.288 Arguably either claim would establish the self-
conscious nature of experience without conflicting with cases of self- deception and self-blindness. 
(4) Finally it may seem that my defense of self-conscious looks cannot be right, since my 
account overintellectualizes lucidity. Whatever the correct account, surely non-rational animals 
share phenomenal consciousness, which is presumably “lucidly” available to the relevant animal. 
But either (a) animals are not self-conscious and therefore “lucidity” cannot be explained in  
those terms,  or  at  least  (b)  animals  are  not  rational,  and  therefore  even insofar as “lucidity” 
288 Clearly anything along these lines vastly underappreciates what might be involved in Kant’s famous claim 
(B131-32) “The I think must be able to accompany all my representations”. 
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implicates a form of self-consciousness, this cannot be associated with thought. But I do not  think 
this follows from what we must grant of animal consciousness. Animal consciousness is 
phenomenal, and this involves a form of “lucidity.” There is a sense in which non-rational animals 
have “immediate access” to their conscious states like rational subjects do. But non- rational beings 
do not have knowledge in the way rational beings do. Accordingly, the character of lucidity is 
different. Consider further that on the view developed, it is partly constitutive of (certain) 
conscious states to be lucid. Accordingly, there is no need to grant a uniform way in which the 
relevant conscious states are common to rational and non-rational animals. It can be allowed that 
the nature of self-consciousness makes a difference that penetrates the nature of states self-
consciously possessed. 
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5.0 EXPERIENTIAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND PERCEPTUAL PRESENCE 
 Let’s assume that subjects are, by and large, justified in their perceptual judgments.  While 
reliabilists ground this type of epistemic warrant in the reliability of perceptual 
judgment, experientialists hold that subjective conscious experience makes a critical 
independent contribution to perceptual justification and knowledge.289 In Michael Tye’s 
vocabulary (2009, p. 98), experientialists hold that experiential consciousness is “undeniably 
epistemically enabling.” Call this experience’s “epistemic value.” In this sense, experience’s 
epistemic value is at the  heart of internalist approaches to perceptual justification and 
knowledge, since  while perception’s reliability is not typically considered as subjectively 
available, conscious experience is or can be.290 
 Consider the way, mundanely, experiences include “good cases” and “bad cases”: cases in 
which the subject is actually perceptually confronted with her environment, and cases where she 
is not, though indiscriminably so. What does this fact mean for experience’s epistemic value? 
 For  the  disjunctivist,  less  than  one might have thought. Specifically, following Duncan 
289 I will take the questions in this paper to arise specifically for conscious visual experience (Genone 2014, p. 16). 
Tyler Burge (2003) makes important distinctions between “perceptual justification” and “perceptual entitlement” as 
describing types of epistemic standing vis-à-vis perceptual judgment. Here I will not follow Burge. 
290 This leaves open a wide range of internalist positions. A demanding version might take experience’s character to 
be “reflectively available” in a robust sense, e.g., such as to be potentially articulable by its subject. A more modest 
version may take conscious experience to be available to the subject in a more attenuated sense (for example, as in 
Jim Pryor’s dogmatism (Pryor 2000, 2004)). Thanks to Adrian Haddock and Jim Pryor for discussion of this point at 
a conference on perceptual experience and empirical rationality at the University of Pittsburgh, Oct. 21-24 2016. 
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Pritchard’s influential exposition (Pritchard 2007, 2012), the disjunctivist is not deterred from 
claiming that in the good case experience’s epistemic value: (1) guarantees the truth of propositions 
that can be believed on its basis, and accordingly ensures the subject an opportunity to form beliefs 
that are knowledgeable; (2) is “reflectively accessible,” such that the subject is or can become, in 
some suitable sense, aware of being in a position to knowledgeably judge on the basis of 
experience.291 
My interest in this chapter is how to understand the first claim: i.e., how to structure 
experience’s epistemic value so to reveal it as bearing the intimate connection to knowledge 
posited by (1). As I will make plain, Pritchard’s version of disjunctivism depends on understanding 
(1) as a claim about the strength or status of experience’s epistemic value. By contrast, I will 
suggest disjunctivism is best understood as a claim about the structure of experience’s epistemic 
value per se. Experience bears an intimate connection to knowledge because of the way experience 
bears epistemic value at all, not because of the strength or status  of experience’s epistemic value 
(where this is more generically conceived). As such, disjunctivism is a claim about what makes 
experientialism true, not a position within a more widely accepted conception of why conscious 
experience is epistemically valuable. If I am right, much about disjunctivism as a view of 
experience is illuminated by appreciating this point. 
But before elaborating (1), let me say something about (2). 
Pritchard himself, like much subsequent literature on disjunctivism, spends relatively  little 
attention developing (2).292 By contrast, it will be critical to my understanding of disjunctivism 
that  the  “reflective access”  mentioned   in   (2)  is  understood along the lines  I have elaborated 
291 I will come to question Pritchard’s way of dividing up disjunctivist commitments in this fashion. 
292 Pritchard does not detail his conception of (2), and French 2016 explicitly sets it aside (p. 90, p. 100). Haddock 
2011 and Stuchlik 2015 are exceptions, but neither correctly appreciates the role of (2). 
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elsewhere, namely in terms of a variety of first-order self-awareness.293 On this view, possessing 
a relevant first-order conscious experience amounts to being self-aware of having the 
experience. In the places where I discussed this view, I noted that this variety of consciousness is 
a feature of our capacity to think: it is the nature of subjects as thinkers that allows for the existence 
of first-order states that are at once self-conscious states. Accordingly, it is not external to this type 
of self-consciousness that it is enjoyed by the subject as a thinker specifically. 
What I want to start with here is to address one way (2) has seemed problematic. In a recent 
paper, Adrian Haddock (2011) has suggested an argument complicating the disjunctivist’s 
commitment to (2), which Haddock formulates as the idea that “if I perceive that P, then I am in a 
position to know that I perceive that P.”294 For Haddock, there are two ways the disjunctivist might 
arrive at (2): a weaker view on which a perceptual state ensures that the subject is in a position to 
gain the relevant self-knowledge, and a stronger view on which self-knowledge of a perceptual 
state is “the same reality” as the perceptual state itself.295 Haddock (2011, p. 28)  rejects the 
stronger view by counter-example, viz. the occurrence of so-called “reflectively bad” cases, i.e., 
cases   in   which   a   subject   ostensibly   suffers   a  perceptual  experience  but  does  not  enjoy 
293 The main idea here is clearly developed in Rödl 2007, 2013. Some story must be told about how “self- 
awareness” relates to “self-knowledge” full-blown. But that story is not important here. Self-awareness secures 
reflective access. 
294 Haddock 2011, p. 26. The upshot of Haddock’s objection is a variety of Williamson’s influential “anti- 
luminosity” argument. Compare Williamson’s formulation of luminosity (Williamson 2000, p. 95): 
For every case α, if in α C obtains, then in α one is in a position to know that C obtains. 
My response to Haddock here is intended to cover objections of this type generally. For one reply to Williamson’s 
argument, see Weatherson 2004. 
295 The phrase “the same reality” coming from Rödl 2007, p. 140. I do not think Rödl’s position needs to be 
identified with Haddock’s “strong claim,” since first-order self-consciousness need not be a full-fledged form of 
knowledge. For my purposes nothing will turn on the distinction between Haddock’s strong and weak readings of 
(2). 
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knowledge that she does.296 But Haddock rejects the weaker view, and thereby (2) generally, on 
philosophically deeper grounds, and those I want to address right away. 
Consider the suggestion that if a mental state is to count as knowledge, it must be subject 
to some reliability constraint (Haddock 2011, p. 30): 
Let us assume a certain sort of reliability principle for knowledge: for any times t and t + 1, where t 
and t + 1 are any two times spaced only fractionally – say, one millisecond – apart, if at t one knows 
that something is the case, then at t + 1 this very thing is the case. 
The intuitive idea here, I take it, is that knowledge requires suitable responsiveness to its objects, 
such that, e.g., knowledge that p is responsive to p being true. Moreover, a capacity for such 
responsiveness must in some sense be limited in its sensitivity.297 Accordingly, it follows that 
where t and t + 1 are some infinitesimally small fraction apart, if a subject knows p at t, then p is 
true at t + 1, and if she knows p at t + 1, then p is still true at t + 2, etc. 
Assume now that p is the subject being in a perceptual state. Then, in an example (ibid.): 
But, 
If at t I know that I see that your sweater is brown, then at t + 1 I see that your sweater is brown. 
Now imagine a stretch of time between two intervals, at the beginning of which I see that your 
sweater is brown, but at the end of which I do not (perhaps this is a stretch of time during which 
your sweater is slowly starting to look a different colour, because the lights which make it impossible 
to tell the colours of things are slowly turning on). 
Accordingly, we imagine a time span from t through t + n over which the subject gradually stops 
seeing something (in this case, that a sweater is brown). So at t + n the subject is no longer seeing 
296 Kern 2017, p. 104ff for similar terminology. I do not think Haddock’s objection here is convincing, and I discuss 
disjunctivist treatments of “reflectively bad” cases below (5.8). 
297 To make this idea a bit more plausible, consider that Williamson’s argument derives from the assumption of what 
is commonly called a type of “safety condition” on knowledge. A subject only counts as having knowledge of some 
proposition p if in nearby possible worlds she also knows p. True belief in p only counts as knowledge if it is not 
“lucky.” One way to think about the subject having knowledge in this way is her having a certain “expertise” or 
“reliability” in judging whether p. This would ensure her having knowledge of p in nearby possible worlds. But such 
“expertise” or “reliability” is typically limited in its sensitivity. The subject has “expertise” on the question whether 
p, but she cannot detect temporally miniscule fluctuations in the truth value of p. Accordingly, the subject cannot 
enjoy the relevant “expertise” vis-à-vis p, if p did change truth-values in this way. Hence it can seem to follow that if 
the subject knows p at t by exercising her “expertise,” then this entails p still obtaining (and the subject knowing it 
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do so) at t+1. This, at any rate, seems along the lines of Williamson’s suggestion. 
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that the sweater is brown. From the foregoing it follows that if at t the subject knows  she is seeing 
that the sweater is brown, then at t + 1 it is still true that she is seeing that the sweater is brown. 
Just  so,  if  at  t + 1  the  subject  knows  that  she  is  seeing  that  the  sweater is brown, then at t 
+ 2 it is still true that she is seeing that the sweater is brown. And so on. But now assume that at t 
+ n-1 the subject is seeing that the sweater is brown. Then, per claim (2), the subject at t + n-1 is 
in a position to know that she is seeing that the sweater is brown. From this it follows that the 
subject at t + n is seeing that the sweater is brown. But we have stipulated that at t + n the subject 
is no longer seeing that the sweater is brown. Contradiction. Claim (2) seems false. 
Arguments along Haddock’s lines have caused significant skepticism about claims like (2). 
But to appreciate my reading of disjunctivism’s commitment to (2), consider that the disjunctivist, 
as I understand her, rejects the argument by rejecting its starting-point: the idea that self-knowledge 
is attended by a reliability condition of the sort specified. This is not part of the disjunctivist 
conception of (2). The reason for this lies in what I noted, namely that self- consciousness is a 
feature of the first-order consciousness of thinkers. Indeed Haddock has this point within his grasp 
when he concedes (Haddock 2011, p. 29; emphasis altered) that “unlike  my perceptual knowledge 
that P, my knowledge that I perceive that P is, for [the disjunctivist], in some sense 
spontaneous.”298 As Haddock notes, 
whereas the object of spontaneous knowledge (e.g., the fact that I perceive that P) suffices to put me 
in a position to know itself (e.g., to know that I perceive that P), the object of receptive knowledge 
(e.g., the fact that your sweater is brown) does not suffice to put me in a position to know itself; to 
know the latter, I need to bear a receptive nexus to the object (e.g., I need to perceive that it is 
brown). 
As Haddock here outlines, for receptive knowledge (of which perceptual knowledge is a species) 
the object is not sufficient for knowledge. Instead, the subject must bear a “receptive nexus” to the 
object.   By   contrast,   for   spontaneous  knowledge   (of   which  (the   relevant   type  of)  self- 
298 “Spontaneity” is more of Rödl’s vocabulary. 
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knowledge is a species) this is not true: the object of such knowledge suffices for knowledge. 
Having a conscious perceptual state eo ipso allows for knowledge of the state.299 
But then this opens space for the following disjunctivist reply to Haddock’s argument:  the 
idea of a limited reliability condition applies specifically to receptive knowledge. Limited 
reliability characterizes, for example, the sort of tracking capacities that are required for the subject 
to bear the appropriate “receptive nexus” to the objects of her receptive knowledge. I cannot count 
as possessing receptive knowledge of p if I am not within an appropriate range of sensitivity to the 
obtaining of p. This does not bear on the sort of self-knowledge implicated in claim (2), which is 
afforded not by my sensitivity to first-order conscious states, but simply by the first-order 
conscious states as such. 
For my discussion of disjunctivism to follow, it will be important to keep in mind this 
elaboration of (2). 
Let me now turn to how to understand claim (1). For the disjunctivist, what is the structure 
of experience’s epistemic value such that it ensures the subject an opportunity for knowledge? The 
heart of this chapter will be my suggestion that the claims of disjunctivists are best understood in 
terms of a “presentational” conception of epistemic value: a conception on which perceptual 
experience contributes to knowledge by presenting the subject, in a suitable sense, with the very 
items of which she is thereby in a position to obtain knowledge. It is an attractive idea that the 
subject is aware of being in a position to gain perceptual knowledge in virtue of experiential 
consciousness in which objects are simply there for her, manifestly available for knowledge.300 
299 Whether in act or in potential. 
300 As Stuchlik notes (2015, p. 2648), one of the interests in exploring the disjunctivist’s conception of epistemic 
value is that it may be applicable to other domains of grounding knowledge in conscious experience, e.g., in 
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Specifically, I will suggest that such a presentational conception of experience’s  epistemic 
value helps the disjunctivist answer two prima facie challenges that philosophers have recently 
raised for the disjunctivist’s combination of commitments. First (Dennis 2014; Madison 2010; 
Soteriou 2016; Silins 2005) disjunctivism can seem to face what I will call a “dialectical infelicity 
problem” in its posture vis-à-vis skeptical scenarios.301 By (1), experience’s epistemic value 
guarantees the truth of perceptual beliefs. By (2), the subject is (or can be) aware of experience’s 
epistemic value in this sense. But then the subject can rule out that she is in a skeptical scenario. 
This seems inconsistent with the way skeptical scenarios are constructed.302 Second (Pritchard 
2011; French 2016; Ghijsen 2015) disjunctivism faces the so-called “basis problem,” which 
suggests that if perceptual experience is a state in which the subject “sees that” some fact obtains 
(which is one way of spelling out the idea that perception guarantees truthful belief), it is not clear 
how the subject might “base” her belief on experience, since “seeing that” is frequently taken to 
itself imply (knowledgeable) belief.303 I will suggest that the idea of perceptual presence resolves 
both the “dialectical infelicity problem” and the “basis problem.” 
From this point I will proceed as follows. §1 introduces what is meant, and particularly 
what is not meant, by a presentational paradigm of epistemic value. §2 and §3 turn to 
epistemological disjunctivism, discussing the parameters set by Pritchard. §4 introduces my 
presentational alternative. §§5-6 then apply my view to worries raised for disjunctivism. §5 
discusses the “dialectical infelicity problem.” §6 deals with the “basis problem.” In §7 I reflect  on 
the   way   disjunctivism   amounts   to   a   compelling   view   of  internalism  about  experiential 
memory. Some of these claims have been made, for example, for dogmatism (e.g., Chudnoff 2013). I cannot address 
this idea here. 
301 Soteriou ultimately defends the disjunctivist from this scenario. For similar worries without specifically 
discussing disjunctivism, see Cohen 2002. See also Stuchlik 2015, p. 2653ff. 
302 Pritchard 2012 discusses this as the “distinguishability problem.” See §5 below. 
303 E.g., Cassam 2007, Williamson, Chapter 1. Brewer Manuscript. 
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consciousness. Finally, §8 concludes by briefly considering the way disjunctivists can deal with 
cases of “reflective badness.” 
5.1 PERCEPTUAL PRESENCE 
Perception famously has a presentational character. As Scott Sturgeon puts the point, 
your visual experience [of a moving rock] will place a moving rock before the mind in a uniquely 
vivid way. Its phenomenology will be as if a scene is made manifest to you. This is the most striking 
aspect of visual consciousness. It’s the signal feature of visual phenomenology.304
Clearly perception’s presentational character is not that it presents one’s environment in a 
“uniquely vivid way.” While it is true that perception stands apart from thought in its qualitative 
character, the point is not that perception is a particularly striking show of color- and object- 
experiences. Rather, the central point is that perception does present its objects; that, unlike in 
thought, the objects of perceptual experience appear quite literally present to one. 
If  presentational  character  is  an important feature of perceptual experience, C.D. Broad 
has noted an interesting aspect of the phenomenon: 
It is a natural, if paradoxical, way of speaking to say that seeing seems to ‘bring one into direct 
contact with remote objects’ and to reveal their shapes and colours.305 
As Broad notes, the presentational character of experience may seem in some sense “paradoxical.” 
Objects are external to us, yet in experience they seem “right there, available to us” (Valberg 1992, 
p. 4).
304 Sturgeon 2000, p. 9. 305 Broad 1965, pp. 32-3 (italics original). 
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The version of presentationalism at issue in this chapter amounts to the idea of taking 
Broad’s paradox at face value. Perceptual awareness appears to present environmental items 
precisely because perceptual awareness is the presentation of such items. Experience consists, at 
least partly, of awareness in which the subject is presented with aspects of the environment, i.e., 
objects and (arguably) their properties, such that the relevant features are present to the subject. 
For present purposes, I should note that presentation is a conception of experience’s 
epistemic value: presented aspects of the environment are what experience contributes for 
perceptual rationality specifically. I will have a lot to say about what such a conception involves, 
but first I should right away contrast this suggestion with three alternative, recently popular 
approaches to perceptual presentation. 
(i) If we are justified in believing propositions based on experience, in virtue of what is 
this the case?306 Several recent philosophers have answered by reference to presentation 
specifically as an aspect of perceptual phenomenology.307 Consider Elijah Chudnoff’s formulation 
of the following principle (Chudnoff 2012, p. 25): 
If an experience […] justifies you in believing that p, it does so in virtue of realizing the 
property of having presentational phenomenology with respect to p. 
On Chudnoff’s specific development of “realizing the property of having presentational 
phenomenology,” perception both implicates propositional contents modeled on p and appears to 
present  truth-makers f or p. Say I experience a tiger pouncing: for Chudnoff my experience bears 
306 For John Foster, there is a “[p]resentational feel of phenomenal experience—the subjective impression that an 
instance of the relevant type of environmental situation is directly presented” (Foster 2000, p.112. italics original]. 
For Michael Huemer experience bears a “forcefulness,” such that “[w]hen you have a visual experience of a tomato, 
it thereby seems to you as if a tomato is actually present, then and there” (2001, p. 77). For Jim Pryor experience 
provides “the feeling of seeming to ascertain that a given proposition is true” (2004, p. 357). This common focus on 
presentational “feeling” seems to me misplaced. For discussion, Ghijsen 2014. 307 On one version of the question, this is the “distinctiveness problem” (Ghijsen 2014), i.e., the question why 
perceptual experience provides grounds for belief where, say, imagination does not. I doubt this question merits a 
simple phenomenal answer. For subtle discussion, Martin Manuscript. 
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the content that the tiger is pouncing and, moreover, I appear to be presented with the very tiger 
(and its pouncing, perhaps) that make my experiential content true. For our purposes, the important 
point is that for Chudnoff it is experience’s appearing to present truth-makers for representational 
contents that provides the subject with justification for belief. On Chudnoff’s suggestion (2013, p. 
180), it is “in virtue of” this type of presentational phenomenology that experience equips the 
subject with justification.308 
The present approach to presentation diverges from approaches like Chudnoff’s since it 
follows from Chudnoff’s view that (2013, p. 92) 
if a perceptual experience puts you in a position to know something about your environment, it 
does so because of something other than or in addition to its [presentational] phenomenology. 
That is, while for Chudnoff presentation plays a role in providing the subject with perceptual 
justification, it cannot be the explanation of the way perception provides the subject with 
perceptual knowledge. After all, presentational phenomenology is not unique to cases of 
perception, but also can be true of cases like hallucinatory experience. Accordingly presentational 
phenomenology inevitably falls short of furnishing an opportunity for knowledge.309 By contrast, 
the aim in the current chapter is to understand presence as it plays a role in illuminating (1), on 
which experience’s epistemic value guarantees the truth of perceptual belief, and accordingly on 
which experience does not stop short of explaining knowledge. Accordingly, for present purposes 
to speak of the perceptual “presence” of aspects of the environment in visual experience is not to 
single  out  a  phenomenal  feature  of  experience,  but to mark their availability for knowledge, 
308 See Chudnoff’s discussion of the “in virtue of” relation at Chudnoff 2013, pp. 180-194. 
309 Some philosophers deny non-perceptual experiences have phenomenology (Martin 2002, 2004; Fish 2009). 
Chudnoff (2013, p. 174) suggests that these philosophers might exploit presentational phenomenology as sufficient 
for knowledge. But this seems to me wrong. Opportunities for knowledge must by nature trade on the actual 
presence of items to the mind: nothing in the notion of phenomenology as such seems to secure this. (That is, the 
mere fact that phenomenology might (in some relevant sense) have extended beyond perception disqualifies 
phenomenology from grounding knowledge.) 
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not merely justification (if this falls short). “Presence” precisely marks the critical 
difference between perceptual experience and other states like hallucinations. 
(ii) Presence also does not mark a “naïve realist” position, which is the idea that objects 
are presented in a way that makes them part of what metaphysically constitutes the experience in 
which they are presented. Characterizing the epistemic value of experience in presentational terms 
is a different issue. As has recently been pointed out (Genone 2014), naïve realism is at least partly 
to be understood in terms of the idea that perception is not fundamentally a representational 
state.310 By contrast, I will suggest that quite plausibly a presentational construal of epistemic value 
is best understood in terms of a type of representational content.311 Coming at the distinction from 
the opposite end, “naïve realism” is also not committed to thinking of the epistemic character of 
experience in terms of the presence of objects (though this may be a natural choice, e.g., Fish 
2009). For example, it is open to the naïve realist to hold that subjectively indistinguishable 
experiences have the same epistemic value, even as  metaphysically only perceptions involve the 
presence of objects.312 
(iii) The position at issue in this chapter must also be distinguished, though less 
substantially, from the epistemological view that the objects of experience constitute so-called 
“objectual reasons” which perception provides the subject (Cunningham 2017; Kalderon 2011; 
Brewer 2011, Manuscript).313 The idea of an “objectual reason,” on which this view centers, is 
that presented  objects  might  constitute  reasons  for  judgment in the specific sense that they are 
310 “Not fundamentally” because there are many less fundamental senses in which naïve realists can accept 
representational contents. 
311 E.g., McDowell 2013. 
312 For example, some naïve realists seem intent to forestall the impression of their view as entailing a form of 
epistemological disjunctivism, such, as e.g, might aim to address skeptical worries. The motivation is rather merely 
to allow perception to be object-involving (see e.g., Martin 2006). 
313 For a good discussion of such views, invoked by Brewer Manuscript, see Cunningham 2017. 
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truth-makers for perceptual beliefs. Accordingly, a presented object o is an “objectual reason” in 
that o makes “o is F” true, and accordingly, if o is appropriately presented to the perceiver, o can 
in this sense serve as an “objectual reason” for the subject to judge “o is F.” This view is more 
specific than the presentationalism at issue here. “Objectual reasons” constitute one way of cashing 
out the idea that the epistemic value of experience consists in the presence of objects, but a 
presentational conception of epistemic value is consistent with a “factual” conception of perceptual 
reasons. For example, a subject’s perceptual reason for judging “o is F” might be,  e.g., the fact 
that some items are perceptually present to her. Moreover, the idea of perception providing the 
subject with perceptual “reasons” is as such downstream from a presentational conception of 
epistemic value. The heart of the latter idea is that the epistemic significance of experience can be 
understood through the notion of presentation, whether or not it is reasons that perception thus 
presents.314 As I will suggest, in this context the idea of perception as  presentation is more 
significant than that of a reason because, as I will explain, presentation constitutes a sui generis 
gloss on the nature of the link between experience and knowledge, which is something not captured 
by the notion of a reason as such.315 
314 Consider, e.g., Joe Cunningham’s consideration of representational conceptions of experience’s epistemic value, 
i.e., the idea that the epistemic value of experience can reside in the way experiences bear representational contents
(Cunningham 2017). On the current conception, these views can take a presentational approach to epistemic value, 
but for Cunningham they constitute a competitor for the “reasons” view. 
315 The idea of “objectual reasons” itself can serve to express just this point: the idea that in perception the very 
truth-makers for propositions can be the subject’s reasons. But as I will make clear, it is more helpful to focus on the 
idea of presentation that makes this possible, rather than on the notion of reasons itself. 
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5.2 DISJUNCTIVISM: EVIDENCE OR PRESENCE? 
I will now turn to disjunctivism. 
The usual assumption among internalist conceptions of perceptual epistemology is that 
experience equips the subject with a type of “evidence” for belief. Clearly a subject does  not infer 
beliefs from her experiential evidence, nor does evidential support need to be “quasi- inferential.” 
But nevertheless it is supposed that conscious experience supports judgment by providing the 
subject with a relevant type of evidence. 
An evidential conception of experience’s epistemic value provides a natural treatment of 
the way experience comes in good and bad varieties.316 Specifically, the operative idea is that 
evidential support can fall short of guaranteeing the truth of the proposition it supports. Consider, 
for example, 
Dogmatism: if it seems to S that p, then S has immediate prima facie justification 
for the belief that p.317 
For the dogmatist, perception provides justification that is “immediate” and prima facie, in being 
defeasible.318 While in principle dogmatism can be developed on reliabilist grounds, an 
evidentialist version of experience’s epistemic value provides a natural rendering of the dogmatist 
conception of perceptual justification. For dogmatists, experience provides some evidence for 
belief  sufficient for the subject to be justified in forming beliefs based on how things seem to her
316 To be sure, the opposition between good and bad cases is far from the only source for an evidential approach to 
experience’s epistemic value, and not an essential part of it. As I will note, most disjunctivists maintain an 
evidentialist approach. But I will suggest that the existence of bad cases has tended to obscure the very idea of a 
presentational alternative, i.e., a conception on which, as I will develop, the connection between experience’s 
epistemic value and knowledge is more intimate than evidence could be, specifically such as to rule out error in 
virtue of the very nature of the type of support it provides. 
317 I modify this statement from Ghijsen 2014, p. 196. Dogmatist views have been advocated by Pryor 2000, 2004; 
Huemer 2001, 2007; Chudhoff 2011, Tucker 2010, Brogaard 2013. 
318 “Immediate” as opposed to only in virtue of support from further beliefs. See Pryor 2005. 
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in experience. In the good case, if things are as her evidence would make  them seem, then the 
subject gains perceptual knowledge.319 But if things are not as they seem, as in the bad case, the 
subject was no less justified in responding to her experiential evidence. Nevertheless, since the 
justification provided by her experiential evidence was prima facie and therefore 
defeasible, she merely fails to gain knowledge. 
Disjunctivism famously dissents from the dogmatist idea that perceptual justification is 
merely prima facie. Specifically, disjunctivism combines a positive and a negative claim. The 
familiar disjunctivist strategy starts from disjunctivism’s negative claim. 
Highest Common Factor: the epistemic value of experience (understood as 
subjectively accessible) in the good case cannot exceed the epistemic value of 
experience in the bad case. 
The negative disjunctivist claim is to deny this thesis, by rejecting the idea that an account of 
epistemic value in the good case must accommodate, as an equal, an account of the bad case. For 
example, while in the bad case the epistemic value of experience may be that it appears that p, in 
the good case the epistemic value of experience may be that the subject sees that p.320 In turn, the 
disjunctivist’s negative claim makes room for the positive claim that the epistemic value in the 
good case does not “stop anywhere short of the fact” (McDowell 1994, p. 29). 
But this schematic gloss of the disjunctivist outlook does not by itself determine a single 
way of conceiving of experience’s value, and in particular makes no mention of presentation. 
Consider that while dogmatists and disjunctivists are opposed on the treatment of good and 
bad cases, disjunctivism is nevertheless frequently understood from within an evidentialist 
conception  of  experience’s  epistemic  value.321 On this type of rendering, while dogmatists hold 
319 This is somewhat simplified, the case must for example not be Gettierized, etc. 
320 See Stuchlik 2015 for discussion. 
321 This is explicit in the locus classicus of recent disjunctivism exposition, Pritchard 2012. 
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that the type of support experience provides for belief is “prima facie” or “defeasible,” for 
disjunctivists it is “indefeasible” or “conclusive.” Being “conclusive” and “indefeasible” are 
predicated of evidence: these qualifications characterize the way particular pieces of evidence 
locate on a spectrum of evidential support, specifically as located beyond a point where the 
obtaining of the evidential support entails the truth of the proposition supported. In this way, the 
disjunctivist’s dispute with the dogmatist is taken to lie in the strength or status of experiential 
evidence. By contrast, the dispute is not taken to lie with the more fundamental idea that the  form 
of internalism at issue in the idea of experience’s epistemic value is to be understood, in relevant 
ways, within the evidentialist paradigm. I will now go on, in the next two sections, to explain how 
this assumption is at work in most recent readings of disjunctivism, and how we can see 
disjunctivism differently. 
5.3 PRITCHARD-STYLE DISJUNCTIVISM 
Let’s be more precise. In the sketch of disjunctivism, we so far have seen a negative  claim 
and a positive claim. We will see that both of these claims have a different structure than commonly 
understood, but in this section I will focus on the positive claim.322 
The statement of disjunctivism in terms of (1) and (2), from which I started this chapter, I 
derived from Duncan Pritchard’s influential exposition (in Pritchard’s terminology, experience’s 
epistemic value is the “rational support” it provides). 
In paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge an agent, S, has perceptual knowledge that p in virtue 
of being in possession of rational support, R, for her belief that p which is both (1) factive (i.e., R’s 
obtaining entails p), and (2) reflectively accessible to S.323
322 For reflection on the structure of the negative claim, §5. 
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From this passage, it is clear that Pritchard envisages a certain division of labor in the way the 
disjunctivist conceives of experience’s epistemic value as ensuring the subject an opportunity for 
knowledge. Specifically, the knowledge-guaranteeing character of a disjunctivist conception of 
experience’s epistemic value centers in (1).324 If it is a slogan that, for the disjunctivist, the value 
of experience does not “stop short of the facts,” then for Pritchard this points to a more literal place 
that facts hold in a disjunctivist conception of experience’s epistemic value. Specifically, 
experience is a factive state, which therefore entails the truth of a relevant proposition p. For 
example, a factive state pertaining to a tiger pouncing at me entails that there is a tiger pouncing 
at me. Now for Pritchard it is because experience’s epistemic value entails the truth of perceptual 
beliefs that experience’s epistemic value guarantees the subject an opportunity for knowledgeable 
belief (whether or not the subject manages to avail herself of this opportunity.) On Pritchard’s view 
the type of “reflective accessibility” articulated by (2) specifies merely the way the subject is in a 
subjective position to exploit the epistemic value of her experience for knowledge. On this account, 
the subject reflectively appreciates her possession of entailing grounds for p, and therefore 
appreciates her being in a secure position to knowledgeably judge that p. Accordingly, the heart 
of Pritchard’s rendering of disjunctivism centers on a specific explanatory connection between the 
epistemic value of experience and the beliefs it grounds, viz. a connection grounded in entailment. 
Table 4 The Entailment Model (1) 
Product Epistemic Value Mode of Support 
Position to know that p Perception is factive Entailment of p 
323 Pritchard 2012, p. 13; variables altered, numbering added. 
324 Understanding Pritchard this way also makes sense of Pritchard’s relative neglect of the theoretical development 
of (2). 
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Below I will suggest this is not the right way to understand the disjunctivist’s view, but first 
consider an alternative proposal, suggested by Craig French and Adrian Haddock in several recent 
papers (esp. Haddock 2011; French 2012, 2016). 
If experience’s epistemic value consists in a type of “factive support” for beliefs, in virtue 
of what is this so? Here the disjunctivist must provide what Craig French (2016) calls a 
“specification” of her view. One natural candidate is the idea that experience amounts to a relation 
to the fact that p specifiable as “seeing that p,” and that for this reason experience factively supports 
a belief that p.325 As French notes (2016, p. 88; emphasis original): 
the epistemological disjunctivist holds that the visual perceptual states which ground perceptual 
knowledge […] are states of seeing that p. I take it the idea is that we are to view such states as 
constituting the rational support for belief had in paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge. 
This is the path Pritchard himself chooses as well (Pritchard 2012, p. 14; emphasis original): 
The particular kind of rational support that the epistemological disjunctivist claims that our beliefs 
enjoy in paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge is that provided by seeing that the target 
proposition obtains. So when one has paradigmatic perceptual knowledge of a proposition, p,  one’s 
reflectively accessible rational support for believing that p is that one sees that p.326 
Essentially, then, a Pritchard-style rendering of the disjunctivist account of epistemic value 
trades on a twofold explanatory connection. First, the epistemic value of experience guarantees 
the knowledgeable character of perceptual beliefs because it entails the propositons believed. 
Second, experience entails of the truth the propositions believed because in experience the subject 
sees that the relevant propositions obtain. 
By contrast, for reasons associated with the “basis problem” discussed below (§6), 
Haddock  and  French  reject  the  “specification”  of  disjunctivism  in terms of “seeing that.” By 
325 See also Madison 2010, pp. 847-848 
326 Cf Pritchard 2011, p. 435. French (2016, p. 91) attributes Pritchard’s view to John McDowell, and certainly 
McDowell frequently characterizes experience in terms of “seeing that” (e.g., McDowell (Manuscript2, p. 2), 
McDowell 2011, p. 13, McDowell 1994, p. 29 and McDowell 2002, p. 277, McDowell 2003, p. 680). But on 
balance, this attribution seems to me incorrect, as e.g., shown by McDowell’s articulation of object-centered Kantian 
intuitions in McDowell 2009, 2013, as well as McDowell’s formulation of disjunctivism in terms of perceptual 
presence (McDowell 2011, pp. 30/31; discussed below). 
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contrast, Haddock and French suggest disjunctivism can be grounded in a different “specification” 
of experience, on which experience involves not “seeing that p,” but “seeing o…on,” where o…on 
are truth-makers for propositions like p. In this way, Craig French (2016) has advocated cashing 
out disjunctivism in a form of “thing seeing,” and Adrian Haddock (2011) has suggested a 
disjunctivist account of “seeing such-and-such.” 327 As French illustrates (French 2016, p. 95; 
italics removed): 
There is a lemon before me. […] rational support for beliefs about the lemon before me can come 
from my plainly seeing it. Suppose I know, by vision, that the lemon before me is yellow. We can 
think of the visual basis of this knowledge in terms of my seeing the yellow lemon. How do I know 
that the lemon is yellow? Because I see it.328
But how might experience’s epistemic value be “factive” if not grounded in perceptual access to 
facts, but rather to truth-makers, i.e., objects? The central idea, in Craig French’s terms, is that 
while seeing objects is not factive, it bears a relation to propositions like p that amounts to a form 
of “quasi-factivity” (2016, pp. 100-101). Seeing o…on entails the existence of o…on. In turn, given 
that o…on are truth-makers for propositions like p, the existence of o…on entails the truth of 
propositions like p.329 Accordingly, even while seeing o…on is not a factive state since it does not 
take facts as its objects, it nevertheless entails the truth of p. Accordingly, French’s and Haddock’s 
object-centered versions of disjunctivism are at merely limited remove from Pritchard’s 
interpretation. Specifically, the object-centered view denies the second stage of Pritchard’s two-
fold explanatory connection, viz. the connection between experience’s factive epistemic character 
and  episodes of “seeing that.” But this leaves the first stage:  the idea that experience’s epistemic 
327 The account can be liberal about the character of o…on, (allowing objects to include e.g., events,) as well as on 
the question whether properties are among the truth-makers seen. French 2016, p. 95. 328 Compare Adrian Haddock 2011, p. 36. 
329 French suggests that a more complete account involves the subject being responsive to o looking F. If the subject 
is seeing the lemon, and the lemon looks F, then the subject’s perceptual experience provides quasi-factive rational 
support for the lemon being F. I have already discussed the role of “looks” in debates about content (Chapter 5), and 
will not discuss it here. 
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connection to knowledge resides in entailing p. 
Table 5 The Entailment Model (2) 
Product Epistemic Value Mode of Support 
Position to know that p Perception is quasi-factive Entailment of p 
The upshot of my reading of disjunctivism below is that, pace Haddock and French, an 
object-centered reading of disjunctivism should reject not merely the second of Pritchard’s 
explanatory steps, but both steps. But before moving to my account, let me make explicit the  way 
Pritchard-style disjunctivism, including Haddock’s and French’s object-centered versions, remains 
within the evidentialist paradigm. 
Internalism about perceptual experience is sometimes articulated in the context of the  idea 
that the acquisition of perceptual knowledge is a case of “rationality at work.” In this sense, 
internalism captures the type of rationality the subject displays in forming knowledgeable 
judgments grounded in the experiential resources subjectively available to her. Now, 
responsiveness to evidence is clearly a paradigm of rationality. In emphasizing the “factive” or 
“entailing” character of epistemic value, this is the paradigm of rationality that the Pritchard- style 
disjunctivist employs to understand the disjunctivist view of perceptual epistemology. For the 
Pritchard-style disjunctivist, the subject’s “reflective access” to the character of experience serves 
her to gain access to “factive” or “entailing” support for p (whether this consists in a fact or a truth-
maker). In turn, the subject’s responsiveness to this evidence characterizes the type of rationality 
operative in her acquisition of knowledge that p. 
But by lights of my argument to come, the idea of responsiveness to evidence misconstrues 
the form of rationality that, for the disjunctivist, is in act in the acquisition of perceptual knowledge. 
Consider the way the evidential view of what it can mean for rationality  to  be  “at  work”  in 
perceptual   knowledge   engenders   some   of   the   most   striking   prima facie questions about 
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disjunctivism. It is part of the nature of evidence that evidence, both individual pieces and 
general sources, can fall short of ensuring knowledge. Equally, both individual pieces and 
general sources of evidence are naturally in competition with other individual pieces and 
general sources of evidence. Etc. Accordingly, the type of rationality exemplified in 
responsiveness to evidence is not as such a type of rationality operative in knowledge- 
guaranteeing conditions. On the contrary, responsiveness to evidence is naturally a type 
of rationality operative in less conclusive conditions.330 As such, the evidentialist disjunctivist 
will face questions how exactly it can be that experience’s evidential status can be 
indefeasible, questions of what this means for the way perceptual evidence interacts with 
apparently conflicting evidence from other sources, and so on.331 I raise some specific questions 
of this kind below. 
The suggestion for the rest of this chapter is that questions of this broad variety arise 
primarily because the proper shape of disjunctivism cannot be appreciated within an 
evidential paradigm of what it means for rationality to “be at work” in experience. Instead, 
perceptual presence is itself a paradigm of rationality “at work,” and one that is free from the 
problematic properties of evidential support. In this way, I will suggest disjunctivism, as I have 
developed it, proposes a revision from views like dogmatism not concerning the strength or 
status of perceptual evidence, but more profoundly of internalism about perceptual epistemology 
as such, shifting its animating paradigm away from evidence, and towards presence.332 
330 Which, of course, is not to say there can be no knowledge-guaranteeing evidential conditions. Pritchard’s 
disjunctivism is precisely the view that perception is such a condition. 
331 See e.g., the cases of “reflective badness” discussed at §5.8. 
332 Below, in referring to “the disjunctivist,” I intend this specific form of disjunctivism. 
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5.4 DISJUNCTIVISM: EVIDENCE OR PRESENCE? 
The upshot of my interpretation of disjunctivism is that, pace the Pritchard-style reading, 
the structure of experience’s epistemic value is not determined primarily by Pritchard’s condition 
(1), viz. experience’s “factive” nature. Rather, the heart of the disjunctivist conception of 
experience’s epistemic value is condition (2), viz. the way experience is reflectively available to 
the subject.333 That is, the explanatory connection experience’s epistemic value bears to perceptual 
knowledge does not run through perception providing entailing grounds for proposition p, which 
are in turn reflectively accessible. Rather it runs directly through the reflectively accessible 
character of experience, which encompasses the presence of items in experience. So consider 
Table 6 The Access Model 
To see how this abstract structure might allow for a reading of disjunctivism, consider the 
way John McDowell frames the position (McDowell 2011, pp. 30-31; emphasis original). 
When all goes well in the operation of a perceptual capacity of a sort that belongs to its  possessor’s 
rationality, a perceiver enjoys a perceptual state in which some feature of her environment is there 
for her, perceptually present to her rationally self-conscious awareness. If a perceptual state can 
consist in a subject’s having a feature of her environment perceptually present to her, that gives lie 
to the assumption that a perceptual state cannot warrant a belief in a way that guarantees its truth. If 
a perceptual state makes a feature of the environment present to a perceiver’s rationally self-
conscious awareness, there is no possibility, compatibly with someone’s being in that state, that 
things are not as the state would warrant her in believing that they are, in a 
333 I need to qualify the way I proceed here. Properly, my point is not a focus on (2), as opposed to (1). Instead, a 
more accurate presentation of the point would be to collapse the distinction between (1) and (2). (2) is not to be 
understood as a mode of reflective access to an independent experiential reality; nor can (1) be understood 
independently of a suitably corrected version of (2). Nevertheless, I take it that emphasizing my approach here in 
terms (2) is felicitous. The reason is that while (1) has figured prominently in analyses of disjunctivism, the 
significance of (2) has not been appreciated. 
334 We may, of course, ask for a more detailed view of what it is that experience presents: is it merely objects 
(Brewer 2011), is it objects and properties, or facts? But it is precisely the point of my discussion that presence is the 
deeper notion than what it is that is presented. See my discussion below. 
Product 
Position to know that p 
Epistemic Value 
Presence of o…on334 
Mode of Support 
Reflective Access to o…on 
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belief that would simply register the presence of that feature of the environment. 
In this passage, McDowell avails himself of the idea of perceptual presence, such that in  a 
successful case of perception “some feature of [the subject’s] environment is there for her, 
perceptually present.” My interest here is to contrast two ways in which presence might seem to 
play a role in McDowell’s thinking. 
On the one hand, McDowell notes that the fact that aspects of the environment can be 
present in experience shows that, contrary to e.g., dogmatist views, perception can “guarantee” the 
truth of beliefs, since “there is no possibility, compatibly with someone’s being in that state, that 
things are not as the state would warrant her in believe that they are.” Emphasizing this aspect of 
McDowell’s point is in line with an explanatory focus on the idea that experience’s epistemic value 
is “(quasi-)factive.”335 
But McDowell also mentions specifically that aspects of the environment can be 
perceptually “present to a perceiver’s rationally self-conscious awareness” (emphasis mine). What 
is the upshot of McDowell’s specific focus on rationality and self-consciousness here? My 
suggestion is that taken together, this spelling out of (2)—with which I started this chapter— 
amounts not merely to a way experience’s epistemic value can be “reflectively accessible” to the 
subject, but rather a sui generis way of structuring experience’s epistemic value. 
On the disjunctivist view, as I have understood it, experience self-consciously presents  the 
subject with environmental items. The very presence of the items renders them internalistically 
available to the subject—that is a feature internal to the character of her conscious  experiential 
state  itself.  Moreover,  this  is  a  feature  specifically   of  the  subject’s  rationality.336 This  now 
335 Indeed French develops his notion of “quasi-factivity” based on this passage, French 2016, pp. 99-101. 
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clears the path for the following idea: once items are present in experience, it is not a further 
question how the relevant experience places the subject in a  position that ensures her knowledge
—confronted with the objects she is self-consciously in a position to form a 
knowledgeable belief that, as McDowell puts it, “merely registers the presence of that feature of 
the environment.” That is, presence as such yields a basic description of perceptual consciousness 
as a sui generis mode of acquiring knowledge: the subject is self- consciously presented with items, 
and since this is self-consciously a feature of rationality (i.e., her being a rational judger), she can 
rationally exploit the presence of the relevant items for judgment.337 To be sure, this is a way of 
forming beliefs that “guarantees” their truth, etc. But the rationality operative in the subject’s 
acquisition of knowledge does not reside in her “reflective access” to “factive,” “quasi-factive” or 
otherwise entailing evidential support. Self-consciousness as such, extending as it does to the very 
experiential presence of the items, furnishes a context in which the subject can rationally transition 
from experience to knowledgeable belief.338 
Below I will suggest the way my presentational understanding of disjunctivism is operative 
in addressing some of its most pressing prima facie difficulties. 
But first let me briefly elaborate on what understanding presence through self- 
consciousness means for presence as a way of understanding experience’s epistemic value. If I am 
correct that presence furnishes one way of spelling out the disjunctivist thought, then the primary 
upshot is that perceptual presence trades essentially on the way experience is self- consciously 
available   to   a  rational  subject.  Presence  is  not  a  characterization  of  experience  that can be 
336 Or as McDowell specifies, of her rational capacity for knowledge through perception (McDowell Manuscript2). 
337 Of course this is only a basic description of the epistemic value of experience. Much more is to be said about 
what types of knowledge specifically presence can afford, and what capacities the subject must possess to transition 
from being presented with items to knowledge of them. See my Chapter 6 below. 
338 The full significance of understanding internalism along these lines may not at this point be clear. See §5.7 
conclusion below for further discussion. 
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understood independently from the way self-consciousness furnishes a subject with 
opportunities for knowledge. In this sense, presence reflects the “double” structure of the sort of 
awareness that characterizes rational consciousness. In a state of “presence,” the subject finds 
herself confronted with items in a way that involves intrinsically her being aware of herself as 
confronted that way. In experience, an item is presented to the subject, and it is central to the 
experiential state that its description is just that: in having the experience, the subject’s  awareness 
is of her being presented with the relevant items. 
I should note that I mean presentational consciousness to be special in this way (that is, 
part of a special class of states). Consider that for a being capable of self-knowledge, there are 
plausibly general connections between her mental states and her capacity for self-knowledge.339 
Compare a case of fear. There might seem something wrong with a state of fear that is not suitably 
integrated into the subject’s self-consciousness. But this is a general wrongness. Nothing about 
fear specifically trades on this fact. Intelligibly, the nature of fear is independent of the subject’s 
subjective access to her states. The suggestion is this is not true for a presentational state: if in 
experience items are present to the mind, this trades essentially on the subject’s experiential self-
consciousness. Presence, in this sense, articulates a specifically rational variety of consciousness. 
Let me also note that my presentational version of disjunctivism must not be confused with 
the suggestion, recently offered by Joe Cunningham (2017, fn. 13) as an interpretation of John 
McDowell’s disjunctivism, that for the disjunctivist the subject’s “reason” for perceptual belief is 
339 Consider, for example, broadly constitutivist accounts of the relation between consciousness and self- 
consciousness (Shoemaker 1996; 2004). For Shoemaker, there is something wrong in a general sense with a rational 
subject who is “self-blind,” i.e., fails to be knowledgeable about her own mental states. Relatedly, Shoemaker thinks 
that in rational cognitive systems first-order consciousness can be constitutive of second-order consciousness. For 
present purposes, the point is that my account of presence is stronger than Shoemaker’s claim: presence essentially 
involves the subject’s rational self-consciousness, even if Shoemaker is also correct that there is a general relation 
between rationality and self-knowledge. 
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that she is in a perceptual state. Putting matters this way makes it seem as though the 
subject’s grounds for perceptual belief lie in her appreciating facts about her own state. But this 
misses the way self-consciousness characterizes presence as a rational type of first-order 
experiential consciousness. For the disjunctivist, the subject forms perceptual beliefs based on  the 
object’s presence to her, where presence characterizes an irreducible way of explaining 
knowledge. To be sure, conceiving of presence as grounding a mode of knowledge is not 
intelligible without noting the fact that presence is a modification of the subject’s rational self- 
consciousness. But this is not to picture the subject forming beliefs based on facts about her own 
mental condition, as opposed to the items present to her in experience. 
5.5 THE DIALECTICAL INFELICITY PROBLEM 
I have so far used perceptual presence to articulate disjunctivism’s positive claim, viz. its 
conception of epistemic value in the good case. I will now turn to the way presence figures in the 
disjunctivist’s negative claim, i.e., her treatment of the bad case. 
We begin with a prima facie problem. Recall: 
Highest Common Factor: the epistemic value of experience (understood as 
subjectively accessible) in the good case cannot exceed the epistemic value of 
experience in the bad case. 
Owing to the recently voluminous and impressive literature on disjunctivism, denying claims along 
the lines of the Highest Common Factor thesis has become a familiar fixture of disjunctivist 
thinking. But it would be misleading to think that epistemological disjunctivists’s negative claim  
can  be easily assimilated  to  its  relatively more anodyne  cousins  (such  as,  for example, views 
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distinguishing the metaphysical constitution of bad experience from the metaphysical 
constitution of good experience.)340 Consider that on the above formulation the “highest 
common factor” concerns specifically the epistemic value of experience as it is accessible to the 
subject. For the disjunctivist, not only does experience’s epistemic value ensure an 
opportunity for knowledge, it also ensures the subject’s own access to this opportunity.341 
This produces a problem. Consider the way disjunctivism, like dogmatism, can seem to 
amount to a “neo-Moorean” position in the face of skeptical scenarios.342 On such a position, 
experience puts the subject in a subjectively accessible position to gain some perceptual knowledge 
that p, and thereby in a position to gain inferential knowledge of the falsity of skeptical scenarios 
(“anti-skeptical knowledge”). Neo-Moorean views raise questions generally, but my point merely 
requires seeing the different ways dogmatism and disjunctivism fill out the view. For the dogmatist 
the subject is in a position to gain anti-skeptical knowledge but the type of justification that this 
position involves explicitly accepts the parameters set out by skeptical scenarios. Accordingly, for 
the dogmatist the subject’s position to gain anti-skeptical knowledge is always prima facie, given 
that the subject cannot discriminate her condition from a skeptical scenario.343 By contrast, for the 
disjunctivist the subject’s justification for anti-skeptical knowledge  is  indefeasible.  But  then  
it  seems   the   subject   must   be   able   to   discriminate   her  condition  from  the  obtaining of 
340 Of course these views are controversial in their own right. For a view that might seem properly anodyne, 
compare an epistemically externalist view: the epistemic value of the good case naturally exceeds that of the bad 
case since it can individuated by environmental factors beyond the subjectively common character of good and bad 
cases. The epistemological disjunctivist cannot be conciliatory to the commonality of good and bad cases in this 
way. 
341 For the role of this aspect of the disjunctivist’s internalism, Pritchard 2011, pp. 435-9. 
342 For an emphasis on disjunctivism’s neo-Moorean character, Pritchard 2008. I actually think disjunctivism is 
poorly cast as providing this type of response to skepticism. See §5.7 below. 
343 But then what knowledge is anti-skeptical knowledge? This is a question frequently taken to motivate 
disjunctivism (e.g., McDowell Manuscript2; for discussion Setiya 2009). The subtle dialectic here goes beyond my 
purposes. Suffice to say I think the question is best understood as motivating the particular connection between 
experience and knowledge proposed in this paper, rather than questioning the dogmatist’s title to knowledge on any 
conception. 
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skeptical  scenarios.  But  skeptical  scenarios  are construed in such a way that the good and bad 
cases are stipulated to be subjectively indiscriminable.344 
This is not yet the disjunctivist’s “dialectical infelicity problem,” since the disjunctivist has 
a response available. The disjunctivist response resides in the point that the common description 
of good and bad cases as “indiscriminable” relies on an implicit argument.345 The subject in the 
bad case cannot know, based on her experience, that she is in the bad case. By contrast, the 
disjunctivist claims that in the good case the subject can know, based on her experience, that she 
is in the good case. How exactly do these claims seem in tension? The thought must be that if the 
subject in the bad case cannot know, based on experience, that she is in the bad case, then the 
subject in the good case cannot know, based on experience, that she is in the good case. Or again, 
if the subject in the bad case cannot rule out that she is in the bad case, then the subject in the good 
case cannot rule out that she is in the bad case, either. 
This is where the implicit argument operates. The argument introduces an auxiliary premise 
to the effect that the subject’s knowledge of the nature of her experience must be due to a general 
ability for self-knowledge, such that the capacity is operative in the good case as it is in the bad 
case. Accordingly, insofar as experience in the good case allows the subject  to  know  some  type 
344 Pritchard (2012, Part Two) introduces a distinction between “favoring” and “discriminating” epistemic support. 
Rational support may favor believing that p without allowing the subject to be able to discriminate her position from 
cases where p is false.  I do not think this solution fits the disjunctivist. For Pritchard, knowledge can seem to 
require the ability to “discriminate” between its objects and relevant alternatives. For Pritchard, the type of 
“introspection” involved in (2) does not allow for such discrimination between good and bad cases. Nevertheless, 
(2) can be defended on grounds of evidence that “favors” knowledge of being in the good case, without requiring 
“discriminating” support. On my construal, we can perhaps say that the subject cannot “introspectively 
discriminate” between good and bad cases, but this is because (2) is understood in first-order terms, and does not 
take first-order states as its objects. By contrast, by the same token this does not yield a need for “favoring” support 
(which can outstrip “discriminating” support). Instead, as I go on to discuss the disjunctivist treatment of the bad 
case centers on the Defectiveness Claim. (Pritchard also applies the “favoring”/”discriminating” to Dretskean 
“ringer” scenarios. Here it may well be correct, but this is because the defectiveness of the bad case is fundamentally 
different than the environmental presence of “ringers.”) 
345 See John McDowell Manuscript2 for another helpful discussion of the same point, McDowell 2010, p. 246ff; 
Soteriou 2016, Chapter 5. 
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of facts F about the character of her experience, experience in the bad case must also put the 
subject in a position to know facts of type F about the character of her experience. But  the bad 
case shows that F cannot extend to whether or  not  an  experience  is  perceptual.  Therefore,  the 
subject in the good case cannot, on grounds of her experience, know that she is perceiving.346 
Consider accordingly, 
Auxiliary Premise: If experience in the good case puts the subject in a position to 
know that she is perceiving, then this must be part of a general capacity for self- 
knowledge such as, contrary to fact, would apply to the bad case. 
It is in denying the Auxiliary Premise that I will suggest disjunctivists face the  “dialectical 
infelicity problem” I have announced. 
Consider that in denying the Auxiliary Premise, the disjunctivist will have to mark a 
distinction between the way the subject’s capacity for self-knowledge operates in the good and bad 
cases. Specifically, the disjunctivist will have to suggest that what the subject in the good case can 
know about her experience is different (and “more,” so to say) than the subject in the bad case. So 
the disjunctivist is committed to the following: 
346 For McDowell’s exposition of this idea (McDowell Manuscript2, p. 7): 
How does the familiar fact [that the subject in the bad case faultlessly mistakes her state for a state 
of seeing] seem to establish that one cannot know, in one’s self-consciousness in making a 
judgment on the ground of an experience, that the experience is one of perceiving that things are 
as one judges them to be; and, more generally, that the potential for knowing that an experience is 
one of perceiving that things are some way cannot be contained in the experience itself? The 
implicit argument has an extra premise, to this effect: if the potential for knowing that an 
experience is one of perceiving were contained in the experience itself, the knowledge that 
actualizes that potential would have to be an act of a capacity that would enable on to know of any 
of one’s experiences whether it is an experience of perceiving or not, providing that one exercised 
the capacity with care and attention. The familiar fact shows that there is no such capacity. If there 
were, it would not be possible to take an experience to be one of perceiving when it is not, except 
through lack of care or in attention. But the familiar fact is that does happen. And now the 
argument is that since there is no such capacity, there can be no such knowledge. 
For another helpful discussion of this line of thought, Soteriou 2016, Chapter 5. 
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Asymmetry Claim: the subject in a bad case is not in a position to know that she 
is in the bad case, but the subject in the good case is in a position to know she is  in 
the good case. 
But here the disjunctivist faces the “dialectical infelicity problem.” 
As a first pass at defending the Asymmetry Claim, the disjunctivist may simply hope to 
exploit the general shape of her view. Specifically, the disjunctivist may hope to transpose her 
negative claim from perception to self-knowledge. In the good case, experience ensures an 
opportunity for perceptual knowledge, even as in the bad case it does not. Just so, in the good case 
experience ensures an opportunity for self-knowledge, even as in the bad case it does not. 
Accordingly, the dialectical position for the disjunctivist might appear as follows. The Asymmetry 
Claim appears to flout the indiscriminability of the good and bad cases. However, this appearance 
merely trades on the same illicit assimilation of the good case to the bad case  that the disjunctivist 
is in general concerned to deny, this time as experience supports self- knowledge. As John 
McDowell suggests (2010, p. 246; cited at Soteriou 2016, p. 15), the illicit equation arises 
[n]ot only in connection with [perception’s] guise as a capacity for knowledge about one’s 
environment, but also in connection with its guise as a capacity for self-knowledge – knowledge 
that one’s experience is revealing an aspect of objective reality to one.347
But this is too quick. The reason is that where in the perceptual case the disjunctivist’s 
negative  claim  picks  up  on  a  natural distinction between the good and the bad case, this is not 
347 This is also the shape of the solution suggested by Stuchlik 2015. For Stuchlik, experiential mental states, in 
addition to presenting their contents, present themselves to the subject (for my discussion of “self-(re)presentational” 
views, Chapter 4 above). This allows Stuchlik to draw the suggested parallel. In experience, the subject either sees 
that p or it merely appears that p. Just so, for Stuchlik, experience either presents itself to the subject or merely 
appears to present itself to the subject. The reason I do not think this works is that there is an intimate connection 
between “appearance-talk” and the subject’s point of view on her own states. That is, what is meant by a state 
appearing to be a case of φ-ing would, at least plausibly, seem to draw on a commonality, from the subject’s point 
of view, between a state that appears to be a case of φ-ing and a state of φ-ing. Schematically, if states A and B are 
indiscriminable then A and B may well be different (“seeing” and “appearing,” e.g.)—but their indiscriminability 
would seem to imply some commonality, namely precisely at the level of what the subject can discern. Accordingly, 
the disjunctivist maneuver cannot obviously be run at the level of self-knowledge. 
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obviously true in the case of self-knowledge. Consider some set of environmental properties G, 
like redness and so on. It is entirely natural to think that perception is a capacity to pick up 
properties belonging to G, and that in the good case properties belonging to G are plausibly 
available for knowledge, where in the bad case they are not. But contrast the set of mental 
properties F. The question concerning the nature of perceptual self-knowledge is precisely whether 
“is a perceptual experience” is a member of F. Indeed, the upshot of the bad case can plausibly 
make it seem that it is not. But then the disjunctivist seems to lack natural grounds for the 
Asymmetry Claim. 
To further illustrate, consider two ways in which disjunctivists might conceive of 
something like the Asymmetry Claim: 
a) Asymmetry Specified:
You cannot tell that you are dead when you are dead, but from this it doesn’t follow that you cannot 
tell that you are not dead when you are not dead. You cannot tell that you are in dreamless sleep 
when you are in dreamless sleep, but from this it doesn’t follow that you cannot tell that you are not 
in dreamless sleep when you are not in dreamless sleep.348
Grounded in these examples, let a bad case be one of death or dreamless sleep, while a good case 
is one of ordinary waking consciousness. As these cases show, there is no general symmetry of 
self-knowledge in good and bad cases. Death and sleep are examples for which bad cases are 
situations such that you cannot know that you are in them, but good cases are such that you can 
tell that that you are in them, and that therefore you are not in a bad case. On reflection, however, 
these cases do not help the disjunctivist, since within their description they contain grounds for 
rendering the asymmetry intelligible. For example, being asleep is not in fact like being awake. 
Self-knowledge is plausibly a capacity for detecting properties that are distinct for these sorts of 
good and bad cases. 
348 Soteriou 2016, p. 3 
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b) Asymmetry Unspecified: By contrast, it is not intuitively part of the description of the
way good and bad cases arise for perceptual experience that there are discrepancies between the 
cases to which the subject in the bad case is failing to be suitably sensitive—indeed the opposite 
seems true.349 The subject in the bad case is stipulated to be rational, and as thus far developed, the 
bad case is not described so as to include a failure of self-knowledge. 
Accordingly, this is the disjunctivist’s “dialectical infelicity problem.” Disjunctivism 
requires the idea that self-knowledge is asymmetrical between the good and bad cases, but we have 
not been given grounds to favor this view over the view that self-knowledge in two cases is 
symmetrical. Specifically, the very aspect of experience that is supposed to be subjectively 
accessible in the good case, i.e., that a state is perceptual, is the aspect that the bad case seems to 
show is not obviously within a subject’s capacity to detect (based on experience alone).350 
Accordingly, the disjunctivist’s best result seems a stalemate.351 
But a presentational conception of epistemic value illuminates the resolution of this 
“dialectical infelicity problem” for the disjunctivist. The central idea is that it is a subtle misreading 
to take the disjunctivist to repeat or transpose her core strategy of denying inferences from the bad 
to the good case, now concerning the way experience grounds self-knowledge. Rather, the 
disjunctivist’s  strategy at once distinguishes bad from good cases both as grounds for perceptual
349 As Soteriou puts the point (Soteriou 2016, p. 12), 
it is not built into the description of these good and bad [perceptual experiential] situations that 
there is a significant psychological difference between the subjects occupying each: […] it is by 
no means obvious that there are psychological features that are present in the case of the subject in 
the good situation, and absent in the case of the subject in the bad situation, to which the subject in 
the good situation has introspective access. 
350 Consider here that the subject having a capacity to detect features of her own experiences is in question in a way 
that the subject having a capacity to visually detect features of her environment is not in question. This complicates 
the disjunctivist’s strategy as applied to self-knowledge. 
351 Indeed, ceteris paribus symmetry would seem prima facie more parsimonious than asymmetry, so the 
disjunctivist would seem at a disadvantage. 
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knowledge and as grounds for self-knowledge. The reason is that on the presentational paradigm 
experience’s epistemic value is conceived as intrinsically self-conscious, i.e., a single state 
intelligible only insofar as it provides grounds for perceptual knowledge and as grounds for self-
knowledge. That is, the way a presentational state serves as a ground for perceptual knowledge 
itself resides in its nature as a ground for a relevant type of self- knowledge. Consider, accordingly, 
McDowell’s characterization of experiential grounds for self-knowledge and experiential grounds 
for perceptual knowledge as aspects of the exercise of a “single capacity” (McDowell Manuscript2, 
p. 8), such that “the potential for knowledge that the experience is one of perceiving [is] contained
in the experience itself” (McDowell Manuscript2, p. 7). 
Appreciating the “dual character” of a single state of perceptual presence allows the 
disjunctivist to provide the following more specific version of the Asymmetry Claim: 
Defectiveness claim: The badness of the bad case consists not merely in a defective 
condition with respect to the subject’s capacity to gain knowledge of her 
environment through perception. It also consists in a defective condition with 
respect to the subject’s capacity to gain self-awareness of her state. That is, the 
subject in a bad case is not in a position to know that she is in the bad case because 
her state exhibits a specific type of defectiveness vis-à-vis the subject’s self-
knowledge. By contrast, the subject in the good case does not exhibit this  type of 
defectiveness, and accordingly the subject is in a position to know she is  in the 
good case. 
What the Defectiveness Claim provides is a particular grounding of the Asymmetry Claim that 
allows the disjunctivist to overcome her dialectical infelicity problem. The grounding is that, given 
the foregoing, just as the bad case constitutes a malfunction of perception, so it constitutes a 
malfunction of self-knowledge. Consider a case where the subject appears to be presented with 
some item, but is not. This is uncontroversially a defective exercise of the subject’s perceptual 
capacities.  But  now  if  the  subject’s capacity for self-knowledge is implicated in the very same 
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aspect of this state, it must also be a defective exercise of the subject’s capacity for self- 
knowledge.352 That is, it goes to the very heart of the disjunctivist view to see it as a mistake 
that we can picture the bad case as involving a subject’s functioning capacity for self-
awareness in abstraction from a functioning perceptual capacity. A subject cannot merely appear 
to be in a state of presence where this is a failure of perception but not of self-knowledge, since 
being in a state of presence is a single modification of a subject’s self-consciousness. In the 
register of self- knowledge, the bad case will make it seem to the perceiving subject that she is in 
the same type of state as she would be in the good case. But this no different than that it seems 
to her that she is confronted with environmental realities, when she is not. The environmental 
realities are not there, and neither is she in a position that is like the good case. 
This now allows us to appreciate the way the disjunctivist’s original argumentative move 
can be “transposed” to the case of self-knowledge. Just as in the case of ground level perceptual 
knowledge there is no inference from the defective nature of the bad case to the nature of the good 
case, so the same inference fails insofar as it relates to self-knowledge. For the  disjunctivist, the 
epistemic value of experience in the good case is such that, by the subject’s own self-conscious 
lights, experience puts her in a position to gain knowledge of the environment. The existence of 
defective states of this type does not bear on the description of the good case, neither in its 
perceptual-knowledge-granting nor in its self-knowledge-granting aspects. Accordingly, 
indiscriminability  is  fundamentally  asymmetrical  between  the  good  and  bad c ases, since the 
352 Several people have alerted to me to the possibility of an opponent “wriggling” herself out of my argument. 
Granting the idea of defectiveness as attaching to a single, first-order self-conscious presentational state, it does not 
follow that a defect in the state’s presentational aspect must constitute a defect in its guise as a form of self- 
awareness. But what I intend is that the defect concerns the same property of the state: the state’s presentational 
aspect is a modification of the self-awareness the state includes. Consequently, if the state’s presentational aspect is 
defective, then eo ipso it is defective as a form of self-awareness: namely insofar as the subject seems self-aware of 
having a presentational state. Perhaps this point requires further argument. If so, for now it can merely seem 
promising to support the disjunctivist’s Asymmetry Claim by rendering it as the Defectiveness Claim. 
Thanks to Wayne Wu, Stephen Engstrom and Ori Beck for direction on this score. 
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indiscriminability involves a failure of self-knowledge in the bad case.353 
5.6 THE BASIS PROBLEM 
It has recently been argued that a conception of experience as “seeing that” a proposition p 
obtains amounts to a cognitively overly-demanding or “over-intellectualized” conception of 
experience, and more specifically leads to the much-discussed “basis problem.”354 For some 
philosophers “seeing that” is taken to imply cognitive commitment to p, specifically knowledge 
that p.355 
Perceptual knowledge or belief should be based on what perception provides. Indeed, this 
is the very heart of Pritchard-style factive disjunctivism: the point of characterizing perception in 
terms of “seeing that” is that it provides the subject with a fact that p that constitutes its epistemic 
value, and accordingly the grounds for the subject’s perceptual knowledge that p. But if I “see 
that” there is butter in the fridge, then this might seem to imply that I know there is butter in the 
fridge. Accordingly, it might seem that experience places the subject in a position to know that p 
353 What the foregoing underscores is the central place held in the disjunctivist conception of experience’s epistemic 
value by the elaboration of (2) in terms of a first-order variety of consciousness. Consider the way the disjunctivist’s 
“dialectical infelicity problem” in effect stems from the same source as Haddock’s “anti-luminosity” argument, from 
which I briefly defended the disjunctivist in the introduction. In both cases, the source of puzzlement at the 
disjunctivist view is the idea of self-knowledge as a form of receptive knowledge, in which independent experiential 
realities are accessed (realities independent from the capacity to gain such knowledge itself). In Haddock’s “anti- 
luminosity” argument this idea is expressed in the assumption that self-knowledge must be subject to a (limited) 
reliability condition. In the “dialectical infelicity problem” the same idea expresses itself in the assumption that good 
and bad cases must be indiscriminable due to sharing a common reality accessed by a common capacity for self- 
knowledge. But as I hope to have been making plausible, puzzlement at these features of the disjunctivist 
commitment to (2) is tantamount to puzzlement at the disjunctivist’s commitment to (1), and thereby at the view in 
general. Failure to appreciate the way experiential self-knowledge is a form of rationality is, for the disjunctivist, 
failure to appreciate experiential rationality itself. 
354 For discussion, Ghijsen 2015, Cassam 2007. French 2016 specifically makes lot of this latter problem. For a 
statement of the problem, Pritchard 2012, p. 21. 
355 Cassam 2007, Williamson 2000, Ch. 1. 
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only if experience itself already involves a cognitive commitment to p (e.g., knowledge that p.) 
But then it is hard to see how a belief that p could be based on the grounds perception provides. 
It is this difficulty that, as I flagged, provides a major reason for disjunctivists to abandon 
a Pritchard-style conception of “seeing that” in favor of an object-centered conception of “seeing 
o…on.” Now, on my understanding of disjunctivism, experience presents the subject with aspects 
of her environment, including, e.g., objects. I therefore agree that a disjunctivist conception of 
experience can be characterized in the object-centered terms of “seeing o…on..” Moreover, I agree 
that disjunctivism does not depend on the idea that experience guarantees the truth of perceptual 
beliefs in virtue of relating to facts. But critically this does not mean I agree with Haddock and 
French’s adoption of an object-centered view in the face of the “basis problem.” 
Traditionally, the disjunctivist’s response to the “basis problem” has been to suggest that 
“seeing that” does not imply knowledge, but merely a good position for knowledge (Pritchard 
2012, p. 26ff): 
A crucial distinction that we need to draw is between being in a state that guarantees knowledge and 
being in a state that guarantees that one is in a good position to gain knowledge, even if one is unable 
to properly exploit this opportunity. I want to suggest that seeing that p is factive and robustly 
epistemic in the weaker latter sense rather than in the more robust former sense.356
For my purposes, it does not matter whether Pritchard’s response is ultimately effective against 
the “basis problem.”357 What matters is Pritchard’s suggestion that “seeing that” is supposed to 
specify a “good position for knowledge.” From the perspective of the version of disjunctivism I 
have been advocating, the point is that describing an experience in terms of the subject “seeing 
that p” implies that the subject is, in her experience, aware of experience as providing grounds for 
p.  Accordingly  if  a  subject  “sees that p,”  this  ensures that the subject’s subjectively available
356 Pritchard grounds this distinction in the existence of “reflectively bad” cases in which the subject supposedly 
“sees that p,” but is not in a position to judge that p (see also McDowell 2003, p. 680). French 2016 explicitly 
questions this way of arguing. For discussion of these cases, see below at §8. 
357 Unlike Pritchard I have no commitment to the expression “seeing that.” 
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grounds are sufficient for knowing that p. In this sense, what Pritchard’s above passage correctly 
captures is that idea that while “seeing that” cannot, on pain of the “basis problem,” imply the 
subject’s cognitive commitment to p, experience must imply so to say the subject’s “reflective 
commitment” to experience providing grounds for knowing that p. 358 
This is where my version of an object-centered disjunctivism diverges from French and 
Haddock’s.359 French explicitly sets aside attempting to account for disjunctivism’s internalism 
within his view (French 2016, p. 90; p. 100). French suggests that disjunctivists might be able to 
spell out a good position for knowledge in broadly Dretskean terms on which perceptual 
experience is “simple” and “cognitively and conceptually primitive” (French 2014, p. 6).360 French 
moreover claims that the availability of a Dretskean account obviates the need for attributing 
propositional content to perception: 
[traditional epistemological disjunctivists] are committed to the view that there are some states of 
perception—that is, those involved in paradigmatic perceptual knowledge—which constitutively 
involve propositional representational content. The perceptual states in question are a species of 
representational state. Taking on such metaphysical commitments in formulating one’s 
epistemology of perception is perfectly acceptable if the commitments are obvious, or 
uncontentious, or unavoidable. But [perception bearing propositional content] is none  of  the above. 
It is not obvious or uncontentious, it is a theoretical commitment which is denied by many. 
Accordingly, for French the “basis” problem can be avoided because for the disjunctivist 
experience need not be understood in terms of “seeing that,” but can instead be Dretskean 
presentation of objects: indeed experience need not be contentful to capture the disjunctivist 
suggestion. 
358 Properly this is not cashed out as a cognitive commitment: e.g., self-awareness is not a belief the subject forms on 
the basis of experience.  Nevertheless, it is important that in experience the subject’s cognitive condition is not 
neutral on the status of her experience—for the disjunctivist, this is the point to stress. 
359 Haddock does not make French’s claims concerning the cognitively primitive character of object-seeing. 
Nevertheless, Haddock’s claims about the problems the disjunctivist faces in accounting for “reflective access” 
show that his object-centered account cannot take the form I have suggested in this paper. 
360 For a recent articulation of such an approach, Travis 2013. Also see Dretske1969, 2000. 
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On my understanding of disjunctivism, however, while experience is presentational, this 
cannot imply that it is “simple” – nor, plausibly, can the account do without content. The subject’s 
reflective awareness is a feature of her rationality, and as such it is intellectually demanding.361 
Accordingly, while experience can be a form of object-centered “seeing o…on,” it cannot be a 
form of Dretskean “simple seeing.” Very plausibly the attribution of propositional contents to 
experience is associated with the distinctly rational character of experience.362 Moreover, it is clear 
that, understood in the relevant sense, describing experience in terms of “seeing that” does not lead 
to a “basis problem.” The subject’s reflective commitment to the character of her experience in no 
way contradicts her acquisition of a belief that p on the basis of experience. On the contrary, it 
explains how the subject acquires belief on the basis  of  experience by explaining the subject’s 
subjective access to the epistemic value of experience.363 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
Duncan Pritchard (2012, p. 1) characterizes disjunctivism as the “holy grail” of perceptual 
epistemology, viz. a conception on which subjective rationality can reach “to the facts.” But if I 
have been correct in this chapter, Pritchard’s conception of this “holy grail” spoils his 
characterization   of   disjunctivism   as   its   achievement.  Pace  recent  attempts  to  reconstruct 
361 Contrast Dretske’s characterization of seeing objects as “a primitive visual ability which is common to a great 
variety of sentient beings, an ability which we, as human beings, share with our cocker spaniel and pet cat.” 
Compare also Johnston 2006, p. 270, “non-fact-directed sensing seems a basic form of sensing that we share with 
infants and animals.” 
362 Chapter 6 below. 
363 In this sense, I think it is unhelpful for disjunctivists to deny (Pritchard 2011, p. 442; McDowell 2003, p. 680) 
that “seeing that p” in a certain sense implies a cognitive commitment to p. As far as I can tell, the disjunctivist can 
allow that “seeing that p” describes the acquisition of perceptual knowledge as a whole, including knowledgeable 
belief. What matters is that this process involves, in experience itself, the subject’s awareness of her grounds. 
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disjunctivism from object-centered materials, it is a natural consequence of Pritchard’s discussion 
that the critical evaluation of disjunctivism has centered on locutions like “seeing that” and on the 
related claim that experience can take facts as its objects.364 The point is that Pritchard’s 
disjunctivism requires fact-centered discourse to anchor experience’s epistemic value to 
knowledge, since nothing about the evidentialist context within which Pritchard conceives 
experience’s epistemic value ensures such a connection per se. 
I have suggested a significant revision of disjunctivism in this aspect. I began this chapter 
by suggesting disjunctivism is best understood as a claim about the truth of experientialism, not a 
view about the strength or status of experience’s value conceived more generically. We can now 
see this. Experience’s epistemic value is anchored to knowledge just in virtue of what it is, i.e., a 
manifestation of the self-consciousness that belongs to a subject’s rationality. As we might put it, 
experience carries epistemic value because of the way the imagery of conscious experience is 
“ordered under” the subject’s rationality. Characterizing experience this way displays on the 
surface the connection to knowledge that is critical for the disjunctivist, so that the idea of 
rationally formed but nevertheless non-knowledgeable beliefs is off the table. That option is  ruled 
out by the way experience and judgment are both expressions of the subject’s rational nature.365 
Along with reconceiving disjunctivism’s positive claim I have suggested we arrive at a 
significant reconception of disjunctivism’s negative claim. If I have been correct, the disjunctivist 
strategy for addressing the bad case is not properly rendered (as is common) merely in the 
negative terms  of  denying  the  (fundamental)  commonality  of  the  good  and  bad  cases.  The 
364 Notice how, in effect, it reappears in French’s notion of “quasi-factivity.” 
365 This provides one gloss on the Kantian characterization of sensible experience in terms of “receptivity.” Along 
these lines, experience is receptive to items specifically as a feature of her capacity to subsequently know them 
through judgment. 
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gives a significantly deeper analysis of the bad case from within the disjunctivist’s positive 
claim. If perception is a fallible capacity to be self-consciously presented with items, then (a) it is 
unsurprising that there will be bad or defective cases in which it will indiscriminably seem to the 
subject that she is in a relevant perceptual condition366; (b) it is equally obvious that as bad or 
defective, these cases do not represent perception as a mode of knowledge itself, since by 
definition defective exercises of a capacity are not good candidates for understanding the 
capacity’s nature. 
Finally, my revised understanding of disjunctivism’s negative claim provides a gloss on its 
anti-skeptical stance, which I have suggested is not accurately rendered as “neo-Moorean.” For the 
“neo-Moorean,” anti-skeptical knowledge is inferential knowledge gained on grounds of empirical 
perceptual knowledge. But this is not the disjunctivist’s solution. Consider that for the disjunctivist 
it follows from the self-consciousness that attends experience that philosophical study of 
perceptual rationality must, in a certain sense, coincide with a subjective sorting of self- 
consciousness, an enterprise first-personally accessible by rational subjects of experience in 
general. That is, the true shape of perceptual knowledge is something already included within the 
self-consciousness rational subjects enjoy. This provides a gloss on the disjunctivist’s 
understanding of skepticism and the nature of disjunctivism’s corrective project. For the 
disjunctivist, the fallible character of experiential self-consciousness can render obscure what in 
fact ordinary experience makes self-consciously available: namely that in experience objects are 
present for knowledge. In turn, disjunctivism promises to offer the apparatus that resolves this 
quandary of self-consciousness. 
366 Again, indiscriminability being unsurprising since the defect applies to self-consciousness no less than to 
perception. 
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What does this mean for anti-skeptical knowledge? It means that such knowledge is 
directly included in a suitably corrected self-consciousness, rather than being knowledge that 
requires inferential reasoning from empirical grounds. Once disabused of overreactions to her 
fallibility, the subject can once again recognize ordinary experience for what it manifestly is: the 
presence of the world in experience. Such self-consciousness includes in itself the negation of 
skepticism, which purported that the subject lacked capacities for knowledge through 
experience.367 
5.8 REFLECTIVE BADNESS 
Consider three prima facie problematic cases for my version of disjunctivism.368 
Barn (i): Unbeknownst to her, a subject is in barn façade country when she happens to 
see a barn, and judges she is seeing a barn. 
Barn (ii): A subject is seeing a barn but is falsely told by an otherwise reliable source  
that she is in barn façade country. 
Experiment: A subject in an experiment has been told that there is a .50 likelihood 
of facing undetectably unsuitable lighting conditions for color perception. At a 
moment t however, she faces ordinary conditions as she observes colored objects. 
367 Accordingly, I take it as deeply perceptive when Michael Martin’s “On Being Alienated” analyzes the 
disjunctivist approach to skepticism fundamentally in terms of a subject’s “alienation” from the way she naturally 
took perception to constitute a mode of knowledge (Martin 2006, p. 354): 
If the conception one has of how one knows something is falsified, then one’s claim to that 
knowledge can seem to be undermined. We seem to be cut off from the world through lacking the 
kind of contact with it that we supposed ourselves to have. 
368 For the second type of barn case, see Pritchard 2011 p. 443, 2012, p. 26ff; McDowell 2003, p. 680. See also a 
critical discussion at French 2016, pp. 91-95. For the third type of case McDowell 2011, p. 46. 
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In Andrea Kern’s terms (Kern 2017, p. 97), these are cases that are in some aspect “reflectively 
unfavorable.” Structurally, all these cases involve both (a) an ordinary aspect in that the subject 
seems to be enjoying an ordinary perceptual experience (the result of ordinary sensory functioning 
in broadly ordinary conditions), and (b) a complication pertaining to the subject’s being in a 
position to know whether her perception provides grounds for knowledge. 
The three develop (b) in subtly different ways. In Barn (i) many philosophers think the 
subject’s perception of the barn is, unbeknownst to her, not a suitable basis for knowledge. Barn 
(ii), by contrast, is a case where the subject is in principle in a position to gain knowledge from 
experience, but will not avail herself of this opportunity because of a false belief. In Experiment, 
the subject is again not in a position to gain knowledge, but now for reasons known to her through 
an authoritative source. 
The problem cases of “reflective badness” raise is due to the fact that disjunctivism seems 
to entail a strong connection between aspects (a) and (b). The disjunctivist faces the following 
question: insofar as the subject lacks access to her experience’s epistemic value, what does this 
mean for the status of her experience, given that it otherwise seems an ordinary visual experience? 
Specifically, are aspects of the environment present in cases of reflective badness? 
I here want to sketch two ways for the disjunctivist to deal with these cases, and express a 
possible ground for dissent from the way I understand the established disjunctivist approach.369 On 
the established disjunctivist treatment, the character of experience, specifically the role of 
presence, goes with opportunities for knowledge. So conceived, neither cases like Barn (i) 
(McDowell 1982, p. 390 fn. 37) nor cases like Experiment (McDowell 2011, p. 46) are cases in 
which  aspects  of  the  environment  are  perceptually  present  in the relevant sense. By contrast, 
369 I take the authoritative sources for the disjunctivist treatment of the cases to be in McDowell 1982, 2003, 2011; 
Pritchard 2011; and with a special focus, Kern 2017 (part III, section VI). 
370 Specifically, as Kern notes in agreement with McDowell, this is due to perception’s character as part of a rational 
capacity for knowledge through perception. 
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cases like Barn (ii) do provide the subject an opportunity for knowledge, and accordingly are cases 
in which items are present to the subject, even if due to her false belief she fails to judge 
accordingly (McDowell 2003, p. 680). Accordingly, the conventional treatment of cases of 
“reflective badness” takes the following shape: 
Table 7 Reflective Badness (1) 
Perceptual Presence Yes No 
Barn (i) X 
Barn (ii) X 
Experiment X 
But this way of employing the fallibility of perceptual capacities seems to me prima facie 
infelicitous for the disjunctivist, and to contrast unfavorably with non-disjunctivist positions. For 
the non-disjunctivist, “reflectively bad” cases allow for a clean read: in ordinary cases of visual 
functioning, perceived objects are presented to the subject. Such states constituting an opportunity 
for perceptual knowledge requires a responsiveness to rational norms extraneous to the states as 
such. By contrast, the heart of the disjunctivist strategy (Kern 2017, pp. 96-97) must turn on the 
idea that the self-conscious character of experience (e.g., the presence of items to self-
consciousness) is a feature of the subject’s rationality.370 Accordingly, perceptual experience itself 
is open to deficiencies that specifically concern the subject’s rational responsibilities. In Barn (i) 
and Experiment it is not rationally responsible for the subject to acquire belief, and accordingly 
experience does not present the relevant items. In turn, Barn (ii) 
a “good position”—disjunctivism is precisely defined in this sense through its internalism. 
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is a deficient exercise of one’s capacity for perceptual knowledge. It is deficient insofar as the 
perception is not recognized by the subject as it would be if the capacity were exercised perfectly.371
That is, in Barn (ii) the subject suffers an opposing type of deficiency: a failure to follow rational 
norms insofar as the subject fails to recognize an opportunity to know due to a conflicting belief. 
But this integration of rational responsibility into experience’s character seems 
problematic. Start with Barn (ii). For the disjunctivist the self-consciously available epistemic 
value of experience resides in experiential presence as such. Now in Barn (ii), the subject does not 
“recognize” her experience as an opportunity for knowledge. But what is this further stage of 
“recognition,” if not self-consciousness as such? In what sense is the subject’s epistemic position 
good in in the disjunctivist sense, if the subject does not have this epistemic value  internalistically 
available (or does she?)).372  Contrast Barn (i), in which the subject seems to  have a barn self-
consciously present in what is a wholly ordinary experience, but for the disjunctivist no barn is 
present due to the subject’s failure by a rational norm (say, safety.) But subjectively, what rational 
comportment might the subject have undertaken to allow her experience to be what it seems to her 
to be: a case in which a barn is presented? 
The problem for the disjunctivist seems this. By disjunctivist lights, experience’s epistemic 
value should by itself provide the subject with an internalistically accessible opportunity for 
knowledge. But Barn (i) and Barn (ii) show there are cases where in order for experience have that 
epistemic value, or for the subject to have that value available in a suitable sense, further rational 
norms must be followed in addition to simple experiencing. The subject must “recognize” her state 
as  valuable,  and  must  position  herself vis-à-vis her  environment such as to, for example, meet
371 Kern 2017, p. 96 (emphasis original). 
372 Of course an epistemically “good position” may be cashed out in objective terms, viz. a suitable arrangement of 
the subject’s perceptual functioning in her environment. But for the disjunctivist, this is manifestly not sufficient for 
ties to the familiar character of perceptual experience. 
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a safety condition.373 But then the disjunctivist has simply defined experience’s epistemic 
value in terms of an opportunity to know: it is not clear this is the straightforward value 
delivered by simply experiencing the environment as this is a state in the subject’s self-
consciousness. In particular, what seemed attractive about disjunctivism, on its current 
understanding, was to ground secure, internalistically opportunities for knowledge in the heart 
of experience’s presentational character as such. But having now simply defined presence to 
accommodate disjunctivism’s desiderata, it seems the position has distanced itself from this natural 
notion of presence.374 
Accordingly, I want to tentatively suggest there is a better disjunctivist treatment of 
“reflective badness” available that renders the following: 
Table 8 Reflective Badness (2) 
Perceptual Presence Yes No 
Barn (i) X 
Barn (ii) X 
Experiment X 
373 By disjunctivist lights objections along these lines must seem point-missing, since as defective exercises of 
perception as a capacity to know, these cases can only be understood in light of a perfect exercise of this capacity 
(Kern 2017, pp. 93-94). For example, we can say that the subject in Barn (ii) is in a “good epistemic position” that 
she “fails to recognize” because we can appreciate in what respects she falls short of a perfect exercise of her 
capacity to know through perception. These are not independently intelligible descriptions of the subject’s position 
in Barn (ii), and accordingly, they do not carry over to perfect exercises of the capacity. Two problems remain, 
however: a) it is nevertheless not obvious how “unrecognized but self-consciously available” specifies a coherent 
state of mind; b) more generally, it assumes perception as a capacity for knowledge as posited by the disjunctivist— 
the goal should seem rather to ground this claim in a more neutrally compelling view of experience. 374 McDowell 2011, p. 48 grants that his notion of presence may not track more common notions: 
For different purposes, we might work with a different conception of what it would be for things 
to be present to subjects in their perceptual states, a conception that can be understood in 
abstraction from whether the perceptual states are acts of rational capacities for knowledge. 
But it seems to me one of the attractions of working with a notion of presence in the first place is its close 
conditions and they way they relate to the configuration of objects in the environment. 
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On my preferred development, the capacity that results in perceptual presence can suffer 
from two types of defects. The most striking is that, since this is a self-conscious capacity, it can 
be affected by the subject’s higher-order beliefs: a subject cannot be self-consciously presented 
with an item if she believes that her situation rules this out. Accordingly, I think in Barn (ii) and 
Experiment the subject is not presented with items in front of her: the items do not play a suitable 
role in the subject’s self-consciousness.375 On the other hand, in some objective conditions one 
simply cannot perceive things in the ordinary way, for example if one’s sensory organs work  only 
on an insufficient percentage of occasions, or the lighting conditions are very regularly unsuited 
for sight. In those situations objects cannot in properly be perceptually present by looking at them, 
since objective conditions simply do not allow for perception as we understand it (on my view, 
this is true even if on some occasion both one’s sensory organs function and lighting conditions 
are normal). I do not think either of these verdicts distance disjunctivism  from the ordinary notion 
of presence.376 
By contrast, Barn (i) does not involve either deficiency: it is a normal case of exercising 
the subject’s perceptual capacities.377 In this case I think the item is self-consciously present. But 
what  about  the role of presence in  perceptual  knowledge?  I think  the   disjunctivist  has  three 
375 Of course the items do play some role in her self-consciousness, e.g., in making items in some sense seem 
present. But presence to self-consciousness implies internalist access—the subject does not have such access. But 
what about the idea that the subject in Barn (ii) enjoys an opportunity for perceptual knowledge, even if she does not 
avail herself of this? I think the disjunctivist can deny this—for example, I disagree with Pritchard (2011 p. 443). I 
do not think it is clear that the subject in the barn case appropriately describes herself as having “seen that” there 
was a barn before her (cf. French 2016, pp. 91-95). Imagine the misleading source, curious to see whether their 
prank succeeded, asking whether the subject saw that actually there was a real barn there. Could the subject respond 
affirmatively? This seems pretense. 
376 See e.g., the empirical results in Perky 2010, which suggest interaction between presence and self-awareness of 
perception. See Ghijsen 2014 for discussion. 
377 But is Barn (i) not an objectively bad situation for a capacity to know barns based on perception? It is, but this 
cannot be what decides whether an item is present to the subject. Situations are constantly bad for telling what 
precisely items are: this is not a matter of the object being present to the subject. In this respect, there is a structural 
difference between the way perceptual capacities depend on the objective functioning of sense organs and lighting 
perceiving subject. 
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possible answers. The disjunctivist might bite the bullet: it is true the subject might easily have 
seen a barn façade, but in fact she saw a barn, and accordingly the subject can know there is barn 
before her. Alternatively the disjunctivist might deny that being a barn is a properly visually 
available quality of objects: the barn is present in experience as it would ordinarily be, but “being 
a barn” is not part of what is thus securely knowable. Finally, the disjunctivist might deny being 
committed to ruling out “ringer” scenarios like Barn (i). In perception a subject presented with an 
aspect of her environment in a way that self-consciously constitutes a case of perceiving. This core 
disjunctivist idea might seem consistent with the idea that on occasion a judgment based in 
experience fails to be knowledgeable due to the presence of “ringers.” Any of these options seems 
to me preferable to denying the presence of the barn.378 
378 Of course the disjunctivist might say that some aspects of the barn are presented in the experience, but not the 
property of being a barn. But by my lights this does not solve the intuitive problem. The problem is that an 
environmental factor outside the subject’s perceptual functioning and her self-consciousness influences the character 
of her perceptual state. This seems at odds with the familiar way in which items can be (or fail to be) present to a 
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6.0 CONTENT AND THE UNITY OF EXPERIENCE 
A concept should thus be understood as consciousness of an act, and more precisely of an act of 
combining and grasping together. 
Béatrice Longuenesse 1998, p. 46 
How should we understand the idea that perception represents: that perceptual experience 
bears representational content?379 For the type of representationalist views in which I am here 
interested, the operative idea is that experience and thought share a type of intentionality: in  some 
relevant sense, experience and thought involve their objects in the same way. For this 
representationalist, experience can accordingly be said to be “conceptual.”380 
In this last chapter I will provide a non-standard way of thinking about this 
representationalist idea, which centers on a connection between perceptual content and a type of 
379 I will speak interchangeably about perceptual representation and “representationalism,” and about perceptual 
content and “the content view.” 
380 I will turn to the relevant characterization of “concept,” but as the basic elements of thought, or distinctly rational 
representations, the point of departure should be the constituent of a Fregean Thought, i.e., a Fregean sense 
(McDowell 1994, p. 107.) Contrast views on which concepts are associated specifically with predicate-like 
structures (Byrne 2005, p. 231): 
Concepts are certain kinds of Fregean senses, specifically Fregean senses of predicates (e.g., “is a 
horse”). They are supposed to be constituents, together with other kinds of senses (e.g., senses of 
singular terms like “Seabiscuit”) of the senses of sentences (e.g., “Seabiscuit is a horse”), 
otherwise known as Fregean Thoughts. 
This identifies concepts only as certain Fregean senses. But this cannot capture the idea of an element of thought per 
se: a sense as understood under Frege’s context principle, its significance as understood against the unity of a full 
Thought. 
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experiential unity.381 Moreover, I will suggest that this view of experiential content in turn provides 
for a non-standard way in which representation can be understood to figure in explanations of 
perceptual justification. While my aims here are systematic and  not interpretative, the gloss I give 
on content is supposed to capture themes in Kant’s discussion of the character of intuitional 
representations. Accordingly, I effectively try to articulate one way of answering questions like 
how intuitions contribute to judgment; how intuitions bear content; and how intuitions qualify as 
specifically conceptual representations.382 
We can approach my non-standard view of content by starting from a contemporary 
invocation of the basic Kantian idea that we ought to explain perceptual cognition as—in one sense 
or another—the cooperation of two fundamentally different faculties, an intellectual faculty, and 
a faculty for a distinct type of sensory awareness. In this light, consider Mark Johnston’s following 
remark, directed against the idea that perception bears content: 
For more than a decade I have been quietly complaining that contemporary epistemology lacks an 
adequate answer to this question: What is the epistemic contribution of sensory awareness as 
opposed to immediate (or non-inferential) perceptual judgment? It still seems to me a good 
complaint.383
381 There is sometimes a connection made between mental unity and the representational content of conscious states, 
but rarely do we get a grounding explanation of this connection (see e.g., discussion of Tye 2003 and Hurley 2003 
below). For a contribution closer to the present treatment of unity and self-awareness, see Charles Siewert who 
argues for “an account of first-person knowledge of experience” based on a certain conception of “[the] unity of 
experience” (2001, p. 544). 
382 Recall from Chapter 1, 
Non-Judgmentalism: the capacity to think provides intuitions with a particular representational 
character (specifically a conceptual character), even as this does not render intuition similar to 
judgment. 
In Chapter 1, I introduced this as a negative claim. Broadly, the present aim is to provide a positive gloss. 
383 Johnston 2011, p. 165. It is clear that the content view is Johnston’s target from the contrast with his own view, 
on which sensory awareness non-representationally discloses truth-makers for judgment. As Johnston writes 
(Johnston 2006, p. 285), 
items [are] selectively made present, but not synthesized, by our “sensibility,” our distinctive 
capacities for sensory awareness. 
The upshot of this paper is essentially to challenge Johnston’s invocation of Kant: even on a view on which 
experience merely presents, there is nevertheless also a role for what Johnston calls “synthesis.” 
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At first blush, Johnston’s “complaint” can seem imprecisely targeted. It is not common to 
conceive of the epistemology of sensory experience in terms of “non-inferential perceptual 
judgment,” nor is this the representationalist view. To be sure, perceptual judgment is non- 
inferential. But perceptual judgment is not identical with visual experience, or with its contents. 
Instead, the non-inferential character of perceptual judgment is intended to be grounded in the 
character of visual experience—e.g., in the way experience bears content. For representationalists, 
it is in virtue of experience bearing content as it does that perceptual judgment can be non-
inferential, i.e., the affirmation of what has been called experience’s “face value.”384 
But if our focus is on the idea that perceptual cognition should comprise the work of two 
distinct faculties, then we can appreciate the way representationalism can seem a proper target for 
Johnston’s worry. For the views I have in mind, perceptual representation is a distinctly intellectual 
phenomenon. Accordingly, representationalists seem committed to 
Intellectualism: in a suitably fundamental sense, experience implicates the 
subject’s capacity for thought.385 
Plausibly, something close to Intellectualism is at the heart of Johnston’s objection to a content 
view. Consider that for many representationalists, even if experience does not judge, the heart of 
a content view is nevertheless a type of judgment-like structure. Consider for example, 
Representation-As: Perceptual representation is always representation as, insofar 
as the representing state presents some item o as some way F, in such a way that 
the representing state, simply in virtue of possessing this structure, sets accuracy 
conditions for the way o may or may not be (namely F).386 
384 For the relation between content and experience having a “face value,” see Travis 2004. 
385 I assume, as before, that perceptual representation is supposed to provide a “fundamental” gloss on the character 
of experience. 
386 A commitment of this sort is common, e.g., Boyle Manuscript, p. 10: 
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Representation-As captures the way judgment can seem to bear a certain structure, which structure 
moreover can seem essential to representationalists’ explanatory aims.387 For example, consider 
the following representationalist thought about the explanatory relation between experience and 
judgment, 
1. Experience represents (some object in) the environment to the subject as some way F.
2. The subject accepts experience at “face value.”
3. The subject non-inferentially judges that (some object in) the environment is F.388 
On this way of understanding perceptual rationality, the critical work is done by a common 
structure between judgment and experience, both of which involve F. As such, I take it that 
Johnston’s more particular point is that, for the Intellectualist at least, it is the intellectual faculty—
and the distinctive judgmental structure associated with it— that does the significant 
epistemic work  in  a  view of experience.389 The epistemically significant character of experience 
The notion of perceptual content […] is the idea that perception presents objects as being certain 
ways (or equivalently: as having certain properties or features.) [...] the idea is that perceptual 
content involves a referential element (marked by “things”), on the one hand, and a classificatory 
element (marked by “thus-and-so”), on the other hand. 
Indeed, a similar conception prevalent among non-conceptualists (Ned Block 2012, p. 1) 
every percept is constituted by a “perceptual attributive” (that represents an attribute) and a 
singular element (that represents an individual). 
. 
As Block’s mention of an “attributive” indicates, a non-conceptual representation must still specify some way for the 
environment to be (even if not expressible as F.) For representationalists this is simply an implication of 
understanding representations as accuracy conditions. 
387 One such aim is perceptual justification, which I discuss below. A second is perceptual error. F spells out a 
possible way things can be believed to be, but may yet not be, and it is the analogy between experience and belief 
that is supposed to be central to the content view (Siegel 2010, p. 30; Byrne 2009, p. 437). But as I have argued, 
representationalists need not treat perceptual error this way: the fallibility of a self-conscious perceptual capacity for 
knowledge is an alternative. (Nor, pace recent work by Michael Tye, does this mean representationalists must posit 
de re contents. See McDowell 2013, p. 155.) 
388 This explanatory order need of course not be sequential: (2) and (3) may e.g., be identical. 
389 I here single out the Intellectualist, but insofar as the idea of content depends on an analogy with belief (Siegel 
2010, Byrne 2009), the point generalizes to representation simpliciter. Travis 2013 emphasizes the Intellectualist 
origins of a concept of representation more generally. 
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resides   in   its   judgment-like   structure,  while  the  sensory  faculty  plays  what  can  seem  an 
epiphenomenal role.390 
For Johnston’s worry to be gripping, we must of course believe that sensory awareness 
should be given an independent, positive role in a view of perceptual rationality. Why? In recent 
work Anil Gupta has captured what I take to be a profound source for this suggestion.391 For Gupta, 
thought and experience must be seen not merely as distinct states, as on views on which experience 
does not itself involve judgment. Instead, experience and thought must be seen as two 
fundamentally different postures of mind—specifically such that experience could not be said to 
bear the structure proper to thought. As Gupta writes, 
We should recognize two kinds of directedness of the cognizing subject—the mind, in brief— 
toward the world. The first kind is the directedness of experience, which I have called presentation; 
the other kind is intentionality, the directedness of thought. […] Presentation is characterized by a 
certain blending; intentionality, by a certain separation. Each conscious experience presents the 
subject with a particular presentational complex without, however, articulating the complex for the 
subject. […] With thought, the situation is the very opposite. You cannot think a complex (e.g., the 
peach’s being sweet) without the capacity to articulate its constituent parts (e.g., the peach and 
sweetness.) Experience and thought are, thus, two radically different, indeed opposite movements 
of the conscious mind. One passively blends elements together, while the other actively separates 
them—or at least strives to do so. 
As Gupta here puts it, “Experience and thought are […] two radically different, indeed 
opposite movements of the conscious minds.” Specifically, for Gupta “[o]ne passively blends 
elements together, while the other actively separates them.” Accordingly, for Gupta only thought 
implicates a type of articulate structure. By contrast, sensory awareness has an independent and 
opposite role to play, presenting in a united way what thought may subsequently articulate. 392 
390 Johnston criticizes this as the “Wallpaper View” of sensory character (2006, p. 260). 
391 Gupta indeed raises a number of relevant discrepancies between thought and experience: Gupta 2012, p. 18ff. To 
be sure, Gupta’s view must not be identified with Johnston’s. For Gupta, but not for Johnston, experience is not only 
opposed to judgment and knowledge: it must not even be understood as directly acquainting the subject with items, 
or providing them for knowledge. The role of experience is to mandate transitions between views, a logical role that 
lies outside the common spectrum of views on which experience provides direct knowledge-affording awareness. 
392 That this suggestion need not be foreign to representationalism is evinced by John McDowell’s focus on the role 
of “articulation” in a conception of judgment paired with a content view of experience (McDowell 2009b). 
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The claim of this last chapter is that—pace Gupta—representationalism can stand for a 
position on which the intellect not merely “actively separates [elements]” as it does in judgment, 
but also unites or combines them—including in experience. Accordingly, there is at least one type 
of unity in experience that is not a “passive blending”: it is an active combining, owed to the 
capacity for thought.393 More specifically, for the Kantian position I have in mind the relevant unity 
concerns a particular unified way in which a self-aware rational subject conducts  her mental life.394 
For Kant, all thought—and all experience—requires such  self-conscious unification, as expressed 
in Kant’s “unity of apperception.” Further, I will argue that, on this understanding of 
representationalism, it is this unity of experience—and not a structure  associated with judgment—
that is critical to appreciating the role of content in experience. Accordingly, Gupta and Johnston 
are correct that sensory awareness is to be sharply distinguished from judgment, but the role of 
sensory awareness is not intelligible without the activity of the Intellect more generally. I moreover 
suggest this view yields a distinct sense of “concept” as it applies to experience, a sense not 
captured by Evans’ familiar Generality Constraint for concepts. 
I proceed as follows. §1 refers to a brief, late paper by Susan Hurley (Hurley 2003) to 
introduce a claim about the relation between experiential unity and content. §2 then introduces the 
idea  of  the  intellect  as  giving rise to a self-conscious unity. §3 describes a Kantian view of the 
393 To be sure, in Gupta’s case the relevant experiential ‘blending’ “[generates] phenomenology.” The present 
experiential unity I do not take to be phenomenal. 
394 I refer here to Kant’s view of the operation of “synthesis,” which Kant characterizes as (A77/B103) 
[the] action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their 
manifoldness in one cognition. 
As this characterization makes clear, for Kant the “togetherness” of representations depends on 
“comprehending” them in a unity. This self-awareness of unity will play a significant role in my argument 
below. 
201 
role of a “concept” in experience. §4 then turns to develop the sort of representationalism that 
follows, and specifically its treatment of the rational or justificatory role of content. §5 concludes 
by returning to the theme on which I started: a non-standard way of reconciling the idea that 
experience is distinctly sensory, with the idea that it involves a contribution from the intellect. 
Before proceeding to the body of this chapter, I should register a qualifying note. In 
exploring the idea of a “unity” proper to thought, I will, in broadly Kantian terms, spend some time 
exploring views that characterize the intellect in terms of an activity, and specifically the idea that 
that such acts “combine.” Just so there will be reason, both concerning thought and concerning 
experience, to speak of the “elements” of such combination. But in neither case should we attach 
much significance to this vocabulary specifically. The central suggestion ought not turn on 
commitments in the metaphysics of mind.395 The point is that both thought and experience partake 
in a self-conscious unity distinctive of the thinker, and that the idea of an intentionality common 
to both can be understood this way. 
6.1 EXPERIENTIAL UNITY 
The unity of conscious experience is a much-discussed and clearly multifarious 
phenomenon. There are such things as a single spatial visual field and a unified temporal 
experiential “flow.” Moreover, insofar as conscious experience can be said to have different 
elements or aspects, these “parts” can seem to exist against the background of a unified “whole” 
of conscious experience. In Michael Tye’s words, 
395 In keeping with the abstract topic of concern, “element” is intended to be less metaphysically committal than e.g., 
“constituent.” 
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The simplest hypothesis compatible with what is revealed by introspection is that, for each period 
of consciousness, there is only a single experience – an experience that represents everything 
experienced within the period of consciousness as a whole.396
For each type of unity philosophers have specified, it is controversial to what extent it must be 
granted; what explains it; and how it relates to other types of unity.397 
In this paper I will not engage these various disputes directly. For example, I will not isolate 
a type of supposedly phenomenally accessible unity, and engage the introspection-based dispute 
whether experience bears that unity, whether it does so contingently or necessarily, etc. 
Instead, I will take a more theoretical approach to experiential unity. Specifically, I will 
propose thinking of experiential unity in terms of a subject’s self-awareness in having a unified 
experience, the parts or aspects of which are enjoyed in just that way—as self-consciously parts or 
aspects of an experiential unity. 
To appreciate my approach to the relation between experiential unity and content, consider 
the following: 
Access Question: To what extent can a subject know of or access the unity of her 
experiential state? Could a state be (dis)unified in ways that exceed the subject’s 
ability to access that aspect of the state? 
This is an epistemological question of a sort: in order to suitably delimit a subject’s ability to access 
the unity of her experience, we must have some sense of what grounds the relevant  access. In this 
area, consider: 
Content Thesis: One mode of subjective access to the unity of an experience E is 
constituted (and consequently delimited) by the representational content of E.398 
396 Tye 2003, p. 97. I will in effect be giving an account of why it is that what Tye calls “introspection” yields a 
“single” experience. By contrast, I will not be committed to Tye’s view that there is only a single experience he 
identifies as “each period of consciousness” that time “between one state of unconsciousness and the next.” For 
discussion, see Bayne 2005. 
397 For some interesting disagreements in this area, see e.g., the work of Tim Bayne and Farid Masrour. 
398 Below I specify what sort of content this concerns. For the relevance of this being “one” mode of access to 
experiential, see my comments on “transparency” below. 
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My development of the Content Thesis will be the work of the sections below. But as a 
first impression of how to understand the claim, consider a version proposed by Susan Hurley 
(Hurley 2003). For Hurley, where the metaphysical facts concerning a state’s (dis)unity outstrip 
its representational content, consciousness could not make these facts available to the subject.399 
In an example offered by Hurley, consider two ways in which contents constituted of elements P, 
R and Q may be metaphysically unified: either the elements are “fully unified” in such a way  that 
any element is unified with any other element (P&R, R&Q, P&Q, etc.), or the contents are merely 
“partially unified” in such a way that two elements may not be unified with each other, even as 
they are unified with a common third element (P&R, R&Q, ~P&Q, etc.).400 For Hurley, the 
distinction between these two metaphysical structures is not subjectively accessible: in either case 
the subject’s consciousness bears a unity determined by its representational contents consisting of 
P, R and Q. 401 
Hurley’s claim has a certain intuitive plausibility. The representational content of a state is 
in some sense supposed to capture what a state makes available or conveys to the subject. Just so, 
one might think that a state’s content delimits the subject’s access to her state as a subjective unity. 
Now, this might suggest that representational content represents a state as unified. This is not 
Hurley’s claim: the state’s bearing content as it does is itself constitutive of the subject’s 
access to  the  state’s  unity.  This  will  also  be  the approach in this chapter: I will suggest that a 
399 Hurley puts the point in terms of the subject’s inability to discriminate states with different metaphysical unity 
structures. But Hurley’s argument cannot turn on distinguishability strictly, since as disjunctivists have shown, a 
subject’s incapacity to discriminate between states is consistent with the states’ metaphysical differences being 
relevant in subjective experience. Presumably Hurley has in mind subjective inaccessibility: where identical 
contents are concerned, (relevant) metaphysical differences could not amount to subjective differences. 
400 In Hurley’s definition, “Full unity requires that if two conscious states are co-conscious at a time, then each is 
also co-conscious with all the states the other is co-conscious with at that time.” (Hurley 2003, p. 72). 
401 In one way Hurley expresses the idea (2003, p. 74), “there is nothing it is like for experiences with the same 
content to be identical or different.” As this sentence shows, Hurley’s claim is not precisely the one I have in mind 
here, insofar as Hurley seems to understand subjective access in terms of phenomenal character. 
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state bearing representational content in a certain way is itself associated with the subject’s 
awareness of her state as a unity of a kind. 
I take the Content Thesis to fit one way of developing a “transparency” framework for  the 
subject’s knowledge of her experiential states.402 In general, the “transparency” idea trades  on the 
idea that the subject can access the character of her states not by a distinct “introspective” capacity, 
but simply by exploiting her experiences in a first-order way. Applied to perceptual experience, 
the idea is that acquiring knowledge of the character of experience requires the subject to merely 
“look outward.” As Gareth Evans expresses the suggestion (1982, p. 227): “[The subject] goes 
through exactly the same procedure as he would go through if he were trying to make a judgment 
about how it is at this place now, but excluding any knowledge he has of an extraneous kind.” This 
idea makes natural room for a view of perceptual content. Plausibly it is the content of experience 
that is isolated when the subject “tries to make a judgment about how it is at this place now, but 
excluding any [extraneous] knowledge.”403 Just so, it is plausibly the content of experience that 
captures the dual character of experience on the transparency view, i.e., the way experience at once 
serves as a basis for judgment and as a basis for a type of self- knowledge. But how this should be 
so has not been much explored. In this sense my present argument is intended to contribute to the 
transparency framework for self-knowledge. In my view, perceptual content is constitutively 
associated with the subject’s self-awareness of her experience as a unity. Self-awareness is 
accordingly  inalienable  to  the  idea  of   experience   as   (in the relevant way)   content-bearing, 
402 See especially the work of Matthew Boyle, esp. 2009, 2011. In this sense I should note that I am not committed 
to a strong version of Hurley’s idea. As understood through the “transparency” framework, the Content Thesis 
merely delimits a type of knowledge of a type of unity. In this sense, the Content Thesis is also consistent with some 
“transparency” views that self-knowledge is bifurcated between knowledge of such rational states as belief and 
intentional action and knowledge of other states, e.g., sensory states. (E.g., Boyle 2009.) Perceptual content delimits 
knowledge of experiential unity in the former sense, leaving open unity as an object for other modes of self- 
knowing.) 
403That is, for views on which experience carries content, which is Evans’ approach, and that of many supporters of 
“transparency.” 
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thereby providing one way of grounding the transparency approach. 
6.2 INTELLECTUAL COMBINATION 
I am here focused on conceptual perceptual representation. For sake of my exposition 
below, let’s accordingly focus on the most basic model of this idea, the idea that experience bears 
propositional contents (e.g., Searle 1983, p. 40). How should we understand this idea? 
On most traditional approaches, conscious states bear an act-object structure. Accordingly, 
many philosophers have found it natural to assume that experiences must in some sense be attitudes 
or relations to propositions. But recent literature has renewed interest in a classic alternative way 
of thinking about states that bear propositions as their contents. 404 
Propositional contents are distinctly intellectual: they are associated with a capacity for 
thought. But what is a capacity for thought? On the classic alternative, such a capacity is not 
associated with a relation to an item: rather it is associated with a specific type of mental act that 
constitutes a representational structure. Call this idea 
Activism: Propositional representation is constitutively associated with certain 
mental acts, i.e., the exercises of certain representational capacities.405 
404 Hanks 2011, 2013, 2015, Soames 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015. See also Susanna Schellenberg’s recent work: 
“perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. […] this view is in fact a version of 
representationalism.” (Schellenberg Manuscript, p. 16. To be sure, Schellenberg does not think of perceptual 
representation as propositional, but instead as constituted by the pre-conceptual exercise of “basic” or “simple” 
discriminatory capacities. 
405 For similar views, Locke 1975, IV and the logical work of G.F Meier. Arguably a more recent example 
is Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment (Russell 1913, p. 116.). For a defense of early modern 
activist views, Marušić 2014. 
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There are number of ways to construe an “activist” position, but on a classic development 
representational structures are understood as constituted through a type of mental operation that 
grounds a type of relation among various elements of a mental representation. For example, this is 
the view presented in the standard textbook of early modern logic, Arnauld and Nicole’s Port- 
Royal Logic of 1662. As that work states (Arnauld and Nicole 1996, p. 82) 
we unite or separate [ideas]. This is called affirming or denying, and in general judging. This 
judgment is also called a proposition […] It is not enough to conceive [the terms of the proposition], 
but the mind must connect or separate them. 
As  the  Logic here makes clear, on this view thought contents—propositions—are constituted by 
the   subject’s  introduction  of  either  of  two  relations  among  its  element,   “connection”   by 
affirmation, and “separation” by denial.406 
“Activist” views of propositional contents have been long dismissed for at least three 
reasons: (1) they seem to violate a reasonable context principle by construing full thoughts from 
more basic elements; (2) they seem to violate the content-force distinction by taking the application 
of a predicate to a subject term to involve an assertive element; (3) they seem guilty of a 
problematic psychologism in identifying representational contents with mental acts. Recently, 
however,   these   criticisms   have   been   either  rebutted,  or  in  the  case  of  the  content-force 
406 As will become clear, the Kantian version of the “activist” view must be distinguished from the description given 
by Arnauld by supposing that the intellect must always first combine. Consider Kant’s characterization of judgment 
as “comparing” various representations (R 4634, 17: 616), 
In every judgment, therefore, there are two predicates we compare to one another. One, which 
constitutes the given cognition of the object, is the logical subject, the other, which is compared 
with it, is called the logical predicate. 
Kant’s characterization of the judgmental act as involving “comparison” prefigures the demand for conscious unity 
discussed below (see further A260-1/B316-7). It is a central thought of German Rationalism, especially prominent in 
Wolff, that comparison requires a type of unified consciousness comprising the relevant representation: only against 
the background of representations united in a single consciousness is the appropriate sort of comparative act 
intelligible (Dyck 2014). For further discussion of Kant’s use of “comparison,” see Longuenesse 1998, p. 111ff. 
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distinction,   positively   accepted.407   Specifically,  Peter  Hanks  (2011,  2013,  2015)  and  Scott 
Soames (2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) have popularized what are effectively neo-activist views of 
propositions, including the idea that propositions are constituted by certain mental acts. As Peter 
Hanks has characterized this view (Hanks 2015, p. 4), 
[I reject] a picture of the relation between content and thought on which the contents of judgments 
have their representational features in a way that is explanatorily prior to the representational 
features of particular acts of judgment. […] Representations and truth conditions begin with acts  of 
predication, and propositions inherit their representational features from these acts. 408
I am not here concerned to defend Hanks’ or Soames’ versions of the “activist” view. For 
example, the view is clearly not appropriate to an account of perceptual representation: perception 
does not judge. Rather, my aim is to highlight a problem these views face in order to bring out a 
specifically Kantian version of activism, on which the relevant act is associated with  a type of 
self-conscious mental unity. To this end, I will present a few more details of Hanks’ program 
specifically.409 
For Hanks’ development of the activist view it is critical that propositions are constituted 
by mental acts that are (A) types and (B) complex, and which have as their tokens individual mental 
judgments or their verbal expression, assertions. Consider the following example Hanks introduces 
(Hanks 2011, p. 12): 
Suppose Ann asserts that George is clever. Ann’s assertion is a composite action; it is composed out 
of more basic actions. In asserting that George is clever, Ann refers to George and she predicates 
the property of being clever of him. 
Taking this example, we can understand Hanks’ view as follows. 
407 All three criticisms are familiar from Frege, while (2) specifically raises the Frege-Geach problem: propositions 
cannot be intrinsically assertive because they can be employed in non-assertive roles. But see Hanks 2011, 2015 for 
a view that positively accepts (2). Hanks proposes to avoid the Frege-Geach problem by introducing force-canceling 
contexts, as opposed to force-neutral contents. For discussion, Brigham 2017. 
408 It is significant that Hanks conceives of this act as “predication”: this will differ from the view of propositional 
acts expressed below, on which a grasp on the elements of thoughts (e.g., predicates) requires a prior grasp on a 
unified thought. 
409 I should qualify the discussion below: it brings in view what I take to be one aspect of a Kantian “activism,” but 
clearly stops well short of a proper account—I do not, for example, touch on the relation for Kant between self- 
consciousness and knowledge specifically. 
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(A) Propositions are types of actions because individual assertions can constitute tokens of 
the same propositional action-type. For example, Ann might assert that George is clever, but so 
might Betty. Indeed, the relevant type of action can be specified without being tokened. 
(B) Second, propositions are complex because they are composed out of more basic acts. 
Specifically, as Hanks continues to develop the view, propositions are actions consisting of a 
referential act and a predicative act, where predicative acts are in turn composites of more basic 
acts: acts in which a property is singled out (Hanks calls this “expressing” a property), and acts  in 
which the relevant property is applied to an object.410 Accordingly, the proposition in the example 
consists of three basic elements: (i) a referential act singling out George; (ii) an “expressive” act 
picking out the property “clever”; (iii) an attributive or “applicative” act of applying “clever” to 
George. 
Clearly this brief sketch is insufficient to evaluate the general merits of Hanks’ account of 
content. Instead, my purpose here is to raise a specific worry introduced by Jeff Speaks 
(Manuscript.) 
The worry concerns Hanks’ account of the “unity of the proposition.”411 If for Hanks a 
proposition is a complex act, then the various “basic” acts must cohere suitably. In an example, 
consider that it is a feature of Hanks’ view that propositions can be individuated by different ways 
of referring to the same item: say through the distinct types of referential acts A and B.412 Now, 
suppose I single out an item o by an instance of A. Suppose further that I, as part of the same 
propositional  act,  predicate  F  of  o. Now, as Jeff Speaks helpfully observes, whatever else goes
410 I take here the paradigmatic example of a singular proposition. Clearly different types of account are required for 
different types of propositions. 
411 As Speaks notes, this is supposed to be a problem particular to “activist” approaches to propositions, rather than 
simply the problem of the “unity of the proposition” in its general shape. 
412 The upshot of this feature of Hanks’ account is to provide a solution to Frege’s puzzle that does not posit modes 
of presentation. I do not here share Hanks’ opposition to Fregean semantics. 
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under “the unity of the proposition,” it includes the following: my propositional act is unified in 
such  a  way  that  in predicating F of o, I do so of o as singled out in way A. One way to put this 
point is that propositional unity rules out a certain identity question: that the predicative act 
concerns o, but leaves open whether it concerns o as singled out by the referential act. In  other 
words: the referential act and the predicative act are executed together in such a way that the 
character of the referential act “carries over” into the predicative act. In what follows I will refer 
to this relation between the elements of a propositional act as follows: 
Identity Condition (IC): Propositional unity includes a  common  identity between 
the elements of the proposition, such that the identity of the referential and 
predicative acts necessarily coheres. 
Speaks   does  not  himself  provide  a  way  of  addressing  (IC),  instead  noting  that  no 
straightforward account of (IC) seems forthcoming.413 Consider, 
(i) Co-exercise: The mere co-exercise of referential and predicative capacities does not 
ground (IC). Merely simultaneously engaging in A and predicating F of o does not meet 
ensure the act meets (IC). 
(ii) Causation: It is not clear that a referential act A causing the predicative act F of o 
suffices to meet (IC). But a causal relation does not obviously accommodate (IC.) After 
all, there may be a causal relation between A and predicating F of o while nevertheless the 
predicative act does not retain the identity of A.414 
413 The options (i) – (iii) below are those Speaks discusses. 
414 Hanks raises several more complicated problems for the causal view, including suitably rendering distinctions 
between complexes in which both A and B occur (e.g., , as uttered by Jeff Speaks, “I am chasing Jeff Speaks” and 
“Jeff Speaks is chasing me.”). 
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(iii) Intention: It would be problematic to introduce an intention to meet (IC) (e.g., the 
intention to predicate F of o as singled out by A.) Intentions are themselves states with 
propositional contents, and accordingly an infinite regress ensues.415 
I will here set aside attempts to accommodate (IC) on versions of (i)-(iii). Instead, I want 
to introduce a fourth alternative which will help illuminate a Kantian “activism,” and which seems 
to me plausible as an account of (IC): 
(iv) Constitution: In the relevant respect, the “unity of the proposition” is 
constituted by the subject’s self-awareness of engaging in a unified act that 
encompasses the full proposition, viz. thinking a thought. Specifically, (IC) is 
grounded in the fact that the identity of the referential act (A, say) is retained in  the 
predicative act in virtue of both acts being aspects of a single self-consciously 
unified propositional act. 
This way of approaching (IC) can seem difficult to parse, so let me develop the 
constitutivist suggestion in a few steps. 
First (iv) suggests, as seems to me natural, that the solution to the suitable coherence of 
sub-propositional acts lies in a further act, which spans the full propositional act. Hanks opts to 
render propositional acts as composites of sub-propositional acts. But there seems to me nothing 
counting  against  taking  propositions  to involve a distinct capacity for the relevant unity, which 
415 Speaks and Hanks do not themselves propose accounts of (IC), but both briefly consider the idea that 
propositions are “simple” or “primitive” acts, both concluding that this is effectively to abandon the explanatory 
benefits of the “activist” view (e.g., Hanks 2015, Ch. 2). In this sense, I take my suggestion of propositional acts as 
“unified” to be preferable. 
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has sub-propositional acts as its elements. 416 Indeed, it is natural to associate thinking a thought 
with the exercise of a single capacity, even as this capacity subsumes referential and predicative 
capacities. 
Second, the suggestion is that this single act is associated with an awareness of its own 
unity. This awareness is intended to be neither prehensive nor productive: the awareness does not 
grasp an independent unity, nor does it produce such a unity. The awareness is the unity. This 
phrasing may seem obscure, but consider that it delivers a natural account of (IC). The relevant 
“unity of the proposition” consists in the coherence of the subject’s referential and predicative acts. 
On the present view, this coherence is nothing other than the subject’s self-awareness of the 
coherence: the way when the subject predicates F of o, she predicates F of o as singled out by A. 
Accordingly, the type of unity captured by (IC) consists in the subject’s self-conscious “holding 
together” of the relevant elements as elements in a single act.417 
Third, (iv) spells out a distinct way in which the full propositional act bears the sub- 
propositional acts as its elements. Specifically, this relation requires recognizing a type  of 
priority of   the   full   propositional   act  over  its   elements.418   Consider  that  for   Hanks   sub- 
416 Hanks considers the view that propositions are “primitive,” but rejects the idea that such an account might 
provide genuine explanation of propositional unity (Hanks 2015, Ch. 2). But constitutivism at once takes the 
capacity for thought as primitive, and gives an explanation of propositional unity. (E.g.: Hanks casts the issue of 
propositional unity as the question how propositions are truth-evaluable unities. This may well be within an the 
capacity of an account of self-conscious judgment to explain.) 
417 Here it is also worth noting that the point here is not temporal, as if being self-aware of the relevant unity is an 
act of memory. In predicating F of o, the point is not that the subject recalls A. That is, I take it thinking a thought 
does not involve the temporally prior isolation of a referent and a subsequent predicative act. Instead, the order is 
logical. 
418 I was helped here by Stephen Engstrom’s compelling characterization of the part-whole relations distinctive to a 
self-conscious unity (Engstrom 2009, p. 99) 
So far as [self-consciousness] contains distinguishable components within it, they are originally 
related as components belonging to a single whole. We may call this unity the unity of thought. 
[…] The consciousness of the whole must accordingly precede the specific consciousness of the 
components, as the consciousness of the form of relation in which the latter stand to one another in 
the whole; and this consciousness in the form of relation, or form of the whole, must be in each of 
212 
propositional acts are “basic,” and full propositional acts are composites of such basic acts. On this 
picture, the idea of an act that suitably unifies the relevant “basic acts” to accommodate (IC) takes 
a broadly relational form, forging a suitable coherence-relation between its elements. But this is 
not consistent with (iv). The sub-propositional elements are “unified” because within their 
character is included a self-awareness of the unity of the full propositional act. That is, in her 
referential act the subject is self-conscious of engaging in one part of a single act, just as in her 
predicative act she is self-conscious of engaging in another part of the same single act. These 
properties of the sub-propositional acts accordingly presuppose the subject’s consciousness of  the 
full propositional act. Accordingly, there is a significant sense in which the capacity for the full 
propositional act is “basic,” and sub-propositional acts are derivative as its elements. 
Developed in this way, my suggestion is that the constitutivist approach to (IC) specifies 
one broadly Kantian way in we might understand the idea of a unity of thought, and of an intellect 
that “combines”: a thought content is self-consciously unified in a subject’s act of thinking. In the 
next paragraph I will note a qualification here, but here the account is sufficient to shed light on 
the association between a type of content and a type of conscious unity. Above I spelled out this 
connection specifically for conscious experience as follows: 
Access Question: To what extent can a subject know of or access the unity of her 
experiential state? Could a state be (dis)unified in ways that exceed the subject’s 
ability to access that aspect of the state? 
the conscious thinkings that make up the components, as what enables the latter to be conscious of 
themselves as component of the whole and indeed as components of the same whole. 
Engstrom here makes the point I try to articulate in the remainder of this paragraph: that for a self- 
conscious unity, parts inhere in the whole by including a self-consciousness being part of this whole. The 
parts of a self-conscious unity are accordingly not more “basic” than the whole. For more of Engstrom’s 
rich discussion see (2009, pp. 99-102; 2006, p. 10, and the discussion at 2013). 
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Content Thesis: One mode of subjective access to the unity of an experience E is 
constituted (and consequently delimited) by the representational content of E.419 
I will turn to experience below, but discussion so far illuminates the general association between 
content and unity I have been concerned to bring out. For contents of an intellectual sort, the 
attribution of the relevant contents to a conscious state itself specifies the subject as self-aware of 
the state as a unity of that sort. To that extent, the content of a conscious state is constitutive of the 
subject’s awareness of the unity of her state (that is, awareness in that specific way). 
The qualification is that (IC) at best isolates one aspect of Kant’s view of the self- conscious 
unity of thought. More specifically, it does not provide the reason for Kant’s insistence on the 
significance of “apperception” in the rational mind: the point of Kant’s association between self-
consciousness and thought does not turn on (IC).420 Critically, for Kant the unity of the 
propositional act—judgment—is not merely a matter of self-consciously stringing together sub-
propositional elements. Instead, the act is judgment, a putative act of cognition, and accordingly 
predicate and subject are self-consciously united by the subject under that aspect: as self-
consciously cognition. This will be relevant below, when  considering Kant’s  view of the role of 
self-consciousness in intuition: there, too, the unity of intuition must not be seen as  merely uniting 
sensory elements, but rather uniting under the aspect of self-conscious cognition. 
419 Below I specify what sort of content this concerns. For the relevance of this being “one” mode of access to 
experiential, see my comments on “transparency” below. 
420 Consider, for example, the way Kant specifies self-consciousness (“consciousness of myself as original 
apperception”) as a condition on empirical cognition (A117n): 
all empirical consciousness has a necessary reference to […] the consciousness of myself as 
original apperception. It is therefore absolutely necessary that in my cognition all consciousness 
belongs to one consciousness (that of myself). […] that all the varied empirical consciousness 
must be combined in one single self-consciousness is the absolutely first synthetic principle of all 
our thought as such. 
What Kant has in mind here is is not the unity of various representations as spelled out in (IC), but instead 
with “thought” in the form of acts of knowledge – the way empirical judgment is self-consciously based in 
experience. 
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6.3 KANT ON THE PERCEPTUAL CONCEPT 
My discussion so far has not spelled out a view of experience or its content: my focus has 
been on propositions as the contents of thought specifically.421 However, the centerpiece of Kant’s 
view of experience is precisely the relevant type of parallel. As Kant writes in two significant 
passages (B103/A79; B130): 
Thus the same understanding, and, to be sure, by just the same transactions by means of which, in 
the case of concepts, through analytical unity, it created the logical form of judgment, also, by means 
of the synthetic unity it brings overall to an intuition’s multiplicity, brings a transcendental unity to 
its representations. 
The combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and 
cannot, therefore, be already contained in the pure form of sensible intuition. For it is an act of 
spontaneity of the faculty of representation; and since this faculty, to distinguish it from  sensibility, 
must be entitled understanding, all combination—[…] be it a combination of the manifold of 
intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts—is an act of the understanding. To this 
act the very general title ‘synthesis’ may be assigned. 
The first of these passages contains a complexity with which I will not here be concerned, viz. 
Kant’s      description      of      the      way      the       “same       understanding”       that    “through 
analytic  unity  […]  created  the  logical  form  of   judgment”  is also responsible for the 
421 Consider, for example, Colin McLear’s recent line of argument in this regard that Kantian intuitions should not 
be seen as content-involving (McLear 2016a, p. 108; more generally: 2016b, 2015.) As McLear writes, 
the senses […] are incapable of bringing together ideas in the manner requisite to form a 
proposition—the vehicle of correctness—and thus cannot err. 
McLear’s argument here trades on two ideas: (a) for Kant the senses are passive; and (b) for Kant, content 
is the result of a self-conscious combinational act. McLear concludes that, in attributing unity to 
experience, Kant cannot mean the unity of thought, but must mean a distinctly non-intellectual, spatio- 
temporal type of unity (McLear 2015). 
However McLear’s argument fails on two grounds. It is true that for Kant the senses are passive, 
but this does not countenance the role of imaginative synthesis in experience (pace McLear’s non- 
conceptualism 2016a, 98ff.) Moreover, experiential synthesis need not itself be judgment for it to be 
significantly representational. A clue lies in the textual evidence McLear himself cites (Prol. §22 4: 304). 
The unification of representations in a consciousness is judging…thinking is the same as judging 
or as relating representations to judgments in general. 
While it is true that Kant places judgment center-stage in the idea of conscious unification, Kant explicitly 
allows this need not take the form of judgment, but can also be relating representations to judgment. This is 
a role a representational view of experience can play. 
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“synthetic unity it brings overall to an intuition’s multiplicity.”422 Instead, the important point is 
the common unifying function: “all combination—[…] be it a combination of the manifold of 
intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts—is an act of the understanding. To 
this act the very general title ‘synthesis’ may be assigned.”423 Note specifically that this 
combination does not concern the richer, arguably judgment-like notions Kant uses for experience 
(e.g., “experience” (Erfahrung) and “perception” (Wahrnehmung)), but instead explicitly concerns 
“an intuition’s multiplicity.” Accordingly, Kant’s suggestion is that the same self-conscious unity 
the understanding brings to contents in thought, it also contributes to Kant’s ground level notion 
for perceptual confrontations with objects: intuitions. The aim of the rest of this paper is to explore 
the consequences of this idea. 
The central idea is that Kant reserves a distinct notion of “concept” for the relevant 
“synthetic unity” of an intuition. As Longuenesse notes, Kant’s standard use of the notion of a 
concept is as a distinctively discursive representation: a concept is a “universal and reflected” 
representation (JL n2; A304/B360-61), which can serve as a “predicate of possible judgments” 
(A68-9/B93-4). But for Longuenesse, Kant’s discussion of the unity of experience introduces a 
second, distinctly experiential use of “concept,” which Kant identifies not with a reflected 
representation   or   a   predicate,  but  with  “consciousness  of  [the]  unity  of  the  synthesis  [in 
422 For a compelling discussion of both types of unity in Kant’s view of concepts and judgment, Newton 
Dissertation, Chapter 2 and 3. Note also here Kant’s opposition between “concept” and “synthetic unity,” which 
might seem problematic for my view—this is resolved by Kant’s twofold use of “concept” that I note below. 
423 To see that Kant appears to intend something like the account developed at (iv), recall Kant’s characterization of 
“synthesis” (A77/B103). 
[the] action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their 
manifoldness in one cognition. 
As this characterization makes clear, for Kant the “togetherness” of representations depends on 
“comprehending” them in a unity. This self-awareness of unity will play a significant role in my argument 
below. 
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intuition]” (A103-104). As Kant writes in the latter passage, referring a sense of concept to a 
preceding passage discussing the uniting of a series of sequential representations424: 
[this sense of] concept consists solely in the consciousness of [the] unity of the synthesis. The word 
“concept” itself could already lead us to this remark. For it is this one consciousness that unifies 
the manifold that has been successively intuited, and then also reproduced into one representation. 
This consciousness may often only be weak [...]; but regardless of these differences one 
consciousness must always be found, even if it lacks conspicuous clarity, and without that 
concepts, and with them cognition of objects, would be entirely impossible. 
The basis for Longuenesse’s positing of a “second concept” in Kant’s thinking is that the concepts 
mentioned in the passage’s last line (“concepts [that constitute] cognition of objects”) appear 
conditioned on the concept mentioned in the first line (“concept [consisting] in the consciousness 
of [the] unity of the synthesis”).425 For Kant, without “concept” as it figures in the first line, 
“concepts […] would be entirely impossible.” 
What then is the sort of concept that denotes a “consciousness of the unity of the 
synthesis”? Consider Thomas Land’s adaptation of an example Kant uses, concerning the type of 
unity of consciousness required in a mental representation of a line: 
To illustrate what Longuenesse has in mind [in her discussion of the second concept] consider one 
of the geometrical examples Kant mentions, viz. the act of ‘describing a circle’:  In drawing a circle, 
to apprehend what is before my mind as the representation of a single object, I must conceive of my 
act of drawing as a single act, in the sense that all the phases of this act belong to the generation of 
a single representation. I must not, for instance, forget that this is what I am doing as I move e.g., 
from the top right quadrant of the circle to the bottom right quadrant. More generally, during each 
phase of my activity I must think of this phase as being part of a more encompassing process; the 
process, namely, of generation the representation of a circle.426
On Land’s presentation of Kant’s example here, two features stand out. First, in drawing an 
analogy with successive “phases” of drawing a circle, it seems supposed that Kant’s holds a view 
of  experience  as a temporal succession of impressions (or as Kant describes it “the generation of 
424 Kant’s specific case here concerns the uniting of the sequence under a concept of “number.” The specific 
application of this example is beyond my scope here, though I below point out the abstract use Kant appears to have 
for the concept of number as it applies to the very idea of a “consciousness of an act of synthesis.” 
425 There is interpretative disagreement over whether Kant’s text genuinely requires identifying the consciousness of 
synthesis with a notion of concept (Newton Dissertation fn. 22). But for present purposes that disagreement is 
merely verbal. 
426 Land 2015, p. 24. 
217 
the multitude [in intuition] through this successive addition of one to the other” (A103-4)). Second, 
so conceived, Land presents the “consciousness of the unity of a synthesis” as the idea that “I must 
not […] forget what I am doing […] during each phase of my activity.”427 That is,  for Land it can 
seem that the creation of a “unity” from experience’s “succession” requires an awareness of on the 
part of the subject of herself as engaged in a single experiential act. 
But for present purposes I take it we can approach the Kantian thought as significantly 
more abstract. Critically, the point need not turn on attributing to Kant a view of experience as 
temporally successive.428 The point is that experience has a structure such that its “elements” – 
without here carrying a commitment to such elements being temporally successive – are 
characterized by a certain homogeneity: viz. as being elements of the subject’s experience. 
Consider the way Kant appears to express this idea by associating the relevant form of self- 
awareness with a notion of “number.” As Kant writes directly preceding the introduction of the 
“second concept” (A103-4): 
If, in counting, I forget that the units that now hover before my senses were successively added to 
each other by me, then I would not cognize the generation of the multitude through this successive 
addition of one to the other, and consequently I would not cognize the number; for this concept 
consists solely in the consciousness of this unity of the synthesis. 
In turn, as Kant specifies elsewhere (A142-3/B182): 
427 It seems to me that the temporal aspect of Land’s view is misplaced, Forgetting describes a failing in a distinctly 
temporally extended act, but the proper point is logical: any element of an intuition must be included within the 
same self-consciousness. 
428 Which would seem independently problematic, as e.g., the attribution to Kant of a type of sensory “atomism” 
(Golob 2011). See also Lewis White Beck’s critique (1978, p. 144): 
Kant assumes that the manifold of representations is always successive. This is certainly wrong. 
When I open my eyes I do not scan the visual field as if my eyes or my attention worked like the 
electron ejector in a television tube, aiming first at one point and then at an adjacent point. But as a 
consequence of his sensational atomism, Kant assumes that my apprehension does work in this 
way. 
If I have been right in describing the distinct character of a type of self-conscious unity, it is clear that this is 
inconsistent with “atomism.” 
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[number] is [….] simply the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition in 
general. 
Kant’s precise thoughts about succession and “number” are beyond my view here. But the abstract 
point, if my suggestion is right, is that the homogeneity of an intuition—its being constituted of 
parts belonging to a single whole, which accordingly are countable—consists in nothing other than 
the subject’s self-awareness in engaging in a single experiential act. That is, what grounds the unity 
of an experience is nothing other than the subject’s self-awareness of engaging in a unified 
experiential act—what Kant describes as “consciousness of the unity of the synthesis.”429 
Accordingly, my suggestion is that for Kant experience is conceptual in a distinct way: (i) 
the unity of experience is associated with “concept” as an expression of the self-conscious intellect; 
(ii) on the other hand, for Kant intuitions do not involve empirical concepts in a more standard 
sense—i.e., the type of “universal” representation that can serve as the “predicate of possible 
judgments” (A68-9/B93-4). 
6.4 PERCEPTUAL SELF-COMPREHENSION 
For the Intellectualist representationalist views on which I have focused, the motivation for 
representationalism is supposed to reside in some relevant commonality between thought and 
experience  as  states  of  subjective  consciousness.  Thought  and  experience  are in some sense 
429 Pace Golob (2011, p. 516) who understands awareness of homogeneity in terms of a “second-order capacity” 
allowing the subject to form “representations of our representations’ based on their shared properties.” On my view, 
consciousness of “homogeneity” does not concern an awareness of awareness-independent properties: homogeneity 
is nothing other than the unity of first-order self-consciousness. 
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expressions of the same capacity. I have sketched so far one way of thinking about this 
commonality. However, I have so far said little about experiential content. For example, consider 
the following concern about the view I have so far advanced, 
Suppose we accept that experience involves a type of intellectual self-awareness, 
or the “combination” of elements in a unified experiential act. Why should this 
entail that experience bears content? More specifically, even if it is granted that 
intuition involves a type of self-consciousness, this concerns a “manifold” of 
sensory experience, rather than the elements of a proposition. Accordingly, what is 
the association between self-consciousness and content? 
The worry here is the following. The idea of perceptual representation is supposed to attribute to 
experience a type of intentionality. But appreciating the role of self-consciousness in experience—
if this much is granted—appears to stop short of specifying a mode of  intentionality. What does 
self-consciousness mean for content?430 
The answer I give in this last section turns on appreciating the way experiential 
intentionality expresses perceptual rationality, on the conception that I have developed. That is:  at 
least for relevant types of content views, the theoretical grounding of perceptual representation lies 
in a conception of the way experience supports rational perceptual judgment.431 The aim of this 
section is to suggest that the above account of experiential self-consciousness provides such a 
conception: a way in which talking of experiential content can be part of an explication of 
perceptual rationality. 
430 Consider a related way to express the worry concerning my discussion of Kant: 
Perhaps it is plausible that self-consciousness is an aspect of a distinctly intellectual capacity. 
However, this does not display the connection between self-consciousness and the understanding’s 
representational function in thought. Accordingly, both experience and thought may be self- 
conscious. But it does not follow both bear representational content 
431 I maintain here my focus on specifically conceptualist views. For such views, it seems to me there has been a 
lack of clarity concerning whether anything further needs to be implied than an account of perceptual rationality. In 
one interpretation, characterizing experience as contentful just is to display experience in its rational role. In another 
interpretation, experience bearing content is a more substantial characterization of the metaphysics of experience— 
and can accordingly seem problematic on these independent grounds. The former is my preferred understanding. 
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To introduce the way content figures in my view, consider first two variants (A) and (B) 
that articulate a more standard understanding—I will then introduce (C) as my preferred 
alternative. As my discussion will make clear, (A) and (B) share a common way of conceiving of 
perceptual content, viz. as imposing a certain stricture or constraint on perceptual rationality: the 
justificatory power of some experience e is supposed to depend on representational content insofar 
as such content allows e to meet the relevant constraint. By contrast, in line with the view I 
developed in Chapter 5 above, on my suggestion an account of perceptual content serves to capture 
a distinct type of rationality which the subject displays in perceptual judgment: a rationality that 
centers on her perceptual self-comprehension.432 
(A) “Premise Principle”: 
Every perceptual experience that a subject enjoys is poised to justify perceptual beliefs. In order for 
them to play this role, (a) perceptual experiences must be the sorts of things that can stand in 
justificatory relation to beliefs, and (b) the subject must grasp the contents of perceptual experiences. 
Condition (a) is satisfied only if perceptual experiences (like beliefs themselves) have Fregean 
propositions as contents […] Condition (b) is satisfied only if the subject has a concept  for each 
item represented by her perceptual experiences.433
This passage presents the idea that perceptual justification depends on strong “content” and 
“state” conceptualist claims: perception must (a) bear propositional contents, and the subject must 
(b) possess concepts to articulate such contents Many philosophers have found (a) and (b) overly 
strong as demands on perceptual justification, so what justifies them? One option is, 
Strong Premise Principle: In order to epistemically support a belief that o is F, a 
visual experience needs to bear the structure of a premise supporting the conclusion 
that o as F.434 
432 Compare Travis 2013 for a treatment of the idea of content in terms of a “constraint,” one putatively restricting 
the simple idea that experience presents the subject with her environment. It is the idea of a distance between these 
two notions that I am currently attempting to dispel. 
433 Bengson, Korman, Grube 2011, p. 168 (capitalization, italics, numbering altered). Bengson, Korman and Grube 
hold a fundamentally bifurcated view of experience: perceptual relations to objects account for the phenomenal 
character of experience, while content accounts for perception’s justificatory character. This is fundamentally at  odds 
with my approach, on which the unity of experience is central to its justificatory character. For the association of 
perceptual rationality and experiential unity, Chudnoff and Didomenico 2015. 
434 See Pryor 2003 for this interpretation. For explicit adoption of this idea, Brewer 1999, p. 149. 
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But this seems uncharitable: experiential justification is not inferential. Alternatively, 
Weak Premise Principle: In order to epistemically support a belief representing  o 
is F, a visual experience needs to conceptually represent o as being some  way(s), 
where these are understood on the model of F. 
This may seem more modest, insofar as it merely demands rendering perceptual justification 
intelligible in terms of perception representing o as some way like F, which makes no reference to 
inference, and indeed does not require even perceptual representation of F (for example, a table 
may be presented as “brown” and as “rectangular,” but not as a table.). Nevertheless, many 
philosophers have continued to find even the modest principle unnecessarily demanding.435 
(B) “Reasons Principle”: 
(1) Perception supplies rational subjects with reasons for judgment. (Judgment is ‘rationally 
constrained by perception.’) 
(2) A rational subject’s reason for judgment must be a reason available to the reflection of the 
subject. 
(3) A representation with nonconceptual content would not present a reason available to the 
reflection of the judging subject. 
So (4) Perception cannot have nonconceptual content (not insofar as it is to 
supply with reasons for judgment, at any rate.)436 
This argument, presented by Matthew Boyle, is not to be identified with (A). What is relevant in 
this proposal is not any constraint on a supposedly “logical” role of experiential content as required 
for justification, but on its “reflective availability.” Accordingly, 
Reasons Principle: only conceptual contents can provide reasons available to the 
reflection of the judging subject. 
Nevertheless, to many philosophers (B), too, will seem overly demanding. Specifically, the 
argument   requires  a strong version  of  (2).  Consider that  a reason  for belief can,  in principle, 
435 Principally because other models of perceptual justification can be imagined. In this way, non-conceptualists 
conceive of entitlement the subject need not be able to comprehend conceptually (Hanna 2011, Burge 2003); 
relationalists often suppose that “conceptual recognition” of objects is sufficient (versions at Travis 2013, Brewer 
2011); and Gupta (2006) conceives of experience as altogether contributing in a different way to empirical 
rationality, viz. as on the model of an argument licensing transitions between “views.” 
436 Boyle 2016, p. 27 (numbering altered.) Boyle presents this as an argument against non-conceptual content, but I 
take it as an argument for conceptualism more generally. 
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simply be the conscious presentation of an object (Brewer Manuscript, Cunningham 2017). Is the 
conscious presentation of an object “available to the reflection of the judging subject”? On a weak 
reading of (2) the answer is yes, but then is not clear why (3) is true. Why could a non- conceptual 
presentation of an object not meet (2)?437 On a strong reading of (2), a conscious presentation of 
an object is not eo ipso available to the subject. Instead, only conceptual structures (belief-like, 
e.g.) are “reflectively available.”  But then it can seem overly demanding to require this type of 
“reflective access” from perceptual justification.438 
(C) “Self-comprehension” 
As opposed to varieties of (A) and (B), the view of content I prefer is less frequently 
made explicit.439 But consider, 
437 Boyle explicates (3) by writing that (2016, p. 28) “a representation with conceptual content is just a 
representation that actualizes conceptual capacities, where “conceptual capacities” are stipulatively defined as those 
capacities as those capacities that enable us to reflect on reasons.” But this risks rendering the debate vacuous: if 
conscious presentation of objects presents us with reasons, then this is a “conceptual capacity”—and therefore the 
consciousness bears conceptual content. But then why dispute conceptualism? 
438 One expression of the demanding character of Boyle’s conception of a perceptual reason is apparent from his 
response to the idea that that such reasons could be reflectively available through a process of ‘conceptualizing’ (Boyle 
2016, p. 29): 
consider this supposed act or event of ‘conceptualizing.’ […] Can I, who conceptualize my 
perception in a certain way, reflect on this act and see a reason for so conceptualizing, or can I not? 
It does not seem that I can see a reason for conceptualizing as I do, for what could this reason be? 
It cannot be the very reason the perceptual state itself was supposed to supply, for my ability to 
reflect on that reason was supposed to be the upshot of my conceptualizing, and so cannot be 
available to me as something I can see as my ground for this very act. […] But if my act of 
conceptualizing for which I cannot see a reason, then how can I regard the reflective thought that  is 
the upshot of this supposed to be the upshot of my conceptualizing, and so cannot be available to 
me as something I can see as my ground for this very act. 
For Boyle, if a perceptual reason R is the result of ‘conceptualizing,’ then this process of generating R must 
itself be grounded in some reason R*. But the above dilemma recurs. Either R* can consist in a consciously 
presented object, or such presentation would not qualify —but then it would seem overly demanding to 
require that conceptualization be grounded in perceptually-presented “reasons.” That is, where perhaps it is 
natural to suppose that perceptual judgment requires reasons of a robustly reflectively accessible sort, the 
same would not seem obviously true for a process of conceptualization. 
439 See McDowell 2013 for what I take as a content view developed in part along these lines. Consider also 
McDowell’s more recent remark, which does not explicitly specify a content view, but expresses the Kantian 
rationale for which Self-Comprehension stands (McDowell 2016, 314; italics original.) 
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Self-Comprehension Principle: a conscious experience bears a unity that is 
constitutively associated with the subject’s self-comprehending of her state as an 
experience. 
In effect, Self-Comprehension expresses the idea that the subject’s experience is self-consciously 
unified as I have described Kant as holding: just as a thinker is self-aware in thinking a unified 
thought, so her experiential consciousness includes a self-awareness of her unified experiencing. 
My suggestion is that this principle supports thinking of experience as contentful. 
As I have noted, attributing contents to experience expresses a view of the way  experience 
rationally contributes to judgment—the way experience can serve to justify belief. The Self-
Comprehension Principle specifies such a view. To illustrate, consider a feature distinctive of John 
Searle’s view of the contents of experience. Searle distinguishes experience from belief by 
describing the way “experience has a kind of directness, immediacy […] it gives us direct access 
to [the scene perceived]” (Searle 1983, p. 45). Searle then expresses this point by attributing to 
experience a distinct type of content (Searle 1983, p. 48): 
the Intentional content of the visual experience requires as part of the conditions of satisfaction  that 
the visual experience be caused by the rest of its conditions of satisfaction, that is, by the state of 
affairs perceived. The content of the visual experience is therefore self-referential.440
Accordingly, for Searle experiential contents are as we might say “causally self-referential”: 
experience  represents  a  certain  state  of  affairs,  but  it  also  represents the experience itself as 
the role of determination by the function of judgment, in the conception of intuitions [Kant] is 
putting into place, is to provide for the manifold given in an intuition to be brought into one 
consciousness. An empirical intuition as Kant is conceiving it here is, we might say by definition, 
something in which multiple sensibly given “representations”—elements in a sensory manifold— 
figure not as a mere multiplicity, an aggregate or heap, but as a unity self-consciously experienced 
as such. 
My suggestion here is that “a unity self-consciously experienced as such” spells out a way of thinking  about 
experience as contentful, viz. by associating the rational contribution of experience with the capacity for 
thought. 
440 Searle explicitly takes his causally self-referential contents to explicate the presentational conscious character of 
experience, i.e., the distinct way according to Searle “experience has a kind of directness, immediacy […] it gives us 
direct access to [the scene perceived]” (Searle 1983, p. 45). 
224 
by the relevant state of affairs. Searle’s suggestion has been roundly criticized (McCullough 1984). 
But my interest here is just to note the following: (a) Searle’s contents in effect express a 
version of Self-Comprehension; and (b) understood this way, Searle’s contents spell out a distinct 
way in which experience can support judgment. For (a) consider that Searle’s contents effectively 
spell out an awareness included within the experience itself as an  experiential confrontation with 
the environment: it is part of the experience itself that it (or its subject) comprehends the experience 
to be in effect a revealing of the environment. This is just  to spell out the idea that the experience 
includes an awareness of itself as brought on by the environmental state of affairs it represents.441 
Now this provides a version of (b). Namely, if it is within the subject’s experiential awareness that 
her experience is a revealing of her environment, i.e., if experience is a form of self-understood 
“direct access to [the scene perceived],” then the subject is thereby in a position to make suitable 
judgments concerning her environment: the scene is self-consciously presented to the subject’s 
ability to know. That is, the Self- Comprehension Principle presents a mode of perceptual 
rationality. 
But how does Self-Comprehension express a version of perceptual representation? The 
core suggestion is that the rational significance of experience resides in a unified experiential 
awareness of a type that is “conceptual” in Kant’s distinctive, second sense. Experience relates to 
the objects in the environment in a way it fundamentally shares with thought. Experience reveals 
the environment, and the heart of this type of relation to the environment is a distinctively 
intellectual form of self-consciousness. Experience could not reveal the environment if it were 
not  a   mode  of   self-consciousness.  A ccordingly,   experience  and  thought  share  a  form  of 
441 To be sure, Searle’s inclusion of causal language to express this point would not seem quite sufficient to 
accommodate his thought. The fact that a mental event with a specific content is caused by items specified by the 
content does not secure that the event is “presentational” in the way that figures in Searle’s explanandum; nor does it 
secure that that the state involves the environment in the right way, as shown by cases of “veridical illusion.” 
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intentionality: experience relates to the environment in a way it shares with thought, namely self- 
consciously. 
What does this mean for the idea of content? Recall: 
Representation-As: Perceptual representation is always representation as, insofar 
as the representing state presents some item o as some way F, in such a way that 
the representing state, simply in virtue of possessing this structure, sets accuracy 
conditions for the way o may or may not be (namely F). 
At the start of this chapter, I noted that the idea that experience bears this type of structure is 
typically considered essential to the idea that perception represents, and especially  its explanatory 
aims concerning perceptual justification and perceptual error.442 For example, I presented the 
commonly held representationalist view of perceptual justification as follows, 
1. Experience represents (some object in) the environment to the subject as some way F.
2. The subject accepts experience at “face value.”
3. The subject non-inferentially judges that (some object in) the environment is F.
However, nothing I have said about perceptual intentionality turns on experience bearing 
this type of articulate, judgment-like structure. Moreover, nothing turns on experience involving 
empirical concepts like F. If attributing content to experience is supposed to express a view of  the 
way experience contributes rationally to belief, then the rationality captured by Self- 
Comprehension does not fundamentally turn on the idea that a judgment involving F matches an 
experience involving F. What matters is that experience reveals the environment to the subject in 
a distinctly conceptual way, not that it articulates what is there to be found. 
442 I have noted that it does not seem to me the content view’s explanation of perceptual error need turn on 
Representation-As. What matters is that an experience in which the world seems self-consciously revealed can be 
defective. Now, clearly if experience does represent an F, and the experience is defective, then the experience 
erroneously represents the environment as including an F. But this is not to say that such a structure plays a 
fundamental role in explaining perceptual error. 
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But if not as on Representation-As, how might we express perceptual representation on 
my conceptualist view? It seems to me that within the conceptualist position I have sketched, there 
is room for significant flexibility. Consider some options: 
(i) The F is G. 
(ii) There is an F there before me. 
(iii) “this-such” 
(iv) “this” 
(i) – (iv) divide among significant debates about the character of perceptual epistemology. (i) and 
(ii) accept that experience represents using empirical concepts, while (ii) bears an ego-centric 
spatial structure as well as being existentially quantified. By contrast, (iii) requires the subject to 
bring her empirical concepts to what experience provides her proper. Finally, (iv) is a position in 
which any empirical concept use is a matter of exercising post-perceptual capacities on what 
experience provides. By my lights, however, any of these positions can capture a conceptualist 
view of the sort I have described: in each case the ascription of content to experience specifies the 
experience as enjoying a distinct type of rational status, namely as a state in which the subject is 
self-consciously confronted with her environment. Just in having content of a conceptual sort, the 
experiences are placed within the fold of the unity of self-consciousness, and accordingly, the 
character of the Intellect. Disagreements about the structure of content can be placed downstream 
from this more basic idea. 
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